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  1. Home
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Browsing by Author "Juta, Sinozuko"

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    Erosion of presidential term limits in practice: a comparative study of unconstitutional constitutional amendments in African states
    (University of the Western Cape, 2023) Juta, Sinozuko; Fessha, Yonatan
    Tracing the constitutional strategies of incumbents in African countries, the study documents the range of constitutional strategies these incumbents have pursued when they reached the end of their prescribed term to remain in office. The study shows that in many African countries amendments are frequently passed by following formal democratic procedures but result in anti-democratic constitutional outcomes, helping powerful presidents extend their term in office. The incumbents universally display nominal respect for the constitution by using constitutional rules and procedures to circumvent term limits, abusing the numerical advantages of two-thirds attempting to amend the constitution. The study presents the unconstitutional constitutional amendments doctrine as an institutional device for preventing a coup by constitutional means to erode term limits. Limiting the power of constitutional amendment can have clear democratic benefits. One way to do this is via a judicially enforceable unconstitutional constitutional amendments doctrine. The study establishes how judiciaries across jurisdictions have successfully deployed the unconstitutional constitutional amendments doctrine to prevent attempts of term limit evasion.

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