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A social ontology of �maximal� persons
(Wiley, 2021) Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony
In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti�s twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in social reality. They argue that his account of �maximal� persons, rooted in African traditional thought?worlds, conflatesissues and ultimately involve him in a category mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed, and that Menkiti�s view is not in any predicament because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle�s account of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes, behaviours and practices are constituents of persons. Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging in a social ontology.