Personal identity, consciousness and a self-concept
| dc.contributor.author | Johnstone, Candice | |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Beck, Simon | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-12-10T08:54:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-12-10T08:54:28Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
| dc.description.abstract | With a universally agreed upon perspective towards personal identity yet to be discovered, philosophers continue investigating the metaphysical question of what it means for a person to be one and the same person over time. Current views include those offered by those in the Lockean tradition, who claim that who we are lies within memories (Locke, 1975), while Parfit (1984) furthers this view to require psychological continuity, or what he calls Relation R. In contrast, contributors such as Williams (1970) and Olson (1997a) postulate that bodily continuity is responsible for the sameness of self. Schechtman (1996) puts forward a more contemporary perspective emphasising a narrative view, particularly as a component of her combination theory. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the work of each of the above-mentioned theorists and expose the damaging charges their respective views of personal identity are confronted with. In the hopes of addressing the theoretical gaps we are therefore left with, I will propose my own view of where our personal identity lies, borrowing essential concepts from Locke’s use of consciousness and Schechtman’s narrative view and self-concept, highlighting that a person is required to be aware of their existence within the world. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10566/19780 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | University of the Western Cape | |
| dc.subject | Personal identity | |
| dc.subject | Personhood | |
| dc.subject | Memory | |
| dc.subject | Bodily continuity | |
| dc.subject | Criterion | |
| dc.title | Personal identity, consciousness and a self-concept | |
| dc.type | Thesis |