Research Articles (Philosophy)

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Browsing by Author "Lerm, Jessica"

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    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction: my two sense(s)
    (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2013) Lerm, Jessica
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is very well established and widely employed in the metaethical literature. However, I argue that there are actually two different senses of the distinction at large: the hetero-/homogeneous sense and the dependence/independence sense. The traditional, unqualified distinction ought, therefore, to be amended, with each use of the distinction being stipulated as used in either the hetero-/homogeneous sense or the dependence/independence sense. Careful analysis of various metaethics supports that there are these two senses - analysis, in particular, of a neo-Kantian metaethic, according to which reasons are agent-relative in the dependence sense but agent-neutral in the homogeneous sense, and - perhaps surprisingly - of Utilitarianism, according to which reasons are agent-neutral in the independence sense but agent-relative in the heterogeneous sense.
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    What is moral fetishism?
    (Taylor & Francis, 2024) Lerm, Jessica
    According to Kant, an action is morally praiseworthy when it is performed on the basis of the “motive of duty”, because the action is morally right. In the contemporary literature, this view is known as the de dicto account of moral worth. And, the de dicto account has in recent years been supplanted by the de re account, which holds instead that an action is morally praiseworthy when it is performed on the basis of those reasons that make the action right in the first place; that is, on the basis of its right-making features. One popular argument against the de dicto view and in favour of the de re view is that the former is “fetishistic”. This charge of fetishism was originally laid by Michael Smith, and has been taken up by very many supporters of the de re view since. But, this article asks, what is moral fetishism, and in what way is the de dicto view (purportedly) guilty of it? In this article, I consider four possible readings of the fetishism charge. I ultimately argue that the de dicto account evades them all.