This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino's Personhood in African Philosophy
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Date
2015
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Philosophical Society of Southern Africa
Abstract
The subject of personal identity has received substantial treatment in contemporary
African philosophy. Importantly, the dominant approach to personal identity is
communitarian. Bernard Matolino's new book Personhood in African Philosophy
enters into this discussion by way of contesting some of the assumptions underlying
communitarian approaches. His own critical assessment leads him to what I believe
is an unprecedented objection in the literature; the conclusion that communitarian
philosophers are involved in a category mistake when framing the question and
articulating the notion of personhood. I intend to present a brief summary of the
chapters of the book and reflect on some of the main philosophical issues that the
book provokes, noting what I take to be refreshing insights that Matolino brings to
the discussion while also engaging critically with the ones I find most contentious.
In particular, I briefly assess Matolino's implicit suggestion that an Akan inspired
quasi-physicalist account of mind avoids the mind-body interaction problem; I
object to the category mistake charge on behalf of communitarians; and lastly, I raise
questions about, and propose ways Matolino can refine, his proposal concerning
a new way of thinking about personhood, which goes under the rubric of Limited
Communitarianism.
Description
Keywords
Communitarianism, Personal identity, Matolino
Citation
O.A. Oyowe. (2015). This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino's Personhood in African Philosophy. South African Journal of Philosophy, 34(4): 504-515