A social ontology of �maximal� persons
| dc.contributor.author | Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-07T11:40:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-10-07T11:40:17Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti�s twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in social reality. They argue that his account of �maximal� persons, rooted in African traditional thought?worlds, conflatesissues and ultimately involve him in a category mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed, and that Menkiti�s view is not in any predicament because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle�s account of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes, behaviours and practices are constituents of persons. Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging in a social ontology. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Oyowe, O. A. (2021). A social ontology of �maximal� persons. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 1�17. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12312 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1468-5914 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | 10.1111/jtsb.12312 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10566/6869 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Wiley | en_US |
| dc.subject | African | en_US |
| dc.subject | Conventions | en_US |
| dc.subject | Realism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Social ontology | en_US |
| dc.subject | Human attitudes | en_US |
| dc.title | A social ontology of �maximal� persons | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |