Understanding ourselves better

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dc.contributor.authorBeck, Simon
dc.date.accessioned05/08/2014 22:00
dc.date.available05/08/2014 22:00
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractINTRODUCTION: Marya Schechtman and Grant Gillett acknowledge that my case in �The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View� (2013) has some merits, but neither is moved to change their position and accept that the Psychological View has more going for it (and the Self-Understanding View less) than Schechtman originally contended. Schechtman thinks her case could be better expressed, and then the deficiencies of the Psychological View will be manifest. That view is committed to Locke�s insight about the importance of phenomenological connections to identity, but cannot do justice to this insight and as a result fails to explain things that it should.en_US
dc.description.accreditationWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.identifier.citationBeck, S. (2013). Understanding ourselves better. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 20(1):51-55en_US
dc.identifier.issn1086-3303
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10566/1151
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.privacy.showsubmitterFALSE
dc.publisherThe Johns Hopkins University Pressen_US
dc.rightsCopyright Johns Hopkins University Press. Publisher granted permission to reproduce the article as published.
dc.status.ispeerreviewedTRUE
dc.subjectPersonal identityen_US
dc.subjectNarrative theoryen_US
dc.subjectPsychological continuity theoryen_US
dc.subjectLockeen_US
dc.subjectSchechtmanen_US
dc.titleUnderstanding ourselves betteren_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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