An analysis and critique of the conceptual relationship between selfhood and narrative in philosophy

Abstract

Narrativity is a popular concept with which to explain the concept of selfhood and the identity of the self in philosophy and other academic fields. It is a natural and easily accessible vehicle for selfhood in philosophy as fictional stories, and indeed the stories we tell about our lives, are instrumental in the way we understand the world and each other. This thesis will argue that some of the most influential narrative theories of selfhood fail to account for a complete notion of the experiencing subject as a fundamental part of the self. The argument will take two interconnected approaches. Firstly, to present the most well-established and defined concept of the self and experiencing subject from the phenomenological tradition in the work of Dan Zahavi. Then, secondly, and as the main thrust of the argument, will be to argue that these influential theories of narrative selfhood do in fact incorporate - either explicitly or implicitly - an experiencing subject; however, the consequences of doing so are not fully appreciated in these theories. It will then be possible to look at the consequences which must follow for a narrative theory of selfhood from the inclusion of a full notion of the experiencing subject. Doing so will help to resolve the current debate on why some narrative theories of selfhood are mistaken in assuming that the self is wholly narrative in nature. Furthermore, it will clarify the distinction between selfhood and personhood, showing that when selfhood is, mistakenly, expressed purely as narrative in nature it is easily confused with the identity questions pertain to persons and not the self. This thesis will conclude that the self does have an important relationship to the way we understand our lives as narrative, however, this relationship is much weaker than the narrative theories of selfhood offered by Marya Schechtman, Anthony Rudd, Alasdair MacIntyre and others claim.