Magister Artium - MA (Philosophy)

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Browsing by Author "Beck, Simon"

Now showing 1 - 6 of 6
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    Can Armstrong cope with Libet�s challenge?
    (University of the Western Cape, 2020) Hattas, Nihahl; Beck, Simon
    According to our ordinary conception of voluntary action, our actions are the causal result of conscious intentions. To take a very basic example: I wish to take a sip of coffee, and I therefore reach out and take hold of the mug. However, studies performed by Libet challenge this ordinary conception. What Libet found in his experiments was that the brain initiates voluntary actions and the person becomes consciously aware of an intention to act only some 400 msec after the brain�s initiation; for instance, my brain has already initiated the process of causing my arm to reach out and take hold of the mug some 400 msec before I am aware that I wish to take a sip of coffee. That is, conscious intention doesn�t appear to precede voluntary action at all � it actually follows it (or follows its initiation, at least), and thus Libet�s studies present a serious challenge to our ordinary conception of voluntary action. This project will investigate whether a particular theory of mind � namely, Armstrong�s Central State Materialism � can cope with the challenge posed by Libet�s studies and salvage our ordinary conception of voluntary action. Armstrong�s theory appears promising in this regard because his account of consciousness and introspection as higher-order states seems to allow room that we will become aware of our willings only after those willings are already initiated.
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    A Critical Study of Doubt (Shakk) and Certainty (Yaq?n) in Ghaz?l?�s Epistemology
    (University of the Western Cape, 2021) Mohamed, Nabil Yasien; Beck, Simon
    Our secular age is a period of scepticism and ubiquitous doubt. The epistemology of a paradigmatic figure like Ab? ??mid al-Ghaz?l? (1058-1111) is central to Islamic intellectual thought, but also speaks to our modern world. In this research dissertation we embark on a critical study of doubt (shakk) and certainty (yaq?n) in Ghaz?l?�s epistemology. We ask, what is the nature and function of doubt, and how do we best acquire truth and certainty according to Ghaz?l?? In our evaluation of scepticism in Ghaz?l?�s epistemology, we analyse the notion of existential doubt and his methodological doubt. In the latter, we look at his scepticism of the methods of knowing as a means to establish the foundations of knowledge. Also, we look at his scepticism as an instrument to cast doubt upon heterodox doctrines and show the limitations of philosophical logic. In this study we assess Ghaz?l?�s attitude to philosophical demonstration and Sufism as a means to certainty. In early scholarship surrounding Ghaz?l?, it was assumed that he was a vehement adversary to philosophy. On the other hand, in much of contemporary scholarship, Ghaz?l? has been understood to give preference to philosophy as the ultimate means to certainty, undermining the place of Sufism. In this study we evaluate these claims; we argue that he was not antagonistic to philosophy and regarded it as a legitimate approach to certainty, but recognised Sufism as a superior approach. Much of previous scholarship has either focused on Ghaz?l? as a Sufi or a philosopher; we attempt to embark on a parallel approach in which we acknowledge each discipline in its right place within Ghaz?l?�s epistemology. Thus, in analysing Ghaz?l?�s approach to acquiring certainty, we evaluate his foundationalism, his attitude to authoritative instruction (ta?lim), and the place of philosophical demonstration and Sufism.
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    Exploring the philosophical mind: An empirical investigation of the process of philosophizing using the protocol analysis methodology
    (University of Western Cape, 2019) Seakgwa, Kyle Vuyani Tiiso; Beck, Simon
    Many empirically supported versions of stage and componential models of the cognitive processing underlying the completion of various tasks spanning a wide range of domains have been developed by cognitive scientists of various kinds. These include models of scientific (e.g. Dunbar 1999), mathematical (e.g. Schoenfeld 1985), artistic (e.g. Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976), engineering (e.g. Purzer et al 2018), legal (e.g. Ronkainen 2011), medical (e.g. Vimla et al 2012) and even culinary cognition (e.g. Stierand and D�rfler 2015) (and this list is nowhere near exhaustive). Yet, despite the existence of fields such as experimental and metaphilosophy which take philosophy as their object, often by using methods from the cognitive sciences, a stage or componential model of philosophizing is conspicuously missing from even an exhaustive list of the kind just produced.
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    Personal identity and practicalities: Can non-reductionist theories guide our practical issues
    (University of the Western Cape, 2024) Martin, Brandon John Emile; Beck, Simon
    Non-reductionist theories of personal identity have become less popular than they once were. However, they are quick to discuss the implications of their theories on real problems, such as abortion, head transplants and other practical concerns. As I will go on to argue, I think they are too quick. I aim to show that non-reductionist theories cannot offer adequate guidance on our practical concerns, or if they do, they are severely limited in the kinds of guidance they can provide since their theories are compromised at either the metaphysical or logical level. Instead, I suggest that these theories focus on strengthening their positions before we can take their guidance seriously.
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    Personal identity, consciousness and a self-concept
    (University of the Western Cape, 2024) Johnstone, Candice; Beck, Simon
    With a universally agreed upon perspective towards personal identity yet to be discovered, philosophers continue investigating the metaphysical question of what it means for a person to be one and the same person over time. Current views include those offered by those in the Lockean tradition, who claim that who we are lies within memories (Locke, 1975), while Parfit (1984) furthers this view to require psychological continuity, or what he calls Relation R. In contrast, contributors such as Williams (1970) and Olson (1997a) postulate that bodily continuity is responsible for the sameness of self. Schechtman (1996) puts forward a more contemporary perspective emphasising a narrative view, particularly as a component of her combination theory. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the work of each of the above-mentioned theorists and expose the damaging charges their respective views of personal identity are confronted with. In the hopes of addressing the theoretical gaps we are therefore left with, I will propose my own view of where our personal identity lies, borrowing essential concepts from Locke’s use of consciousness and Schechtman’s narrative view and self-concept, highlighting that a person is required to be aware of their existence within the world.
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    Rawls, the severely cognitively disabled and the person life view
    (University of the Western Cape, 2015) Seale, Wade; Beck, Simon
    A political arrangement is an arrangement for persons. Political arrangements are assessed in terms of the extent to which they manage the affairs of persons, which includes protecting their interests and entitlements. Political arrangements which are unable to protect the interests of its citizens, or a group of citizens, are deemed unacceptable, and where appropriate, alternative arrangements which do protect the interests and entitlements of its citizens are sought. In this thesis I argue that the political arrangement of John Rawls is unable to protect the interests and entitlements of the severely cognitively disabled who are regarded as full citizens by advanced political arrangements in the world today. I argue that it is the contract nature and conception of the person in Rawls�s system which excludes the severely cognitively disabled. This exclusion goes against our widely-held intuitions about the rights and entitlements of the severely cognitively disabled. I look to the Person Life View of Marya Schechtman, a conception of the person that includes the severely cognitively disabled, to see if a conception of the person that includes the severely cognitively disabled is able to solve the gap in Rawls�s system. I argue that it is not able to do so. I then propose a new way of approaching questions of personhood and appeal to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the basis, arguing that membership of a type of organism typically considered a person is enough to be a complete member of that type and therefore a person.