A note on revenue distribution patterns and rent-seeking incentive

dc.contributor.authorSadik-Zada, Elkhan Richard
dc.contributor.authorLoewenstein, Wilhelm
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-15T06:22:12Z
dc.date.available2019-10-15T06:22:12Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a simple model of rent-seeking incentive to explain the emergence and dominance of the rapacious rent-seeking policies in a number of oil abundant developing and transition economies. The Hubbertian distribution of the commodity exports over time, the magnitude of these revenues, and the availability of offshore havens for the illicitly appropriated rent explain the shift from productive public policies to rapacious rent-seeking. In addition, we show that the existence of the well-functioning democratic institutions prior to the revenue boom precludes the emergence of rapacious rent-seeking institutions due to prohibitively high costs of rent-seeking. The paper complements the existing literature by delivering a novel theoretical rationale for the predisposition of the oil-rich countries to the resource curse.en_US
dc.identifier.citationSadik-Zada, E.R. & Loewenstein, W. (2018). A note on revenue distribution patterns and rent-seeking incentive. International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 8(2), 196-204.en_US
dc.identifier.issn2146-4553
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.econjournals.com/index.php/ijeep/article/view/6078
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10566/5037
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherEconJournalsen_US
dc.subjectRent-seekingen_US
dc.subjectIllicit appropriationen_US
dc.subjectHubbert Curveen_US
dc.subjectOffshore havensen_US
dc.subjectPoint-source resourcesen_US
dc.titleA note on revenue distribution patterns and rent-seeking incentiveen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
6078-15802-2-PB.pdf
Size:
949.93 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
sadik-zada_rent_seeking_2018
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: