The ethics of war, protest, and South African state-sanctioned violence

Abstract

Considering the multifaceted consequences of large-scale violence, could there be any circumstances that would provide sufficient moral grounds for the initial resort to war? These kinds of questions have formed part of the broad basis of Just War Theory (JWT) in moral and political philosophy. However, while a considerable number of philosophers have attempted to tackle the question of when, if ever, war is morally permissible, there seems to be a gap in the philosophical literature regarding the ethics of protest and intrastate- sanctioned violence, particularly in African philosophy. The first part of this project considers the historical philosophical literature on Just War, as advocated by Western philosophers such as Thomas Acquinas. In the crux of my project, I consider contemporary theories of Just War by philosophers such as Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan and Thaddeus Metz. I raise an objection of applicability to McMahan’s revisionist theory and similarly raise three problems for Metz’s African Relational Just War Theory in its application to a single case of intrastate violence in South Africa, the Marikana Massacre of 2012. The first objection addresses the Intersecting Communities Problem and questions Metz’s reliance on the partiality principle. The Initial Force Objection addresses the problem of not being able to identify an initial aggressor in the intrastate case, which is relevant to the question of defensive force. The Reconciliation Objection addresses the foundational principle of reconciliation in Metz’s Just War Theory, arguing for rehabilitation as the primary concern of post-conflict justice.