Browsing by Author "Lerm, Jessica"

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    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction: my two sense(s)
    (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2013) Lerm, Jessica
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is very well established and widely employed in the metaethical literature. However, I argue that there are actually two different senses of the distinction at large: the hetero-/homogeneous sense and the dependence/independence sense. The traditional, unqualified distinction ought, therefore, to be amended, with each use of the distinction being stipulated as used in either the hetero-/homogeneous sense or the dependence/independence sense. Careful analysis of various metaethics supports that there are these two senses - analysis, in particular, of a neo-Kantian metaethic, according to which reasons are agent-relative in the dependence sense but agent-neutral in the homogeneous sense, and - perhaps surprisingly - of Utilitarianism, according to which reasons are agent-neutral in the independence sense but agent-relative in the heterogeneous sense.
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    Anti-natalism and internalism
    (University of the Western Cape, 2023) Collison, Miles; Lerm, Jessica
    Is it morally permissible to bring children into existence? We often go our whole lives never asking ourselves this question, since procreation and parenthood are societal norms. However, a local (and controversial) philosopher, David Benatar, thinks there are strong philosophical reasons to abstain from procreation. In his book, Better Never to Have Been, he presents the argument that bringing children into existence is morally impermissible on account that coming into existence is always a harm. This argument has been met with much criticism and scrutiny, thus producing a great deal of contemporary literature. One more recent critic is Nicholas Smyth. His claim, as opposed to the many others who have focused on the small details of Benatar�s work, is more deeply fundamental; Smyth claims that Benatar, as well as the procreation ethicists who have gone on to discuss his work, are not doing ethics at all.
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    Preferable to whom? A critique of david benatar’s anti-natalism
    (University of the Western Cape, 2024) Steenkamp, Armand; Lerm, Jessica
    Can we spare from harm those who will never exist? Well-known anti-natalist David Benatar believes that we can and that we should save future children from the harms of existence by choosing to never have them be brought into existence in the first place, arguing that non-existence is preferable. This discussion will ask: If existence is a harm and non-existence is preferable, then to whom is it preferable? My focus lies on this call-to-action Benatar brings to prospective parents through his anti-natalist position. Since his argument centres around the interests of the future possible individual, I argue that making any decision to deny their existence creates a paradox since we would act for the sake of someone who will, in virtue of that very action, never exist. This aligns with other contemporary objections made to Benatar’s claims. However, many of them only go so far as to attack the nature of harm itself concerning those who do not yet exist. My discussion will address the solution Benatar presents to this charge. In doing so, I will display how his Basic Asymmetry between harms and benefits is amenable to the positions of critics, specifically concerning justifying procreation for the sake of those who would experience an absence of benefits they would have otherwise gained by existing. I argue that Benatar’s dismissal of this objection on the grounds that it fails to constitute a deprivation for the person (and is irrelevant to their interests) is unsuccessful.
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    The de dicto account of moral worth
    (University of the Western Cape, 2025) Lerm, Jessica
    The de re/de dicto debate takes as its starting point the observation that not all morally correct actions have moral worth; the agent has to act for the right reasons in order to be morally praiseworthy. According to the traditional de dicto view, the “right reason” is that the agent recognises that the action is the morally correct one, that it falls under the description “…is morally right”; whereas, according to the de re view that has recently supplanted it, the “right reason” is that the agent recognises the action’s right-making features, the reasons that make the action right in the first place. The de re view currently holds sway, with Nomy Arpaly being its main advocate. Many of the key arguments in the de re/de dicto literature appeal to thought experiments, such as Arpaly’s Huck Finn and Williams’ ‘one thought too many’. However, several experimental philosophers, such as Edouard Machery, have critiqued traditional analytic philosophy’s reliance on thought experiments. For this reason, I designed a simple study to empirically test our de re/de dicto intuitions. This is the first time this literature has been subjected to empirical testing. Over one hundred participants of a range of ages, races, genders and familiarity with formal Philosophy were polled randomly. The results are presented in this paper. As we will see, though the de re view continues to be the predominant one amongst contemporary philosophers, empirical testing reveals that there is more intuitive support for the de dicto view than the literature has assumed. I hope in this paper to show that the traditional, de dicto account of moral worth deserves a second chance.