A social ontology of �maximal� persons
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Date
2021
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Wiley
Abstract
In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward
by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014)
denying Menkiti�s twin propositions that persons differ
ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in
social reality. They argue that his account of �maximal�
persons, rooted in African traditional thought?worlds,
conflatesissues and ultimately involve him in a category
mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed,
and that Menkiti�s view is not in any predicament
because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle�s account
of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes,
behaviours and practices are constituents of persons.
Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging
in a social ontology.
Description
Keywords
African, Conventions, Realism, Social ontology, Human attitudes
Citation
Oyowe, O. A. (2021). A social ontology of �maximal� persons. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 1�17. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12312