Preferable to whom? A critique of david benatar’s anti-natalism
| dc.contributor.author | Steenkamp, Armand | |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Lerm, Jessica | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-12-10T08:39:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-12-10T08:39:30Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Can we spare from harm those who will never exist? Well-known anti-natalist David Benatar believes that we can and that we should save future children from the harms of existence by choosing to never have them be brought into existence in the first place, arguing that non-existence is preferable. This discussion will ask: If existence is a harm and non-existence is preferable, then to whom is it preferable? My focus lies on this call-to-action Benatar brings to prospective parents through his anti-natalist position. Since his argument centres around the interests of the future possible individual, I argue that making any decision to deny their existence creates a paradox since we would act for the sake of someone who will, in virtue of that very action, never exist. This aligns with other contemporary objections made to Benatar’s claims. However, many of them only go so far as to attack the nature of harm itself concerning those who do not yet exist. My discussion will address the solution Benatar presents to this charge. In doing so, I will display how his Basic Asymmetry between harms and benefits is amenable to the positions of critics, specifically concerning justifying procreation for the sake of those who would experience an absence of benefits they would have otherwise gained by existing. I argue that Benatar’s dismissal of this objection on the grounds that it fails to constitute a deprivation for the person (and is irrelevant to their interests) is unsuccessful. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10566/19747 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | University of the Western Cape | |
| dc.subject | David Benatar | |
| dc.subject | Existence | |
| dc.subject | Non-identity | |
| dc.subject | Anti-Natalism | |
| dc.subject | Procreation | |
| dc.title | Preferable to whom? A critique of david benatar’s anti-natalism |