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Systematics of subtribe anthosperminae and the generic affinities of anthospermum l. and nenax gaertn. (Rubiaceae: Anthospermeae)
(University of the Western Cape, 2021) Nemando, Rangani; Boatwright, James Stephen
The last taxonomic treatment of the subtribe Anthosperminae Benth. (Rubiaceae, Rubioideae, Anthospermeae) was in 1986 by Puff., nevertheless, few attempts have been made to resolve the phylogeny and the inter- and infrageneric relationships within the subtribe. The genera Anthospermum L. (39 species) and Nenax Gaertn. (11 species) are considered the most difficult groups to distinguish. Anthospermum species are widely distributed in Sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar with the highest concentration of taxa in southern Africa, while Nenax species are restricted to southern Africa, in the south-western Cape Floristic Region. The two genera share common morphological and anatomical characters such as the growth form, presence of hairs on the stem, leaf arrangement, presence of petioles, flowers formation, dehiscence and presence of carpophore in fruits. currently combination of characters, woody shrub, needle-like leaves, few-flowered inflorescence and dioecy are considered unique in Nenax.
Personal identity and practicalities: Can non-reductionist theories guide our practical issues
(University of the Western Cape, 2024) Martin, Brandon John Emile; Beck, Simon
Non-reductionist theories of personal identity have become less popular than they once were. However, they are quick to discuss the implications of their theories on real problems, such as abortion, head transplants and other practical concerns. As I will go on to argue, I think they are too quick. I aim to show that non-reductionist theories cannot offer adequate guidance on our practical concerns, or if they do, they are severely limited in the kinds of guidance they can provide since their theories are compromised at either the metaphysical or logical level. Instead, I suggest that these theories focus on strengthening their positions before we can take their guidance seriously.
From chisungu to the museum: A historical ethnography of the images, objects and anthropological texts of the chisungu female initiation ceremony in the Moto Moto Museum in Zambia, 1931 to 2016
(Universty of the Western Cape, 2024) Mbewe, Mary; Hayes, Patricia
This study examines the processes through which sacred cultural practices and people were made subjects of ethnological studies. It considers these histories through a renewed examination of the contexts under which the chisungu female initiation ceremony of the Bemba-speaking people of northern Zambia came to be studied, and how the sacred belongings of the ceremony were collected and turned into objects of ethnography in museums. This project is conceived not only as a biographic study of these collections and their histories but is also a study of processes of meaning-making about cultural practices and people in a museum in Zambia, the Moto Moto Museum. Founded by the missionary Jean Jacques Corbeil in the 1950s, this museum had its origins in particular colonial contexts and was formalised as a national museum in the period after colonialism.
Personal identity, consciousness and a self-concept
(University of the Western Cape, 2024) Johnstone, Candice; Beck, Simon
With a universally agreed upon perspective towards personal identity yet to be discovered, philosophers continue investigating the metaphysical question of what it means for a person to be one and the same person over time. Current views include those offered by those in the Lockean tradition, who claim that who we are lies within memories (Locke, 1975), while Parfit (1984) furthers this view to require psychological continuity, or what he calls Relation R. In contrast, contributors such as Williams (1970) and Olson (1997a) postulate that bodily continuity is responsible for the sameness of self. Schechtman (1996) puts forward a more contemporary perspective emphasising a narrative view, particularly as a component of her combination theory. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the work of each of the above-mentioned theorists and expose the damaging charges their respective views of personal identity are confronted with. In the hopes of addressing the theoretical gaps we are therefore left with, I will propose my own view of where our personal identity lies, borrowing essential concepts from Locke’s use of consciousness and Schechtman’s narrative view and self-concept, highlighting that a person is required to be aware of their existence within the world.
Preferable to whom? A critique of david benatar’s anti-natalism
(University of the Western Cape, 2024) Steenkamp, Armand; Lerm, Jessica
Can we spare from harm those who will never exist? Well-known anti-natalist David Benatar believes that we can and that we should save future children from the harms of existence by choosing to never have them be brought into existence in the first place, arguing that non-existence is preferable. This discussion will ask: If existence is a harm and non-existence is preferable, then to whom is it preferable? My focus lies on this call-to-action Benatar brings to prospective parents through his anti-natalist position. Since his argument centres around the interests of the future possible individual, I argue that making any decision to deny their existence creates a paradox since we would act for the sake of someone who will, in virtue of that very action, never exist. This aligns with other contemporary objections made to Benatar’s claims. However, many of them only go so far as to attack the nature of harm itself concerning those who do not yet exist. My discussion will address the solution Benatar presents to this charge. In doing so, I will display how his Basic Asymmetry between harms and benefits is amenable to the positions of critics, specifically concerning justifying procreation for the sake of those who would experience an absence of benefits they would have otherwise gained by existing. I argue that Benatar’s dismissal of this objection on the grounds that it fails to constitute a deprivation for the person (and is irrelevant to their interests) is unsuccessful.