Department of Philosophy

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Browsing by Author "Lerm, Jessica"

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    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction: my two sense(s)
    (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2013) Lerm, Jessica
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is very well established and widely employed in the metaethical literature. However, I argue that there are actually two different senses of the distinction at large: the hetero-/homogeneous sense and the dependence/independence sense. The traditional, unqualified distinction ought, therefore, to be amended, with each use of the distinction being stipulated as used in either the hetero-/homogeneous sense or the dependence/independence sense. Careful analysis of various metaethics supports that there are these two senses - analysis, in particular, of a neo-Kantian metaethic, according to which reasons are agent-relative in the dependence sense but agent-neutral in the homogeneous sense, and - perhaps surprisingly - of Utilitarianism, according to which reasons are agent-neutral in the independence sense but agent-relative in the heterogeneous sense.
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    Anti-natalism and internalism
    (University of the Western Cape, 2023) Collison, Miles; Lerm, Jessica
    Is it morally permissible to bring children into existence? We often go our whole lives never asking ourselves this question, since procreation and parenthood are societal norms. However, a local (and controversial) philosopher, David Benatar, thinks there are strong philosophical reasons to abstain from procreation. In his book, Better Never to Have Been, he presents the argument that bringing children into existence is morally impermissible on account that coming into existence is always a harm. This argument has been met with much criticism and scrutiny, thus producing a great deal of contemporary literature. One more recent critic is Nicholas Smyth. His claim, as opposed to the many others who have focused on the small details of Benatar�s work, is more deeply fundamental; Smyth claims that Benatar, as well as the procreation ethicists who have gone on to discuss his work, are not doing ethics at all.