Repository logo
  • English
  • Català
  • Čeština
  • Deutsch
  • Español
  • Français
  • Gàidhlig
  • Italiano
  • Latviešu
  • Magyar
  • Nederlands
  • Polski
  • Português
  • Português do Brasil
  • Srpski (lat)
  • Suomi
  • Svenska
  • Türkçe
  • Tiếng Việt
  • Қазақ
  • বাংলা
  • हिंदी
  • Ελληνικά
  • Српски
  • Yкраї́нська
  • Log In
    New user? Click here to register. Have you forgotten your password?
Repository logo
  • Communities & Collections
  • Browse UWCScholar
  • English
  • Català
  • Čeština
  • Deutsch
  • Español
  • Français
  • Gàidhlig
  • Italiano
  • Latviešu
  • Magyar
  • Nederlands
  • Polski
  • Português
  • Português do Brasil
  • Srpski (lat)
  • Suomi
  • Svenska
  • Türkçe
  • Tiếng Việt
  • Қазақ
  • বাংলা
  • हिंदी
  • Ελληνικά
  • Српски
  • Yкраї́нська
  • Log In
    New user? Click here to register. Have you forgotten your password?
  1. Home
  2. Browse by Author

Browsing by Author "Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony"

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Results Per Page
Sort Options
  • Loading...
    Thumbnail Image
    Item
    A social ontology of �maximal� persons
    (Wiley, 2021) Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony
    In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti�s twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in social reality. They argue that his account of �maximal� persons, rooted in African traditional thought?worlds, conflatesissues and ultimately involve him in a category mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed, and that Menkiti�s view is not in any predicament because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle�s account of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes, behaviours and practices are constituents of persons. Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging in a social ontology.
  • Loading...
    Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Thought experiments and personal identity in Africa
    (Cambridge University Press, 2021) Beck, Simon; Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony
    African perspectives on personhood and personal identity and their relation to those of the West have become far more central in mainstream Western discussion than they once were. Not only are African traditional views with their emphasis on the importance of community and social relations more widely discussed, but that emphasis has also received much wider acceptance and gained more influence among Western philosophers. Despite this convergence, there is at least one striking way in which the discussions remain apart and that is on a point of method. The Western discussion makes widespread use of thought experiments. In the African discussion, they are almost entirely absent. In this article, we put forward a possible explanation for the method of thought experiment being avoided that is based on considerations stemming from John Mbiti�s account of the traditional African view of time. These considerations find an echo in criticism offered of the method in the Western debate. We consider whether a response to both trains of thought can be found that can further bring the Western and African philosophical traditions into fruitful dialogue.

DSpace software copyright © 2002-2025 LYRASIS

  • Cookie settings
  • Privacy policy
  • End User Agreement
  • Send Feedback