Department of Philosophy

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Am I my brother�s keeper? on personal identity and responsibility
(Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2013) Beck, Simon;
The psychological continuity theory of personal identity has recently been accused of not meeting what is claimed to be a fundamental requirement on theories of identity - to explain personal moral responsibility. Although they often have much to say about responsibility, the charge is that they cannot say enough. I set out the background to the charge with a short discussion of Locke and the requirement to explain responsibility, then illustrate the accusation facing the theory with details from Marya Schechtman. I aim some questions at the challengers' reading of Locke, leading to an argument that the psychological continuity theory can say all that it needs to say about responsibility, and so is not in any grave predicament, at least not with regard to this particular charge.
Can Armstrong cope with Libet�s challenge?
(University of the Western Cape, 2020) Hattas, Nihahl; Beck, Simon
According to our ordinary conception of voluntary action, our actions are the causal result of conscious intentions. To take a very basic example: I wish to take a sip of coffee, and I therefore reach out and take hold of the mug. However, studies performed by Libet challenge this ordinary conception. What Libet found in his experiments was that the brain initiates voluntary actions and the person becomes consciously aware of an intention to act only some 400 msec after the brain�s initiation; for instance, my brain has already initiated the process of causing my arm to reach out and take hold of the mug some 400 msec before I am aware that I wish to take a sip of coffee. That is, conscious intention doesn�t appear to precede voluntary action at all � it actually follows it (or follows its initiation, at least), and thus Libet�s studies present a serious challenge to our ordinary conception of voluntary action. This project will investigate whether a particular theory of mind � namely, Armstrong�s Central State Materialism � can cope with the challenge posed by Libet�s studies and salvage our ordinary conception of voluntary action. Armstrong�s theory appears promising in this regard because his account of consciousness and introspection as higher-order states seems to allow room that we will become aware of our willings only after those willings are already initiated.
A Critical Study of Doubt (Shakk) and Certainty (Yaq?n) in Ghaz?l?�s Epistemology
(University of the Western Cape, 2021) Mohamed, Nabil Yasien; Beck, Simon
Our secular age is a period of scepticism and ubiquitous doubt. The epistemology of a paradigmatic figure like Ab? ??mid al-Ghaz?l? (1058-1111) is central to Islamic intellectual thought, but also speaks to our modern world. In this research dissertation we embark on a critical study of doubt (shakk) and certainty (yaq?n) in Ghaz?l?�s epistemology. We ask, what is the nature and function of doubt, and how do we best acquire truth and certainty according to Ghaz?l?? In our evaluation of scepticism in Ghaz?l?�s epistemology, we analyse the notion of existential doubt and his methodological doubt. In the latter, we look at his scepticism of the methods of knowing as a means to establish the foundations of knowledge. Also, we look at his scepticism as an instrument to cast doubt upon heterodox doctrines and show the limitations of philosophical logic. In this study we assess Ghaz?l?�s attitude to philosophical demonstration and Sufism as a means to certainty. In early scholarship surrounding Ghaz?l?, it was assumed that he was a vehement adversary to philosophy. On the other hand, in much of contemporary scholarship, Ghaz?l? has been understood to give preference to philosophy as the ultimate means to certainty, undermining the place of Sufism. In this study we evaluate these claims; we argue that he was not antagonistic to philosophy and regarded it as a legitimate approach to certainty, but recognised Sufism as a superior approach. Much of previous scholarship has either focused on Ghaz?l? as a Sufi or a philosopher; we attempt to embark on a parallel approach in which we acknowledge each discipline in its right place within Ghaz?l?�s epistemology. Thus, in analysing Ghaz?l?�s approach to acquiring certainty, we evaluate his foundationalism, his attitude to authoritative instruction (ta?lim), and the place of philosophical demonstration and Sufism.
Exploring the philosophical mind: An empirical investigation of the process of philosophizing using the protocol analysis methodology
(University of Western Cape, 2019) Seakgwa, Kyle Vuyani Tiiso; Beck, Simon
Many empirically supported versions of stage and componential models of the cognitive processing underlying the completion of various tasks spanning a wide range of domains have been developed by cognitive scientists of various kinds. These include models of scientific (e.g. Dunbar 1999), mathematical (e.g. Schoenfeld 1985), artistic (e.g. Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976), engineering (e.g. Purzer et al 2018), legal (e.g. Ronkainen 2011), medical (e.g. Vimla et al 2012) and even culinary cognition (e.g. Stierand and D�rfler 2015) (and this list is nowhere near exhaustive). Yet, despite the existence of fields such as experimental and metaphilosophy which take philosophy as their object, often by using methods from the cognitive sciences, a stage or componential model of philosophizing is conspicuously missing from even an exhaustive list of the kind just produced.
The extreme claim, psychological continuity and the person life view
(Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2015) Beck, Simon
Marya Schechtman has raised a series of worries for the Psychological Continuity Theory of personal identity (PCT) stemming from what Derek Parfit called the 'Extreme Claim'. This is roughly the claim that theories like it are unable to explain the importance we attach to personal identity. In her recent Staying Alive (2014), she presents further arguments related to this and sets out a new narrative theory, the Person Life View (PLV), which she sees as solving the problems as well as bringing other advantages over the PCT. I look over some of her earlier arguments and responses to them as a way in to the new issues and theory. I will argue that the problems for the PCT and advantages that the PLV brings are all merely apparent, and present no reason for giving up the former for the latter.
The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View
(The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013) Beck, Simon
Marya Schechtman has argued that contemporary attempts to save Locke�s account of personal identity suffer the same faults that are to be found in Locke, among which is an inability to capture the role our unconscious states play. To avoid these problems, she advocates giving up the mainstream Psychological View and adopting a narrative account like her �Self-Understanding� View that, she claims, has the further virtue of maintaining important insights from Locke. My paper argues that it is misleading to understand the Psychological View as sharing Locke�s commitments and that (partly as a result) Schechtman has not isolated a problem that needs fixing or any reason for going narrative. It further argues that the Self-Understanding View is a great deal more at odds with Locke�s view than Schechtman cares to acknowledge.
Rawls, the severely cognitively disabled and the person life view
(University of the Western Cape, 2015) Seale, Wade; Beck, Simon
A political arrangement is an arrangement for persons. Political arrangements are assessed in terms of the extent to which they manage the affairs of persons, which includes protecting their interests and entitlements. Political arrangements which are unable to protect the interests of its citizens, or a group of citizens, are deemed unacceptable, and where appropriate, alternative arrangements which do protect the interests and entitlements of its citizens are sought. In this thesis I argue that the political arrangement of John Rawls is unable to protect the interests and entitlements of the severely cognitively disabled who are regarded as full citizens by advanced political arrangements in the world today. I argue that it is the contract nature and conception of the person in Rawls�s system which excludes the severely cognitively disabled. This exclusion goes against our widely-held intuitions about the rights and entitlements of the severely cognitively disabled. I look to the Person Life View of Marya Schechtman, a conception of the person that includes the severely cognitively disabled, to see if a conception of the person that includes the severely cognitively disabled is able to solve the gap in Rawls�s system. I argue that it is not able to do so. I then propose a new way of approaching questions of personhood and appeal to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the basis, arguing that membership of a type of organism typically considered a person is enough to be a complete member of that type and therefore a person.
Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner
(Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2016) Beck, Simon
Nils-Frederic Wagner takes issue with my argument that influential critics of �transplant� thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are rather on my part, in that I have not taken into account the conceptual genesis of personhood, that my view of thought experiments is idiosyncratic and possibly self-defeating, and in that I have ignored important empirical evidence about the relationship between brains and minds. I argue that my case still stands and that transplant thought experiments can do damage to rivals of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity like Marya Schechtman�s Person Life View.
Technological fictions and personal identity: on Ricoeur, Schechtman and analytic thought experiments
(Taylor & Francis, 2016) Beck, Simon
It is notable when philosophers in one tradition take seriously the work in another and engage with it. This is certainly the case when Paul Ricoeur engages with the thought of Derek Parfit on personal identity. He sees it as worth engaging with, but as emblematic of errors in the analytic approach to the topic, especially when it comes to methodology. But he is, in a fairly clear way, taking the analytic debate on its own terms. Marya Schechtman�s work is also noteworthy in this regard. Although she writes in the analytic tradition, in many ways she has represented thinking like Ricoeur�s in the tradition � pressing concerns that echo his, and demanding that the debate needs to take notice. I will focus on complaints that both of them present, which I think are closely related, about the thought experiments that feature large in analytic discussions of personal identity, especially in the seminal work of Parfit. The complaints relate both to those devices and to the theory they have produced. I want to offer something of a defence of both.
Thought experiments and personal identity in Africa
(Cambridge University Press, 2021) Beck, Simon; Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony
African perspectives on personhood and personal identity and their relation to those of the West have become far more central in mainstream Western discussion than they once were. Not only are African traditional views with their emphasis on the importance of community and social relations more widely discussed, but that emphasis has also received much wider acceptance and gained more influence among Western philosophers. Despite this convergence, there is at least one striking way in which the discussions remain apart and that is on a point of method. The Western discussion makes widespread use of thought experiments. In the African discussion, they are almost entirely absent. In this article, we put forward a possible explanation for the method of thought experiment being avoided that is based on considerations stemming from John Mbiti�s account of the traditional African view of time. These considerations find an echo in criticism offered of the method in the Western debate. We consider whether a response to both trains of thought can be found that can further bring the Western and African philosophical traditions into fruitful dialogue.
Transplant thought-experiments: Two costly mistakes in discounting them
(Taylor & Francis, 2014) Beck, Simon
�Transplant� thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory�s opponents.
Understanding ourselves better
(The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013) Beck, Simon
INTRODUCTION: Marya Schechtman and Grant Gillett acknowledge that my case in �The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View� (2013) has some merits, but neither is moved to change their position and accept that the Psychological View has more going for it (and the Self-Understanding View less) than Schechtman originally contended. Schechtman thinks her case could be better expressed, and then the deficiencies of the Psychological View will be manifest. That view is committed to Locke�s insight about the importance of phenomenological connections to identity, but cannot do justice to this insight and as a result fails to explain things that it should.

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