

Namibia's Land Redistribution Programme:  
A Case Study of Steinhausen (Okarukambe) Constituency in  
Omaheke Region

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A mini-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

**Degree of Master in Philosophy in Land and Agrarian Studies**

UNIVERSITY of the  
WESTERN CAPE

**Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS)**

**Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences**

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December 2020

<http://etd.uwc.ac.za/>

## Declaration

I declare that “*Namibia’s Land Redistribution Programme: A Case Study of Steinhausen (Okarukambe) Constituency in Omaheke Region*” is my own work. All other sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. This thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

Prisca Mandimika 9 December 2020



Mandimika

Signature



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## Acknowledgements

This study was completed with the guidance and support of Professor Ruth Hall whose work on land issues gave insight to my study. I equally recognise Carla Henry for all logistical and moral support and the GIZ and the Belgian Embassy for financial support. In addition, I am grateful to the Ministry of Land Reform in Namibia for authorisation and access to the study area and records. My colleagues, Ndesihafela Nekundi, Gerson Aileka, Amalia Iithete, Marvin Sisamu and Mclesia Mbaisa, thank you for technical support and documentation. I am also indebted to Swithun, Paurai and Tanaka for technical and moral support. Lastly my profound appreciation to my father and grandfather who picked me up and reminded me of the perils of unfinished business, without whose support I would not have finished this study.



## **Abstract**

As a means to assuage historical land inequities, resultant socio-economic disparities and poverty alleviation, the Namibian Government undertook to reform the land sector. Guided by the Constitution and the Resolutions of the 1991 Land Conference policy and legal framework, a fractured consensus is built on the rationale to redistribute land to a targeted group. Parallel to the reform agenda, systemic challenges to the resettlement process are growing amid questions on Government's ability to respond to sustainable programme objectives embedded within land reforms. Literature coalesces on the issues of land-reform programmes having lost direction, being skewed in favour of a few, being biased towards commercial agriculture, and requiring review and re-configuration to be inclusive and to satisfy equity and poverty-alleviation concerns. This study seeks to understand who has been benefitting from land reform by analysing the processes and procedures of identifying beneficiaries prioritised for land allocation, and institutional structures for implementation, while analysing how they produce and reproduce class differentiation and the attendant livelihood trajectories. Using qualitative research conducted in one case study site (Okarukambe constituency) the views of the small-scale farmers who benefitted were solicited. Additionally, the experiences and views of institutions and officials involved in land allocation at regional and national levels are taken into account. Theoretically the study draws from the livelihoods approach to find out the different categories of the small-scale farmers who have benefitted. Reforming land ownership structures and tenure systems is complex and ever-evolving due to diverse rural communities and land needs, thus the study benefitted from Cousins' (2011) class analytical perspectives on small-scale farming in framing and defining the farmers who benefitted. The categories described by Dorward et al. (2009) are also referenced when analysing the broad types of strategies pursued by the farmers who have benefitted and the impact land reform has had on their livelihoods. The study highlights a skewed land-allocation process and procedure in favour of well-resourced beneficiaries due to a flawed system which excludes the poor and objective of equitable access to land. The study indicates that access to land is not sufficient for sustainable livelihoods vis-a-vis the lack of post-settlement support. The conclusion urges the creation of a comprehensive, inclusive agrarian structure which contributes to equitable access to land. In the absence of this, implementing land reform would be in vain.

**Key Words:** land reform, beneficiary selection, resettlement, livelihoods, selection criteria, poverty, small-scale farmers, land redistribution

## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AALS	Affirmative Action Loan Scheme
ACLRA	Agricultural Commercial Land Reform Act
ANC	African National Congress
ECFU	Emergency Commercial Farmers Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation.
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
ID	National Identification Document
LAC	Legal Assistance Centre
LADF	Land Acquisition and Development Fund
LRAC	Land Reform Advisory Commission
LSCF	Large Scale Commercial Farms
MLR	Ministry of Land Reform
NAU	Namibia Agricultural Union
NEPRU	Namibian Economic Policy Review Unit
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNF	Namibia Nature Foundation
NNFU	Namibia National Farmers Union
NPC	National Planning Commission
NSA	Namibia Statistics Agency
NUST	Namibia University of Science and Technology
ODA	Official Development Assistance.
PLAAS	Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies
PLAS	Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy
PTT	Permanent Technical on Land Reform
RoN	Republic of Namibia
RRC	Regional Resettlement Committee
SARPN	Southern African Regional Poverty Network.
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SLF	Sustainable Livelihood Framework
SLLDP	State Land Lease and Disposal Policy

SWAPO.....South West Africa People’s Organisation


TA .....Traditional Authority



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
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# Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology

## 1.1 Introduction

Although Namibia attained political independence in 1990 and thereafter embarked upon a land-reform programme, land issues remain contentious. This is due to many factors including a century of colonial rule built on a dual land-tenure system, discontentment with outcomes of land policies and growing poverty. Today communities are dejected as land reform has failed to address urgent land needs. Meanwhile the Government is forging ahead with redistribution of land but oblivious of the multiple land needs (Kaapama 2007).

This thesis sets out to analyse the beneficiary selection and land-allocation system in Namibia's land-reform programme. It interrogates the effectiveness of the institutional policy and legal framework in meeting the objectives of the programme and to ask which social classes are benefitting and what the livelihood trajectories are which are emerging. Earlier studies by Moyo (1995) and Kinsey (2004) in Zimbabwe questioned the procedures within the land-reform process. Cousins (2013), Hall (2009) and Hall et al. (2017) in South Africa concluded that the 'agenda' and 'vision' for land reform has been 'obscured'. The need to conduct this study came in the wake of rejuvenated public concern on those benefitting from land redistribution and the procedures for addressing land demand in Namibia.

## 1.2 Background and the Land-Ownership Structure in Namibia

Namibia is semi-arid with a land mass of 825,418 square kilometres and a population of 2.2 million, (National Planning Commission (NPC), 2015). Of this, 69.6 million hectares is agricultural land and distributed along racial lines as follows:

- 52% (36.2 million hectares) freehold land occupied by 4200 white farming households,
- 48% (33.4 million hectares) communal land occupied by 70% of the black farming households,
- 15% (12.7 million hectares) constitute National Parks, mining areas, research stations (Republic of Namibia 1991).

Namibia's history is important in understanding the land-ownership structures outlined above. Namibia came under German rule in 1884, a conflictual period as black Namibians were dispossessed of land for German and South African farmers. A pivotal moment was the 1904-

1908 genocide waged by the Germans against the Ovaherero, Nama and San communities (Werner 1991). The state, through proclamations, owned all land and black communities lost ownership except use and occupation forcing them into cheap wage labour (Werner 1993).

The German colonial strategy was brought to an end with the close of the First World War, when erstwhile 'South West Africa' was placed under South Africa as a protectorate, where it entrenched segregation and later apartheid. Under South African rule, the Odendaal Commission of 1963 instituted a homeland system where 40% of the land was demarcated for 'natives' and the remainder was considered state land. These extremist policies led to a bitter war of liberation that sought to free Namibia from South African occupation and to redress land dispossession and other socio-economic challenges. These events contribute to the on-going debate for an inclusive land-reform process which prioritises communities affected by genocide which remain problematic.

### **1.3 The Dawn of Namibia's new Land Policy**

After independence in 1990, a policy of national reconciliation premised on redressing land dispossession was adopted. A land conference was held in 1991, which ignited the process of developing the current land policy and legal framework (Adams et al. 1992). The conference resolved to focus on equitable redistribution of land and tenure security in communal areas. Twenty four resolutions were adopted (Republic of Namibia 1991).

The importance attached to land is reflected in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe's negotiated independence settlements. According to Hall (2004), compromises on the property rights under a market-based land reform contributed to the decision to grant independence. However, others have begun to question whether post-independence land policies have achieved the intended objectives or recreated another landed class eager to keep the economy skewed to the wealthy (Hall 2004).

Namibia's land reform has undergone changes for 28 years. On inception, land reform was informed by socio-economic and political dynamics in the country but lacked clarity on the preferred type of rural development (Hall et al. 2017). The question is still relevant for Namibia but others in the context of Zimbabwe and South Africa argue that the 'state may use redistribution as part of consolidating political power' without bringing tangible benefits to the poor (Matondi et al. 2009, Hall et al. 2017). Poverty and growing unemployment have generated a keen demand for land across Namibia due to a highly-skewed income distribution

where 10% of the population consume 65% of the income (Werner 1993). Although land dispossession is evident, its impact is not uniform as northern parts retained traditional lands and redistribution took place primarily in the central and southern parts of the country (Werner 1993).

Today the land issue remains central to the discussions on economic development and a consistent feature of regional politics and policy-making. Regional studies by Aliber (2003), Werner (2004), Matondi (2012) and Hall (2017) note the political commitments made to deracialising land ownership by Governments but point to the lack of tangible results both in terms of the pace and scale of redistribution and between this process and poverty alleviation. The notion that the black elite has captured land reform has gained traction and continues to be supported by research (Cousins 2016; Mtero et al. 2019). Lastly, there is a growing consensus that the land issue will remain if governments fails to take lessons towards a paradigm shift which is built on a broad vision for agrarian reform to guide land reform (Hall 2009).

#### **1.4 Statement of the Problem**

Whilst there is widespread debate on the modalities to be used to reform the land sector, the procedures to redistribute land are highly contested. The Government has been taken to task by Namibians on how it has dealt with the issue of land allocation. To highlight the public preoccupation with this issue, four out of the 24 resolutions adopted at the 1991 Land Conference address the issue of the selection and prioritisation of beneficiaries.

Although the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, Act No. 5 of 1995 (ACLRA) provides the legal framework, it neglected to define the selection of beneficiaries or mechanisms to rank them in order of priority which is similar to South Africa's Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993. This has left the issue open to various interpretations. Of concern is the effectiveness of the selection criteria in addressing the programme objectives. The allocation of land to Government officials in September 2011 resuscitated the debate among Namibians who concluded that the programme had shifted in favour of the black elite, and specifically state-connected elites (The Namibian, 2011).

Commercial farmer organisations allude that the programme is prioritising 'two-goat' farmers, in reference to generational former farm workers who are the landless majority but lack capacity to fully utilise the land (The Namibian 2011). Thus the question of who should be given priority over others is not clear. It is also not clear whether the government maintains a

waiting list or a database (Werner 2004). These assertions are made due to the vague nature of procedures that depend on discretionary administrative guidelines that are not enforceable in law affecting the overall agenda of the programme (Shivji et al. 1998).

The communities where the acquired farms are located view the programme as subordinating local land needs to those of Namibians from other regions. The communities question the policy rationale of advertising farms and inviting applicants whilst there are landless communities within the farms' locality. That the public is not informed about the land-reform process is evident from the manner in which media reports are taken as fact (The Namibian 2011). Most critically, the public contest the lack of transparency about those who are benefiting. The agitation with respect to land allocation processes is not unfounded. Moyo (1999) spoke of selection processes in Zimbabwe that were not open to scrutiny where information on the programme was inaccessible. As a result of lack of information on the programme, the selection criteria is viewed as elitist, corrupt, and not transparent.

This study provides information on the redistributive programme as it relates to whether the intended beneficiaries under the National Resettlement Policy (Republic of Namibia 2001a) are benefiting. This takes us to re-examine the objectives of the programme using Okarukambe (formerly Steinhausen since 9 August 2013) constituency in the Omaheke region as a case study and the policy options within the land-reform process.

The research problem for the proposed study can be summarised in the following questions:

- (a) What are the policy objectives and institutional structure under which land reform is implemented in Namibia?
- (b) What are the policy procedures for settler selection and prioritisation?
- (c) What is the socio-economic status of those benefitting from land reform?
- (d) What are the challenges to settler selection and land allocation faced by the Land Reform Advisory Commission (LRAC), Regional Resettlement Committee (RRC) and Ministry of Land Reform (MLR)?
- (e) Are the livelihood strategies being pursued by the beneficiaries in tandem with the objectives of land reform?

### **1.5 Specific Objectives of the Study**

In the context of the above discussion the study has four objectives outlined below:



- To analyse the policy objectives and institutional structure under which the land-reform programme is implemented.
- To explore the policy procedures for settler selection and prioritisation.
- To assess the social-economic status of beneficiaries in the Okarukambe constituency.
- To identify institutional challenges arising from the selection and land-allocation process.
- To analyse the livelihood strategies of those that benefitted in Okarukambe Constituency and how this compares with policy objectives.

### **1.6 Rationale for Choice of the Study Area**

Okarukambe, which is in Namibia's Omaheke region is the location of most of the earliest resettlement projects and boasts the largest number of resettled farmers. It offers practical examples for comparison on beneficiaries who were selected prior and after the current policy and legal framework. The farmers are among the first group to be resettled since the introduction of the programme and thus have had experience with the policy implementation making them suitable to provide the basis for examining the land-redistribution programme. Additionally, the bulk of public and media complaints on elite capture and nepotism are levelled at the Omaheke region. Harring et al. (2007) singled out the Omaheke region for perceived shortcomings in implementing the National Land Policy. Selection of resettled farmers to participate in the study included (i) farmers who benefitted between 1995 and 2002 prior to the enactment of the current policy and legal framework, (ii) and farmers who benefitted between 2007-2017 on farms purchased and allocated after the enactment of the current policy and legal framework.

### **1.7 Research Methods**

Understanding selection processes and people's livelihood strategies under the land-reform programme requires in-depth analysis. The researcher conducted qualitative research using a case-study design (Babbie et al. 2001). This method was preferred because of its use of a mixture of methods that include personal observation, use of informants for current and historical data, in-depth interviews and the study of relevant documents and records (Yin 1994). The case study design also allowed the researcher to conduct a detailed investigation of households that benefitted from the land-reform programme in Okarukambe. The researcher collected and analysed existing and new data in this study. Lastly, the researcher concurs with

the findings by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) wherein theory that builds on case studies is likely to be more accurate, interesting and testable. ,

## **1.8 Case Studies**

The researcher selected 21 large-scale farms located in Okarukambe Constituency, purchased by the Government from 1995 to 2017 under the land-reform programme to serve as case studies. From among these, 60 farming households participated in the study which consisted of (i) seven farms acquired from 1995 to 2000 and allocated to 29 households, and (ii) 14 farms acquired from 2007 to 2017 and allocated to 37 households.

In-depth interviews, which are one of the data-collection techniques in qualitative studies according to Babbie et al. (2001), were used to establish the socio-economic characteristics of those who have benefitted, their farming backgrounds, livelihoods and whether the beneficiaries meet the criteria as indicated in the policy documents. Besides establishing the link between theory and practice, the other objective was to determine the ability of the chosen beneficiaries to meet the objectives of the land-reform programme as stated in policy. In total, 60 of the 66 farming households, consisting of 17 female and 43 male beneficiaries, were interviewed. Many of the farmers lived in Okarukambe Constituency for more than 24 years. They were able to give different perspectives on the evolution of the resettlement policy, the nature of livelihood strategies and the institutional challenges. Current livelihood status with attention to livelihood assets, type and scale of farming, labour regime, income and challenges were documented. The interviews were conducted from 17 November 2017 to 25 August 2018.

## **1.9 Key Informants**

Besides the farmers in Okarukambe, 50 key informants were interviewed. These included senior government officials, including the then director of resettlement, 14 deputy directors based in the 14 regions which form the secretariat to the Regional Resettlement Committees, (RRC), 19 members of the Omaheke RRC who comprise representatives of civil society and government, and 16 members of the LRAC who comprise representatives of government and civil society. Except for the 14 deputy directors who were interviewed by telephone, all the other interviews took place in the offices of the key informants. The telephone interviews were conducted from 7-15 February 2018; the interviews with the 19 members of the Omaheke RRC were conducted between 12 December 2017 and 8 July 2018, while the interviews with the LRAC were conducted in the researcher's office from 18 January to 21 June 2018 in Windhoek.

## **1.10 Selection of Participants**

To select participants the researcher used purposive sampling, which refers to the selection of participants on the basis of one's knowledge of the people in that particular area (Babbie et al. 2001). Using purposive sampling, Government employees from the Ministries of Agriculture, Water and Forestry and Land Reform were selected for technical input and experience as decision makers in land issues in Namibia. A total population of resettled farmers in Okarukambe was taken and all the 66 farmers were targeted, although 60 farmers were interviewed as the other six were not available. The researcher was able to interview 16 of the 19 RRC members. Appointments were arranged to coincide with monthly meetings in Omaheke region. Interviews were conducted during tea and lunch breaks. Owing to busy schedules, 14 of the 16 members of LRAC were interviewed. The interviews were arranged to coincide with monthly meetings in Windhoek.

## **1.11 Methods of Data Collection**

### **1.11.1 Literature review**

Secondary data was drawn by reviewing Government policies, legislation, reports, minutes of meetings, books, journals, budget statements and annual reports. The researcher drew from international, regional and national debates and studies on land reform. Secondary data assisted in outlining the major areas of the study and provided an insight into the analysis of the data collected in the field. Print and electronic media were also reviewed where opinions and topical issues are discussed.

### **1.11.2 Field interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data which was recorded and saved. The interviews were structured based on the key research questions. The interviews were conducted and recorded in English with a few Afrikaans translations at each farming unit or in Windhoek with the farmers. Farmers who did not have contact details were contacted through the regional office. Prior to the interviews, the farmers were contacted to schedule a date of the interview and at this initial contact the researcher introduced herself, the purpose of the research, what it entails and the reasons for choosing Okarukambe Constituency. This introductory information would be repeated on the day of the interview. All participants were informed that the

interviews would be recorded and that consent was granted by the Minister and Permanent Secretary.

### **1.11.3 Observation**

In addition, the researcher also used the participant observation methods in Okarukambe during field visits. This involved recording the conditions of the farms, farmers and workers homesteads, livestock, farm infrastructure and the general outlook of the farm. This information was recorded and informed on the general farm and veldt management and livelihoods of the farmers.

### **1.12 Data Analysis**

After completion of data collection the data obtained was coded and classified into defined categories, analysed and separated into themes with each corresponding to a particular section of the problem. The coded data which addressed each research objective was then analysed and the observed phenomenon qualitatively described. The process of data analysis commenced with the identification of the research area and the review of literature pertaining to land reform. Furthermore, in designing the study particular attention was given to the choice of variables and their relevance to the topic of study. These variables were manually analysed. Since the intention of this study is to provide information on the characteristics of those benefiting from the land-reform programme the descriptive statistical method was preferred.

### **1.13 Ethics**

In order to ensure data validity and reliability, the researcher explained the objectives of the study to the respondents in advance and explained the option of using pseudonym which the RRC and LRAC adopted. A letter of authorisation and permission to access government records, information and conduct field work on resettlement farms was obtained from the Permanent Secretary and the Minister. All the information was treated with sensitivity and confidentiality and names of respondents were not disclosed afterwards or shared with the Ministry.

### **1.14 Significance of the Study**

Issues pertaining to land are linked to a country's history and any viable attempt for policy and legal solution has to be grounded in research. Moyo (1999) wrote about how land-allocation

programmes in Zimbabwe were unaccountable to the public and information in the public domain was based on rumour and not fact. Lahiff (2007) on South Africa attests to challenges associated with information about people who benefitted under land reform. Hall (2009) highlighted the lack of data to inform policy. Okunlola et al. (2016) also observed the unavailability of reliable government data on the profile of black farmers in South Africa as an issue that warrants further investigation. Werner et al (2010) in Namibia noted a gap in information on land reform thus warranting critical engagement.

This study contributes to the growing debate on land issues. In 2016 a group of citizens identified the lack of information on land-reform beneficiaries and demanded that the names of those who have benefitted be published prior to the hosting of the 2<sup>nd</sup> National Land Conference. Land policies have provided guidelines on the procedures but the implementation of such is brought to question when policy and practice are not in tandem. The current information on land reform in Namibia is viewed as circumstantial, informed by people's perceptions and not empirical data. The lack of information within the public domain thus warrants a study to complement the current discussions on land reform. This study concurs with Marongwe (2008) that there is room for further interrogation on the impact of the beneficiary selection process on the outcome of the land-reform programme.

Research has been undertaken on land-reform programmes in South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe. There is also a growing dedicated literature on land reform on South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya but there is a dearth of reliable data on Namibia. It is hoped that this study will contribute, among others, to the plugging of the information gap, add to the growing voices on the importance of generating strong links between scholarship and the Government in terms of generating evidence-based policies and legislation. Lastly it is also envisaged that this study will form part of the growing body of work which promotes critical thinking on the current discourse on land reform.

### **1.15 Limitations of the Study**

Although studies have been done on land-reform issues in Namibia, there have been a few studies on beneficiary selection. Data on land beneficiaries is under review and there is no repository on applicants who apply for land. Data on beneficiaries is centralised and not synchronised with that of the regional offices requiring verifying on the ground and this impact on fieldwork. Ideally the researcher would have liked to include all the constituencies in

Omaheke region but it was not feasible. These findings are specific to small-scale farmers in Okarukambe and no claims as to their representativity can be made. The researcher mitigated the fact that she worked in the Ministry by explaining that the study was for academic purposes and that identities of the respondents will not be shared with the Ministry and encouraged the use of pseudonyms. All respondents were open and critical and the researcher was able to take steps to mitigate her position in the Ministry against biases.

### **1.16 Thesis Outline**

**Chapter One** introduces the case study, outlines the research background, rationale and objectives of land reform, elaborates on Namibia's historical and current land-reform policy developments, presents the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, methodology, justification and limitations of the study.

**Chapter two** provides the theoretical framework, concepts and review of literature on land reform. The institutional framework for land reform and selection criteria is interrogated. Attention is paid to regional and national debates on smallholder farmers vis-a-vis land reform and the policies on beneficiary selection and impacts on livelihoods.

**Chapter Three** presents the research findings of the specific farming units in Okarukambe. The researcher has used information gathered from the field to outline the institutional context on how the land was allocated in Okarukambe constituency within the two categories of farms. The researcher has focussed on the institutional and process issues in land allocation. This section also presents the background of the farms and farming units in terms of when they were acquired and allocated, the demographic characteristics, regions of origin prior to land allocation, livelihood sources, and the type of farmers and households found in Okarukambe. The farmers are categorised according to how they are performing and strategies for livelihoods. Owing to lack of support, livelihood strategies observed indicates that most of the farmers are active part-time small-scale farmers. Findings also suggest that the elite benefitted more than the landless poor. The chapter also assesses the challenges and opportunities faced by the beneficiaries of land reform.

**Chapter Four** discusses and analyses the research findings using the literature in order to connect the findings back to debates. The analysis is guided by the key thematic area emanating from the research question and objectives.

**Chapter Five** summarises the key insights from the research in relation to the key questions. Reference is made to key theoretical debates. Literature and policies presented in Chapter 2 are revisited in light of the study findings. An analysis of the class differentiation emerging as an impact of the manner, in which the land-reform programme is implemented on the livelihoods of the beneficiaries, is presented. Further policy recommendations and conclusions based on the study findings are presented.



## Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

### 2.1 Introduction

Chapter Two outlines the theoretical framework and literature on relevant existing perspectives on land-reform issues. International, regional and national debates on land reform and intended policy outcomes are discussed and assessed.

### 2.2 Theoretical Framework

#### 2.2.1 Livelihoods analysis approach

The study applies the sustainable livelihoods framework to establish the different categories of farmers who benefitted and to analyse land-reform institutions. The approach's focus on poverty alleviation addresses one of the objectives of land reform. It emphasises poverty alleviation, household food security and sustainable tenure reform as a safety net. It supports land redistribution to the poor and unemployed (Cousins 2016).

Chambers et al (1992:7) define livelihoods as comprising the “capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living”. They argue that a livelihood is sustainable when people are able to cope and recover from setbacks by maintaining either such means or assets or expanding assets through accumulation. Some of the resources are economic and others are not and the question is what should be done and included to create a sustainable livelihood.

Ellis (2000) elaborated that livelihoods comprise *natural capital* such as land and water, *physical capital* such as transportation and communication, *human capital* such as skills and knowledge, *financial capital* which includes cash, credit and remittances, and *social capital* such as networks and membership in organisations. The framework includes policies, institutions and processes which shape livelihoods and often determine how people use their assets to pursue different strategies for survival (Adato et al 2002). All the five elements are essential in realising a livelihood but in Okarukambe Constituency access to resources is different for each farmer and the outcomes which are constructed. The livelihoods approach also interrogates institutional processes and the structures and processes which are available to respond and intervene for a sustainable outcome (Scoones 1998).



To Carney (1998) and Scoones (1998), the livelihoods approach places people at the centre of inter-related influences that affect how they create livelihoods and the resources and 'assets' which they have access to and use for their livelihoods. People are the main concern and not the resources or their governments. The approach is used to identify the main constraints and opportunities faced by the poor as experienced by them. The proponents of the framework insist that it is neither a model to incorporate all the key elements of people's livelihoods, nor does it advance any claims to presenting a universal solution (Carney 1998).

The availability of resources and the institutional set up where the resources are to be sourced determine the livelihood strategies that the poor adopt. In terms of rural livelihoods, the approach offers three strategies that rural households adopt to advance the sustainability of their livelihoods: agricultural intensification, livelihood diversification, and migration. In the Okarukambe study, farmers had to create livelihoods from the land and labour or use off-farm income and others due to lack of support from the government opted to sublease farms as a strategy. To Scoones (1998) and Dorward et al. (2009), the livelihood strategies adopted by farmers are heavily reliant on asset ownership, available income, political status, and gender.

The limitations of the livelihoods framework are taken into account in the study, such as those identified by Scoones (1998), who notes that to focus the analysis of livelihoods on assets and outcomes alone is flawed as this does not give an understanding of the processes through which livelihoods are achieved. He explains that community dynamics and social stratification are as significant as assets and the assumption that rural people are homogeneous encourages inappropriate livelihood intervention strategies. Adato et al. (2002) opine that the framework lacks notions of power and power relationships. Power in this instance may refer to political power or decision-making power and is an important aspect in the allocation of resources such as land.

The framework's strength lies in its ability to be adaptable to many rural development situations making it a strategic tool for use in government driven projects. As a people-oriented approach it seeks a comprehensive and diverse project-planning process that involves the affected communities at project initiation level and takes into consideration the community views and opinions (Kollmair et al. 2002). To Carney (1998) one of the approach's strengths is the attention to the assets that the people have which forces planners to apply a holistic approach. By focusing on what people in rural areas already have, it also recognises and builds on their strengths. By involving the poor as important stakeholders in planning their own

livelihoods it empowers them, unlike in instances where the poor are regarded as passive recipients of development projects (Carney 1998).

While the study is informed by the livelihoods approach, it is important to take note of issues such as gender and power relations embedded within institutions that are critical in land-reform policies to avoid policies that empower only a section of the community (Chambers et al. 2009).

## **2.3 Perspectives on Small-Scale Farmers and Rural Livelihoods**

### **2.3.1 Defining the concept of the small-scale farmer**

This study focuses on the small-scale farmers who have benefitted under land reform and thus it is important to define the concept of a small-scale farmer by looking at their diverse livelihood descriptions (Cousins 2011). The reference to this typology offers an understanding on the beneficiaries and the livelihoods they pursue.

Research in land and agrarian issues shows that rural communities are not homogeneous and thus planning should take this into consideration or fail to achieve the intended impact (Cousins 2011). To Cousins (2011) the primary beneficiaries of land reform in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe should be the rural poor rather than the emerging black elite and these should be differentiated for appropriate policy intervention. Cousins (2011) distinguished small-scale farmers as located in broadly three class categories: (i) petty commodity producers who produce to meet most of their social reproduction needs, (ii) petty commodity producers producing to partially meet their social reproduction needs and (iii) petty commodity producers producing enough to sell and make a profit and start to accumulate capital. Cousins (2011) argue that a major limitation in the generalised use of the concept 'small-scale farmer' is its inability to analyse the dynamics of such differentiations such as class and gender inequalities. To him the different categories of small-scale farmers require different interventions which should be reflected in the policies.

The term small-scale farmer which is widely used in policy and practice in land reform obscures certain inequalities and 'class-based differences' among the many people that ostensibly fall into this category. It does not take into consideration those farmers who consider farming as a partial contribution to their livelihoods, those who depend on farming for their livelihoods, and those who are actually making a profit and investing in the long term and

accumulating capital. The study found that the resettled farmers in Okarukambe were processed as a homogeneous group without understanding the socio-economic levels and needs.

Cousins (2011) suggest the concepts of ‘petty commodity production’ and ‘accumulation from below’ as these concepts bring out the various nuances of what constitutes small-scale agriculture within a capitalist market. Cousins’ (2011) analysis offers tools which enable the delving into household ‘internal tensions’ not in the public domain including gender-based inferences. He speaks of the importance of recognising ‘incipient class differences’ within the ranks of the ‘poor and landless’ which is the reason why land reform was embarked upon in the first place (Cousins 2011).

Cousins’ (2011) thinking on class-analytical perspectives concurs with Bernstein (2010). Bernstein, drawing on Lenin, spoke of three typologies of peasantry, namely the ‘poor peasantry’ in respect to those who become classes of labour, the ‘middle peasantry’ in reference to those who are able to farm in order to reproduce themselves but do not move beyond to the level of accumulating capital, and the ‘rich peasants’ being those that have managed to own land and are able to employ workers and become capitalist farmers (Bernstein 2010).

This study is also informed by the holistic ‘stepping up’, ‘hanging in’ and ‘stepping out’ typology propounded by Dorward et al. (2009:4) to analyse the broad types of livelihood trajectories of the farmers for better policy interventions. Dorward et al. (2009) present different discussions on poverty and people’s livelihoods within an evolving agricultural sector. They advance a notion of poverty that brings out a comprehensive appreciation of the causes and solutions thus making it easier for policy interventions which are in tandem with the aspirations and needs of the poor (Dorward et al. 2009). They contend that people aspire to maintain their means of social reproduction and to expand their existing livelihood activities or pursue new ones, or both, but within social, economic, and political constraints (Dorward et al. 2009).

Dorward et al. (2009:4) argue that people who are said to be ‘hanging in’ have assets and engage in livelihood activities sufficient for them to maintain existing livelihood levels but are unable to accumulate; those who are ‘stepping up’ are able to make investments in assets in order to expand their current livelihood activities, either by expanding the scale or range of production; and the people who are ‘stepping out’ engage in livelihood activities enabling them to accumulate assets which can allow them to venture into different livelihood activities

(Dorward et al. 2009). Mushongah et al. (2012:1241) also proposed another category of a livelihood strategy which is 'dropping out' as people who are unable to 'hang in' and 'opt out' of the venture and, as a result, their circumstances become worse off. This phenomenon was noticed in Zimbabwe where A1 and A2 farmers due to lack of support, assets, markets, and drought 'dropped out' (Scoones et al. 2010). Hall et al. (2017:527-530) also proposed a further livelihood trajectory namely 'stepping in' to agriculture, referring to those agricultural households that engage in commercial farming not because they were able to accumulate through farming but rather by bringing in capital from urban business and salaried jobs in the private or public sectors. They are 'stepping in' to commercial farming, rather than emerging from small-scale farming into larger-scale farming, Hall et al. (2017)

Redistributing land to the landless rural and unemployed as advocated by welfarist arguments will assist the poor to 'hang in' through livelihood diversification instead of 'stepping out' of farming to rely mainly on wages and remittance (Scoones et al. 2010:514-521).

## **2.4 Land Reform in Southern Africa**

### **2.4.1 Background**

The study is premised on the efficacy of implementing a land-reform policy. This section interrogates the institutional framework and mechanisms for implementing land reform using regional examples where similar policies are implemented. The discourse on land reform has remained topical although subtle variations exist. Distinctions can be drawn between Namibia, South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe, which were settler colonies and Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Zambia, among others, who were not settler colonies but primarily linked to regional labour migration (Moyo et al. 2004).

The settler countries share a similar history of colonial occupation which resulted in land ownership structures and patterns defined in terms of race and dual tenure systems and as a result land redistribution is entrenched in the land policies (Roth 2002). In the settler states the land issues remained unresolved due to negotiated settlements (Moyo 2005). The policy framework in the settled states is focused on redistributing land from the large-scale commercial sector to smallholder sectors amid questions on its ability to respond to the land needs (Moyo 2009).

Redistributive land reforms in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe involve the translocation of people from one region to the other. The translocation brings contestations of who should be the beneficiaries especially as these might be from other areas in a region where the needs for land are also high (Moyo 2009). The land-reform objectives claim to define what types of beneficiaries are targeted by land reform and how these are selected (Hall, 2009). Deininger (2003) argued that most land-reform programmes are initiated in response to political pressure rather than as part of a rural development strategy. Owing to this, most of the beneficiaries have been the politically vocal and well-connected (Deininger 2003). This study interrogates these assertions in Okarukambe Constituency.

#### **2.4.2 Regional objectives of land reform**

Southern Africa consists of 693 000 million hectares, of which 138 600 hectares are arable where 62% of the population's livelihoods are land-based, hence the demand for land (The Namibian). South Africa took steps to reform the land sector after apartheid but equitable access to land envisaged by section 25(5) of the Constitution is still to be realised (Mtero et al. 2019). Zimbabwe took a different path to land reform after the 1998 joint government – Donor Land Conference and Namibia reinvigorated the land-reform debate after the 1991 Land Conference (Werner 2010; Matondi 2012).

Land reform is viewed as essential for addressing the structural root of rural poverty (Hall 2009). Nearly 30 years after democratic transitions, ruling parties continue to claim to prioritise land reform yet do so in different ways from the earlier state-driven approaches. Earlier phases in Zimbabwe and Namibia pursued state-centred models of land redistribution which benefitted a wide category of farmers (Matondi 2012).

The African National Congress (ANC) 2019 Manifesto prioritised land, agriculture and rural development. Similarly, the 2019 South West Africa People' Organisation (SWAPO Party) Manifesto underscored the importance of reforming the land sector for equity. Priority on beneficiaries is still being given to the elite in all the countries (Mtero et al. 2019).

#### **2.5 Review of Institutional Structures for Land Reform**

Institutions of land reform in the 1990s in South Africa mainly focused on resisting forced removals in rural areas and paid little attention to the role that smallholder agriculture had on the economy (Cliffe 2009). To Cliffe (2009), government institutions focused on addressing

land dispossession and tenure issues in communal areas, whilst Cousins et al. (2015) observed a lack of policy direction from the government that is still apparent today in terms of lack of policy synergy to support smallholder farmers.

Only 5300 families of the targeted 243 000 have been resettled on 3.2 million hectares in Namibia from 1991 to 2018 (Republic of Namibia 2018), whilst in South Africa, the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act of 2014 was passed with no real benefits. This is evident due to continual farm-worker evictions, insecure tenure in communal areas and joint ventures in the fruit-farming sector which have failed due to lack of funding and support from government (Cousins et al. 2015).

Owing to the slow pace of land delivery, calls for radical land policies are being made but commentators argue that the challenges are premised on other agencies responsible for extension, funding, and training, among others (Reuters 2018). Another dimension is what Hall (2009, p. 63) questions as, “land reform for what, for whom and how”, pointing out that as a political agenda the programme is yet to respond to the economic imperatives. Although restitution claims are an issue in the region, only South Africa pursued this component as Namibia and Zimbabwe regarded the claims as complex and contentious (Republic of Namibia 2018). Following the 2<sup>nd</sup> Land Conference, Namibia’s position has shifted as the Conference resolved to set up a Presidential Commission to investigate land claims and make recommendations to the government on how best to proceed with the matter (Republic of Namibia 2018).

### **2.5.1 Demand for land for resettlement**

Land reforms have been slow in implementation due to a mismatch between beneficiary needs, size of land, and the challenges in integrating land delivery with rural development. The willing-seller-willing buyer approach is also unresponsive to the demands for land and poverty alleviation resulting in governments pursuing other mechanisms to redistribute land from large scale farmers to the poor (Hall 2009).

Since 1991, only 3.2 million hectares have been acquired in Namibia at a cost of N\$2.3 billion (Republic of Namibia 2018). It is based on these facts that Namibians lament the slow implementation process. Commentators point to structural and policy challenges as the culprits. Demand for land is noted from farmers in communal areas, youth, former farm workers, and the San, Nama, Damara and Ovaherero communities who lost ancestral land.

Owing to increased land demand, expropriation of agricultural land without compensation is under discussion as a solution. In South Africa amendments to Section 25 of the Constitution were proposed and in Namibia, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Land Conference, 2018 resolved to pursue expropriation without compensation and implementation modalities are being discussed. Government reliance on the market to provide land will prolong the land-reform process unless other methods are explored to transfer land and address the needs of communities (Cousins (2011). Commentators warn of the dire consequences of tinkering with the constitution within the framework of the experiences from Zimbabwe.

### **2.5.2 Budgets for land acquisition**

Donor funding to governments has dwindled due to the reluctance to support land-reform programmes as they present politically-related problems. The lack of political will in Namibia and South Africa to frame well-planned programmes to expedite the process of land acquisition and allocation is reflected in the amount of land which has been transferred to date. The governments are reluctant to hold established agriculture to account and bring policy changes in the guise of protecting food security (Cousins 2011). The lack of political priority is also reflected in the small budgetary allocations to the Ministries in charge of land reform. In Namibia between 1990 and 2004, budget appropriation was N\$50 million, the highest commitment being in 2014/2015 with N\$590 million and 2019/2020 the budget had gone down to N\$342 million (Republic of Namibia 2018). The budget is insignificant juxtaposed with the demands for land and the price at which land is being offered. These budgets negatively impact on operations and capital projects which are linked to land reform and thus delay benefits to the poor. Although inadequate resources can be mitigated by strategic planning, the issue is compounded by lack of mechanisms for budgetary oversight by parliament which continue to perpetuate inequitable access to land as the elite continue to benefit from the scarce resources, Mtero et al. (2019).

### **2.5.3 Post-settlement support**

The lack of support to beneficiaries is a concern that governments has failed to address. Commentators concur on the importance of post settlement support and the role that colonial governments played in investment in agriculture. In Zimbabwe, Scoones et al. (2010) highlighted the negative effects of lack of government support on resettlement farmers. Kaapama (2007:43) on Namibia speaks of the creation of new rural “dumping grounds” as

beneficiaries are not linked to any development programme. Malawi's example on subsidies warrants escalation because it led to increased production and food security and transformed Malawi into a food exporter (Machira 2009).

#### **2.5.4 Lack of institutional efficacy for land reform**

The lack of a clear vision for agrarian transformation by governments has contributed to the negative perceptions. Reforms have been hampered by cumbersome administrative processes and paternalistic approaches in which one agency acquires land, selects beneficiaries, plans, and demarcates and distributes to beneficiaries. Hall (2009) concurs with the Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform (PTT) Report (2005:95), which argued for a decentralised land-reform process as it would “expedite resettlement, reduce transaction costs, improve decision making, accountability and transparency”.

Studies of Zimbabwe by Marongwe (2008) and Zamchiya (2011) highlight how communities resorted to farm occupations as a land acquisition and selection method. These groups assumed the state's responsibility in land allocation through ‘self-selecting’, thus gaining access to land through the back door and influencing the acquisition of specific farms and programme outcomes (Marongwe 2008; Zamchiya 2011). Werner et al. (2010) elaborated on beneficiary-selection dynamics within Namibia but did not comment on whether the process and procedures are in tandem with the National Resettlement Policy, 2001.

In discussing the selection of beneficiaries in Namibia it is also important to analyse how the programme and institutional setup selects the beneficiaries. In doing so there is need to establish how the application and registration of land need is being determined. The issue of clarity of the roles within the institutional framework in land allocation has also been in question. There is confusion among communities on who actually allocates the land, what is involved, the policy and legal framework (Werner et al 2010). One official pointed that “due to the secrecy of the land allocation process many applicants are not aware of the ultimate authority who actually allocates land” (interviews with former Deputy Director 22/1/2018 -15/2/2018).

The pace at which land-reform is being implemented is also constrained by lack of information to inform planning. It is a given that people need land but very little information is available to assess the different land needs as government is concentrating on transferring land without interrogating the issue. Commentators also argue that the issues of land are politically driven



and governments are often not genuine in the quest to implement land reforms. Populist rhetoric on land reform is associated with political expediency so as to garner political support from a land hungry population. The region could benefit from the experiences of Asia with urbanisation and non-farming activities which became central to increased rural livelihoods, thus making access to land irrelevant for poverty alleviation.

## **2.6 Envisaged Policy Outcomes**

### **2.6.1 Reframing current land policies**

In order for land reform to make an impact, Cousins et al. (2015) suggest the adoption of policies, institutional synergies, and the creation of one entity that talks to the land reform and agriculture agenda. They argue for the subdivision of farms and rethinking of land acquisition with the envisaged support for farmers. They advocate for an “interventionist role for the state” (Cousins et al. 2015: 20) to rethink and change the current land-reform institutional framework and strategies. Sender (2016) concurs by calling for more support to farmers, ‘accumulation from below’ and pressure on agribusiness to mentor smallholder farmers.

### **2.6.2 Improved government capacity for land reform**

Another area that requires reframing is the constraint on government capacity to deal with land-reform issues in terms of political leadership, skills, efficiency in policies, and adequate budgets for agrarian reform. Coupled with this is the issue of training to resuscitate the institutional framework to cope with the different aspects of land reform (Cousin et al. 2015). Although Cousins et al. (2015) questions the institutional proposals to reinvigorate land reform, they admit that it is feasible to rebuild the capacity of the state to implement a comprehensive land-reform programme. Cliffe (2009:242) speaks about setting up a “working group” to debate land-reform issues that are key to reframing new agrarian reform strategies for improved livelihoods. Kenya’s challenges in the ‘Million Acre Scheme’ of 1961 and Zimbabwe’s experiences during the fast-track phase could offer lessons for Namibia (Cliffe 2009). Zimbabwe’s experience demonstrates unintended consequences of flawed institutional policy interventions which have led to a vicious cycle, strategies which brought conflict and agencies which operated without resources, negatively impacting the outcomes (Kinsey 2004; Matondi 2012).

The land-related challenges in Southern Africa illustrate the futility of governments embarking on land reform on their own. Cousins (2013:13) spoke about a land reform in “disarray” as

most of the projects have failed to improve the livelihoods of the beneficiaries. Hall (2015) ascribes the failure to poor planning and non-existent post-settlement support.

Commentators concur on the importance of establishing appropriate institutions which will take forward the new strategies for land reform. To Hall (2009), these strategies include the planning and implementation of land reform which recognises diverse production systems and beneficiaries. For land reform to have the intended impact on poverty alleviation, its programmes should be included in the broader policy framework for political, social and economic transformation, rather than just as a separate programme of land redistribution (Hall 2009).

## **2.7 Targeted Beneficiaries – a Regional Perspective**

In South Africa, beneficiaries of land reform were broadly defined along racial terms and included the poor, labour tenants, farm workers, women and emergent farmers (Hall et al. 2009). Lahiff (2009) lamented the lack of specific strategy and data to ensure that intended groups actually benefitted, leading to speculation on the profile of the beneficiaries. The lack of information meant that the unemployed, youth and farm workers had not benefitted. Findings by Ahmed et al. (2003) and May and Roberts (2000) proved otherwise and tended to support the general findings that land reform had and was targeting the poor—who were the ‘right beneficiaries’. They failed to interrogate who constituted the ‘right beneficiaries’ as proposed by Lahiff (2009). To them it was enough that the policy mentioned the poor as the intended beneficiaries. Hall et al. (2009) pointed that being poor was not sufficient as one had to prove income through a means test. The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme, (DRDLR) (2009) is criticised for failing to prioritise beneficiaries and on what most of the government resources should be spent (Hall et al. 2017).

Kaapama (2007) concurs with Cousins (2010) on targeting smallholder farmers and the need for governments to enact specific policies in terms of beneficiary prioritisation. They suggest models that cater to the diverse production systems and needs of ‘smallholder’ farmers. Namibia’s land-reform programme has been criticised for having one resettlement model to cater to the diverse land needs. The policy suggestion by Hall (2009) was endorsed in Namibia at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Land Conference, in 2018. Statistics South Africa point out that smallholder farmers can accumulate ‘from below’, have capacity to feed South Africa and challenge the current dominance by large-scale farming if given support by government. Cousins (2018) concur with

Statistics South Africa and attribute the challenges to exclusionary and closed off value chains of formal sectors. To break this impasse, he suggests the reframing of current procurement policies and the increase in the acquisition of goods and services in the informal sector by government.

The 1980s land redistribution programmes in Zimbabwe benefitted refugees, landless poor and those whose land was inadequate for generating a livelihood. Agricultural planning took into account the potential of the area to be resettled and selection was transparent with little political influence (Kinsey 1999). The developments of the 1980s vindicated the findings of Weiner et al. (1985) that earlier redistribution projects in Zimbabwe had very little negative impact on the economy or agriculture. After 1990, the programme failed to maintain the momentum established earlier. Commentators pointed that urbanites received land at the expense of the rural poor. Participation by women and farm workers was low, representing 29% of the beneficiaries. The programme lacked transparency and the allocation process suffered from political interference and opportunists (Moyo 2009, Scoones et al. 2010).

Land reform in Kenya failed to address the challenges of landlessness as new political and economic elites acquired more land at the expense of the landless poor. The redistribution efforts resulted in concentration of land for a few elites while the poor continued to hold small patches of land that were insufficient for subsistence farming. This scenario remains today as land is ethicised and the new political and economic elites who acquired it through political patronage own large tracts of land at the expense of the poor (Kanyinga 2009).

In South Africa it is still unclear who will benefit from redistribution policies as the new policies are 'inconsistent' and 'unclear' although there seems to be a bias towards emerging black commercial farmers. Studies on land-reform projects concluded that the impact of the policy on livelihoods is negative and is attributed to poor planning, lack of support, and populist rhetoric by the elite who have high-jacked programmes for the poor (Cousins 2018). Hall (2009) concurs with Cousins (2013) in saying that the success of land reform lies in its potential to re-organise the political structures that impede development and defining the fate of smallholder farmers. Moyo (2009) identifies four strategies on which land reform hinges for success. He spoke of the importance of clarity of strategy and goals to inform land acquisition, tenure security, beneficiary selection and post settlement support. This study concentrates on one, which is determining who gets the land (Moyo 2009).

Land reform has been misaligned to the allocated resource needs and aspirations of the beneficiaries since 1994. Although the new policies under the SLDP (State Land Lease and Disposal policy) targeted small-scale farmers and landless poor, its main focus according to Cousins (2013) are the emerging black commercial farmers. Cousins's (2013) assertions are supported by studies in the Eastern Cape by Hall et al. (2017) where they identified misalignment between government policy and practice. They concluded that beneficiaries could establish sustainable livelihoods with access to capital, extension and markets (Hall et al. 2017).

Of interest to Cousins (2013) and Kaapama (2007), is the lack of capacity within institutions as this affects the ability by beneficiaries to utilise the land. They argue for policy interventions which address poverty and inequality as the current 'populist discourse' on land reform fails to articulate the plight of the smallholder farmers. They conclude by asserting that contrary to policy, the current beneficiaries are not small-scale farmers or the rural poor but emergent black bourgeoisie, as evident in sectors such as mining. This explanation highlights the reasons of continued "disarray" within land reform in South Africa and the slow pace of programme implementation in Namibia due to institutional shortcomings (Cousins 2013a:11; Kaapama 2007).

Deininger and Binswanger (1999) enumerated challenges with land transfers from large-scale farmers to small-scale farmers. According to them, the challenges emanate from the need for change in the patterns of production, subdivision of farms and construction of infrastructure which governments fail to do. They argued that most smallholder farmers do not use the farms optimally and production is characterised by high incapacity leading to decreased productivity in areas that used to produce food. The findings by Deininger and Binswanger (1999) corroborates some aspects of the study findings in Okarukambe where livestock farmers are struggling to produce due to issues expounded above by Hall (2009) and Cousins (2013). Scoones et al. (2010) observed similar challenges in Zimbabwe after the fast-track period, while Borras (2003) disagreed on market-based land reforms and questioned the assumptions made by Deininger and Binswanger (1999) on agrarian reforms. Borras (2003) argued that empirical evidence in South Africa, Brazil and Colombia on the implementation of the market-based land reforms have different outcomes than those advanced by Deininger and Binswanger (1999). Although Deininger and Binswanger (1999) went on to challenge his initial thinking, other commentators subscribe to it when arguing against the subdivision of large-scale farms.

## **2.8 Who Should Benefit – a Namibian Perspective**

Defining the policy agenda on who should benefit and be prioritised under the land-reform programme is contested. This is compounded by the lack of best practices from earlier reforms in Kenya and Zimbabwe where the process was described as “chaotic” but resilient as grassroots institutions became innovative (Matondi 2012:93). Thus, under this framework Namibia has to balance the need to promote the welfare objectives and the productive use of agricultural land. This study concurs with Hall (2009) on the apparent policy contradiction and the inability by governments to reframe current approaches informed by experiences of what did not work.

### **2.8.1 The 1991 National Land Conference and its impact on resettlement policy**

The National Land Conference of 1991 adopted 24 resolutions meant to address matters related to commercial and communal land. Priority for beneficiaries was given to displaced people, ex-combatants, ex-Koevoet, the San, former farm workers, women, and the unemployed (Namibian Economic Policy Review Unit 1991). Women were included, following the recognition that they are the majority of agricultural producers and had suffered discrimination and historical marginalisation. The situation was acute for women, including white women as their property rights were under the general law that only allowed men to own property (Amoo 2010). This position was subsequently addressed in 1991 through Article 95 (a) of the Constitution of Namibia.

Although the first National Land Conference and the National Resettlement Policy of 2001 outlined the social classes of those who should benefit, other commentators felt that other marginalised groups had been left out and were thus invisible in the policies. Those who felt left out of the definition of disadvantaged groups included the communities who were displaced from their ancestral land by colonial occupation. The issue of responding to ethnic equity is regarded as important for social stability and balancing the question of sharing the benefits of land reform amongst the diverse population. The San, Ovaherero, Ovahimba, Nama and Damara communities have been disadvantaged in accessing land (Bessel et al. 1989). They argue that as pastoral communities, whose livelihoods are livestock-based, they lost more grazing lands than communities in the north-eastern parts of the country and thus they should be prioritised in land allocation (Werner 1993; Carlowitz et al. 2015). The 1991 resolution not

to entertain ancestral land claims left this constituency without recourse and hence they felt left out. Given this situation this constituency view land redistribution as unfair.

Related to this is the fact that the current definition of ‘previously disadvantaged’ does not address the needs of those ‘currently disadvantaged’ or those historically dispossessed of land. Although the San and Ovahimba are recognised as ‘disadvantaged’ they are yet to benefit from land reform. They complain of being resettled in overcrowded, group-resettlement farms without individual allotments, making it difficult to farm and access finance as individuals. It remains to be seen whether these policies gained traction on the ground (Werner 1993).

### **2.8.2 The 2nd National Land Conference and its impact on policy**

The 2<sup>nd</sup> National Land Conference in 2018 adopted 169 Resolutions on commercial, communal and urban land. Women, youth, farm workers, communal farmers, returnees from Botswana, people with disabilities, and war veterans are to be prioritised in land allocation. Unlike in 1991, the resolutions went a step further to pronounce that 70% of all land acquired should benefit war veterans and their dependants and only 30% will be reserved for other Namibians. Commentators noted this change as part of government’s turn to a nationalist agenda, thus superseding class and focus on poverty. This resolution has made Namibians question whether the programme is now earmarked for veterans only. Zimbabwe changed its criteria during the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) to give 20% of all farms acquired to war veterans but it remains to be seen how Namibia will implement this strategy (Kinsey 2004).

In terms of the budgetary allocation under the 2019/2020 financial year, parliament appropriated only N\$100 million for land acquisition. This budget is inadequate and fails to translate into a fiscal policy which is attuned to the land needs of Namibians. The policy decisions taken at the conference are not in sync with the budget and commentators are concerned whether the government is committed to addressing the land issue (The Namibian 2019; Werner et al 2010)

Unlike in 1991 where ancestral land issues were ignored in 2018, the Conference resolved to implement a separate programme prioritising those communities (Republic of Namibia 2018). Commentators agree that the issue of ancestral land has divided Namibians as others are against implementing a policy which creates divisions on tribal and ethnic grounds. Further to this, a Presidential Commission was set up in March 2019 to investigate modalities so as to address issues of restitution thus bringing into the fold the communities that had been left out in the

beneficiary strata. Whether the findings of this Commission will influence the current thinking on beneficiary selection remains to be seen.

## **2.9 The Resettlement Programme in Namibia**

In order to illustrate the complexities underpinning the implementation of the Resettlement policy there is need to outline the processes.

### **2.9.1 Legal framework for resettlement**

The Resettlement programme is state-led and implemented through the legal framework outlined in Annexure 1. As discussed in Chapter 1, as a consequence of its colonial past Namibia decided to reform the land sector through acquisition of land from the commercial farming sector for redistribution to the landless (Werner 2015). The programme consists of three components: the Resettlement Programme, the Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS) and Tenure Reform in Communal Areas (Republic of Namibia 1998, 2001). The Resettlement Programme and Tenure Reform are administered by the ministry of land reform and the focus of this study is on the Resettlement Programme.

### **2.9.2 Land acquisition and impact on the Resettlement Programme**


The Resettlement Programme has been criticised for being sluggish in responding to the land needs with only 3.2 million hectares of the targeted 5 million hectares acquired in the past 28 years as depicted in Annexure 2. The ministry attributes failure to meet targets on a lack of adequate funding, escalating land prices through the willing-buyer-willing-seller principle (Werner 2015). These challenges have negatively impacted the programme's ability to contribute towards an integrated rural development and poverty alleviation strategy. The reliance on a piecemeal approach in land acquisition has rendered the resettlement programme ineffective. Only 5338 households have benefitted since 1991, out of the targeted 243 000 families (Republic of Namibia 2001a), as depicted in Figure 1. Commentators argue that this figure has escalated as demonstrated by the number of applications although over 62.2% of the targeted land has been acquired for resettlement.

Moyo (1999) noted that the process of allocating agricultural land through the Resettlement Programme had become politicised and lacking in transparency. He pointed that 'economics of affection' had found expression in the ties of political patronage that are exploited by

bureaucrats and politicians as preferential treatment is given to the elite. The other thorny issue is the absence of selection criteria that is transparent and has resulted in few checks and balances against rent-seeking and free-riding behaviour (Horsthemke 2004). Van den Brink (2006) cautioned against the excessive centralisation of the planning and administration of the process for selecting beneficiaries and opening up the process to ensure efficacy and the involvement of all stakeholders.

Although Namibians and civil society are visible and vocal on land issues, the question on political will remains. Commentators call for policy reframing which includes other socio-economic interventions besides land to address poverty. What is also of concern to Namibians is the lack of data on beneficiaries, those that need land, the size of land, and for what needs (Hall 2009).

Although the ministry receives applications whenever farms are advertised, it has failed to collect and compute the data to gauge land demand. The 2018 Conference directed the ministry to undertake a study to verify land demand.



**Figure 1: Number of people resettled - 1990-2018 by region (Republic of Namibia 2018)**

### 2.10 Policy Review on Beneficiary Selection in Namibia

Approaches to beneficiary selection have experienced shifting policies due to changes in the objectives of the programme. The initial focus on selection was premised on the perceived extent of need the people displayed and to bring stability to war victims (Odendaal 2005). The first phase of land redistribution (1991-2001) was characterised by social integration,



rehabilitation and provision of farming infrastructure for income-generating activities for livelihoods. There were no criteria and specific activities such as craft-making and gardening were introduced as livelihood strategies National Resettlement Policy (Republic of Namibia 2001a). Most of the vulnerable groups were absorbed through group resettlement projects spread across seven Regions.

The Ministry introduced productivity into the selection process between 2002 and 2005. The National Resettlement Policy (Republic of Namibia 2001a) was revised to reflect the changing policy direction meant to make farmers self-reliant, productive, and use land as a source of employment and income generation. Today the National Resettlement Policy (Republic of Namibia 2001a) categorises land applicants on the basis of economic status, priority and needs as follows:

- People who have neither land, income nor livestock
- People who have neither land, nor income but a few livestock
- People who have no land but have income and livestock

The challenge is whether this classification – which would have prioritised the poor – is reflected in the selection criteria under implementation.

### **2.10.1 The selection criteria for resettlement**

Land allocation is a contentious issue especially as questions are raised regarding whether the targeted groups are benefitting. Civil society has raised concern about who is actually benefitting and whether those benefitting are contributing to the objectives of the programme. While Sender and Johnston (2004:156) argue that “control of land has been retained by existing powerful social groups”, is this observation the case in Namibia? Is there a new form of ownership inequality due to the nature in which the programme is implemented and how land is allocated? Cousins (2000) also posed similar questions in South Africa.

In 2002, the Ministry of Land Reform (MLR) introduced broad conditions for selection and qualifying criteria for resettlement meant to identify beneficiaries as reflected in Box 2.1 and 2.2.

#### **Box 2.1: Broad conditions for selection**

- Ability to farm and have a background in agriculture
- Prepared to hold land under leasehold and relinquish other land
- Applicant should not exceed the farm's carrying capacity.
- Prepared to pay lease and water fees
- Adherence to lease agreement
- Literacy
- Income
- Business plan (Republic of Namibia 2001a)

**Box 2.2: Qualifying criteria for resettlement**



Applicant must be:

- 18 years or older
- Namibian

- Must own 800 small stocks or 150 large stocks
- Not own any land besides residential (Republic of Namibia 2011)

'Prior to the introduction of the criteria the resettlement programme mirrored the form of agricultural land ownership that was envisaged by the SWAPO Party for Namibia. The SWAPO Party envisaged a programme informed by welfarism (Kaapama 2007). The introduction of a selection criteria took away the welfarism aspect as the thinking shifted towards excluding others (Harring et al. 2002).

The landless perceive the criteria as having negated the objectives that sought to redress the skewed land ownership and poverty (Kaapama 2007). Hall (2009) is critical of the new policy requirement for 'own contribution' when the intended beneficiaries are 'marginalised groups'. She questions how government expects vulnerable groups to contribute financially especially as most can only offer their labour to land redistribution. The criteria is said to be out of touch with the realities of the intended policy recipients and will fail (Hall 2009). Commentators attest to farmers struggling to pay lease fees and Agribank loans due to drought and socio-economic challenges. The business plan requirement acts as a tool to exclude the targeted beneficiaries. Jacobs et al. (2003) argued against the requirements for income projections as they exclude poor communities from participating, concurring with Cousins (2018) on reframing policies.

The criteria are viewed by commentators as contentious due to failure to differentiate between the diverse socio-economic categories of beneficiaries. The criteria are broad and difficult to apply in a transparent and consistent manner across the 14 Regions. Owing to the broad nature, it is open to different interpretation and can be used to allocate land to anyone without determining the extent of land needs. The term 'formerly disadvantaged' is wide and covers all black Namibians, even those who are no longer economically disadvantaged and can afford to buy their own farms (Werner et al. 2010).

Farmers' unions are critical of the classification and categorisation of target groups in the Resettlement policy of 2001. They question the policy efficacy of providing land to low-income groups without mentioning support but expect contribution to household food

sufficiency and the GDP. They question the livelihood sustainability of the programme and critic a selection criteria that is ever-changing and considered unfair and ineffective in responding to Namibia's land needs. Moyo (1998:34) observed that, in Zimbabwe public speculation about who will benefit from land reform is currently focused on negative images of unskilled and unproductive black farmers using political patronage to access land, or on the ecologically abusive, poor black, subsistence land tillers whose real calling is not farming.

This observation is also levelled at Namibia where some resettled farmers are nicknamed 'two-goat farmers' as they are perceived not to have enough livestock to farm viably and thus should not have benefitted over those with livestock (The Namibian newspaper). Ntsebeza et al. (2013) in South Africa, advocates for better organisation within the various social movement platforms, as a solution to the plight of the poor within land reform. This argument is being propagated by the Landless People's Movement in Namibia who are driving a social agenda on land, inciting communities to occupy state land in the Hardap and Kharas Regions.

The public dissatisfaction with the criteria includes complaints that the poor and landless are allocated farms with less infrastructure whilst the elite get larger portions with infrastructure (Windhoek Observer 2008). Accusations of nepotism in land allocation are levelled at Resettlement Committees. In 2008, government came under criticism that land had been allocated to SWAPO Party members without advertising the land as required by law. Furthermore, the weight placed on these criteria was not clear and made people suggest that the poor are marginalised (The Namibian 2008).

### **2.10.2 Processes and procedures of beneficiary selection**

Defining who is to benefit from land reform should be informed by the objectives and size of land to be redistributed. The process involves three institutions depicted in Annexure 1. The Regional Resettlement Committee (RRC) is tasked with the initial selection of three applicants that are forwarded to the Land Reform Advisory Committee (LRAC) for final selection and recommendation to the minister for land allocation. The minister can either accept or reject the recommendations. These committees are comprised of 19 members selected from traditional authorities, farmers, line ministries, women, youth, and people living with disabilities.

### **2.10.3 Beneficiary eligibility criteria – point-scoring system**

In 2011, government introduced a point-scoring system to select beneficiaries alongside the broad qualifying criteria. The system awards a scale of 1 up to 5 points for evaluation, with 5 points being the highest and 1 lowest, (Annexure 4). The scores are tallied for each applicant and the highest score is allocated land (Republic of Namibia 2016c). The government justified the system as bringing transparency and fairness into the selection process but this has been contested by civil society (see Annexure 4).

Although the point-scoring system is meant to bring balance, it is biased towards agricultural graduates and against the poor. Owing to the Affirmative Action (Employment) Act, 29 of 1998, married and single women get 3 extra points and generational farm workers get five points (Republic of Namibia 2016c). Angula and Sherborne (2003) support the awarding of five points to farm workers as most are born and reside on the farms.

The expectation is for farmers to have basic literacy. The criteria on the number of livestock are contested as most applicants argue that it is unfair and not thought through. Applicants from the communal areas are prioritised to decongest overcrowded communal areas. Although the RRC and the LRAC use the point-scoring system for selection it has challenges. Gender balance is contested by men and so is agricultural background and qualifications, as those without education are said to be the ones that require land to make a living (Werner 2015). The policy shift towards neo-classical thinking is visible in terms of beneficiary selection. The government prioritise Namibians with assets, agricultural experience and resources. This change negated the role of land in poverty alleviation (Werner et al. 2010).

What remains unclear in Namibia is the definition of who the poor are and how they should be differentiated from the formerly disadvantaged group articulated in the constitution and policy and legal framework. The land-reform processes and procedures have failed to bring clarity in terms of the methods and strategies of assessing the levels of poverty. Seemingly, there is also an expectation within the Resettlement policy, 2001 that those resettled should be food secure and contribute to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In practice this thinking reflects policy mismatch between the needs and livelihood realities of the poor and the policies meant to address poverty (Kaapama 2007). Cousins (2004) attribute the mismatch to a lack of power, organisation, and platform by the poor.

Chambers (1983, 1985) argues that policy contradictions are due to bias against the poor at project-planning phase as they are not consulted or invited to participate. The discussions on land reform are situated in the space where the elite have been known to highjack development programmes. In Okarukambe the elites include civil servants, businessmen, large-scale commercial farmers, lodge owners and politicians. Commentators noted instances where benefits earmarked for the poor including land have been misallocated to benefit the elites. Elites at local levels in Zimbabwe used the disgruntled poor to articulate their own land needs. Moyo (2002) concurs with Chambers (1983, 1985) that the elites gained more from land-reform policies in terms of access to credit, land, infrastructure, and equipment. To him, although government has set up parameters to assist the poor to get land and other resources, the dilemma is that they are controlled by the elites. The challenge is on how to frame policies that address elite capture at local level (Moyo 2002).

Lipton (1982) explains policy contradictions through ‘urban bias’ and its impact on rural poverty. To Lipton (1982) ‘urban elites’ which include business, politicians, academics, and trade unions, control the distribution of resources. The poor in rural areas are dispersed and unorganised. The elite have influence on agricultural prices and investment is in favour of urban areas. This study found the concept of urban bias and analysis relevant to the understanding of the dynamics taking place within the land-reform process, especially where beneficiaries are alleged to be those that can afford to buy land under Agribank.

## **2.11 Conclusion**

### **2.11.1 Policy outcome on beneficiary selection**

An overview of broader issues within land reform and policy interventions were interrogated. The National Resettlement policy (2001) recognises a wide range of beneficiaries under the banner of ‘formerly disadvantaged’ although Moyo (2009) recognises two types of beneficiaries in his studies, that is, the ‘vulnerable landless’ and the ‘competent productive landless farmers’. Studies concur on the need for policy revision which is informed by experiences from the region.

## **Chapter 3: Farmers' Perspectives and Livelihoods**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Chapter 3 presents the study findings and gives a description of the households and farmers that are covered in the study and who have benefitted from land reform in Okarukambe constituency. The background on the farms and farming units in terms of when they were acquired and allocated, the demographic characteristics, regions of origin prior to land allocation, livelihood sources, and the type of farmers and households found in Okarukambe is discussed. Attention is paid to the policies and procedures on beneficiary selection, socio-economic classification of the farmers who benefitted, challenges and opportunities for livelihood strategies. 60 farming households participated (Annexure 9)

The Okarukambe Constituency is located in the Omaheke region which covers 85,000 km<sup>2</sup>. It consists of 52% communal land, 47% freehold land and 1% urban land (Namibia Statistics Agency 2011). From 1990-2018, 86 farms, measuring 480,000 hectares have been acquired in Omaheke for redistribution and, out of these, 21 are part of this study. The other 64 farms are located in other constituencies (Ministry of Land Reform). Freehold agricultural land remains at 3,6 million hectares and is owned by 14% of the population, indicative of the need to redistribute land (Namibia Statistics Agency 2018). Annexure 5 and Figure 2 show the regions where government is acquiring land for land reform and the different agro-ecological zones depicting land uses and production systems.

. 60 farming households participated.

### **3.2 Overview of the Omaheke Region**

The region has seven constituencies and Gobabis is the only municipality (Mendelsohn et al. 2002). The region has a population of 74, 629, of whom 10,060 live in Okarukambe Constituency (Namibia Statistics Agency 2011). Statistics show that 70% of the population is rural-based while the median age is 21 years, indicating a young population (Namibia Statistics

Agency 2013). Available data on livelihood and income sources reveals that 55.3% of the households derive income from paid labour, 12,5% from old-age pension, 11,6% from subsistence farming and 10% from cash remittances. Extensive livestock production accounts for 3% of the households' income against 3, 6% from non-agricultural activities (Namibia Statistics Agency 2015b). 57, 9% of the population are formally employed with 41% employed in agriculture and forestry sectors. Livestock farming is an important sector, contributing 40% of the national herd. Of the seven constituencies Okarukambe is the poorest (Namibia Statistics Agency 2011).









Figure 2: The study area and agro-ecological zones (Hall 2020)

### **3.3 Small-Scale Farmers in Okarukambe**

The farmers interviewed for this study are outlined in Annexure 6, which provides information regarding household composition, sex of respondents, household size, land size, production activity, and livelihood trajectories of the 60 households. The farmer households are divided into two categories, farmers that benefitted from 1995 to 2002 and those that benefitted from 2007 to 2017. A description of each category is provided below.

#### **3.3.1 Farmers who benefitted between 1995 and 2002**

Twenty-seven farmers were interviewed (Annexure 9, households 1 to 27). The farmers were allocated land on seven farms that were subdivided into 29 farming units ranging from 600 to 1200 hectares per household. Livestock production is the main activity. Twenty farmers are over 55 years and seven are between 46 and 55 years (Annexure 6).

Twenty nine out of the sixty beneficiaries are pensioners, indicating a gap in policy in respect of the stake of the youth in land reform (Annexure 6). In terms of gender equity, only five female-headed households benefitted against 22 male-headed households, indicating a skewed selection process in favour of men during the early stages of the programme (Annexure 9, households 1, 5,9,21 and 27). The findings confirm conclusions by Swedish International Development Agency (2015) and Mtero et al. (2019) of gender disparity where women and youth are poorly represented in land allocation. The lack of equity supports the current initiative to award an extra three points to women who apply for land (Annexure 4).

#### **3.3.2 Profile of farmers prior to resettlement**

Prior to resettlement, 24 farmers reported farming in overgrazed communal lands and three women who were landless. Two women were dispossessed of their communal land rights and household and agricultural property by in-laws following the death of their spouses, this due to cultural norm (Interview with farmers 11/11/2017-6/7/2018).

Another woman indicated that due to a lease-fee misunderstanding she was evicted from a relative's farm by means of a court order. Her livestock were driven onto the road. The profile of the beneficiaries prior to resettlement shows a picture of landlessness and farming in overcrowded and overgrazed communal areas. Although these attributes are part of the wider

policy, they are considered the least on the selection criteria. All the 27 farmers concurred that the resettlement programme had offered them an opportunity to own land and a home.

### **3.4 Farmers who benefitted from 2007 to 2017**

The researcher interviewed 33 farmers who benefitted from 14 farms acquired between 2007 and 2017, after the promulgation of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, (Act No. 5 of 1995) (ACLRA) and the National Resettlement Policy, 2001. The farms were subdivided into 33 units averaging 1200-1370 hectares, advertised and beneficiaries applied and were selected (Annexure 9, household 28 to 60) .

Twelve female-headed households and 21 male-headed households benefitted indicating a significant increase to close the gender gap (Annexure 6). Of the 33 households, 20 beneficiaries are aged between 46 and 55, six are over 55 years and seven are between 26 and 45 years. Only seven youth benefitted, indicating an effort to include them in land-reform projects (Annexure 6).

#### **3.4.1 Profile of farmers prior to resettlement.**

Twenty-three farmers indicated farming in overgrazed communal areas prior to being resettled. Two generational farm workers households were evicted from a farm upon the death of their parents. One female farmer indicated that she had no access to any land until resettlement 2016.

A widow indicated that due to the culture and tradition of land grabbing upon the death of her husband, she was left landless and destitute. Mandimika and Matthaei (2013) found that although Article 95(a) of the Constitution of Namibia provides for gender equity and protection, the cultural and social norms associated with land grabbing are still prevalent in Northern Namibia. The government has responded to this challenge by introducing the registration of communal land rights but the issue of land and property grabbing is still a menace according to commentators.

Two other beneficiaries were farming in corridors and had lost cattle to wild dogs, leopards and poisonous plants. In Namibia farmers who are landless but choose to keep and graze livestock on the side of the roads are said to be corridor farming. Two farmers inherited a resettlement farm (Annexure 9, households 14 and 32). One farmer was renting land which proved expensive as the rentals kept escalating, making it difficult to farm. The generational

farm workers and the widow are ranked higher on the priority list of targeted beneficiaries. The other 30 farmers are not high on the priority list (Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform Report [PTT] 2005b). Twenty-five farmers were issued with a letter of allotment and a 99-year lease agreement. Eight are still to get their lease agreements. The Regional Ministry of Land Reform (MLR) office indicated that the shortage of land surveyors has impacted the issuance of leaseholds.

### **3.5 Institutional Structures for Land Reform in Okarukambe**

Neves (2017) noted the influence of institutional structures on the outcome of government development projects and lamented the lack of clear, coordinated terms of reference and mandates in project implementation. The ACLRA, the National Land policy of 1998 and the National Resettlement policy of 2001 ascribe the land-reform mandate to the MLR (Annexure 1). Although land reform is a cross-cutting issue, the MLR has, in practice, been left with the overall responsibility from planning to implementation (Werner et al. 2010).

Annexure 7 outlines the institutions which have a stake in land reform and their responsibilities (Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform Report 2005). Some of the institutions have decentralised functions to the regional level. Key informants indicated that most institutions were unaware of their responsibilities under land reform. The MLR does not consult these institutions during planning and budgeting for land reform, thus affecting the overall programme outcomes. To support this Mr Kraaly a key Informant says: “the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry when approached at regional level to provide extension, training and water expertise they always respond that resettlement farmers are not part of their mandate and they do not have a budget for cater for their needs” ( Interview with Mr. Kraaly, 12/2/2018).

#### **3.5.1 Farmers’ perspectives on selection and land allocation – 1995-2002**

The farms acquired between 1995 and 2002 were allocated at regional level although the structures for acquisition were centralised and remain as such today (Republic of Namibia 2018). According to key informants, the 13 regions were managed by directors and land allocation was at their discretion. Prior to the enactment of the ACLRA, farms were not advertised and information on available land was known only to the directors who wielded power over land allocation. The 27 farmers and key informants point to a lack of technical considerations and absence of a selection criteria. For example one farmer remembered that

“the decision on land allocation by the deputy director was final and could not be appealed to anyone as they had the power to allocate land that time” ( Interview with John, 5/12/2017).

To Odendaal et al. (2005), this implies failure by the MLR to implement the objectives of the reform programme as far back as 2002. The programme is said to have ignored the policy directives enunciated in the National Resettlement policy right from its infancy. The objective then was to allocate land to whoever would have indicated landlessness. The selection criteria were not applied due to the absence of supporting administrative structures (Interviews with key informant, 22/1/2018). These procedures were re-affirmed by the 27 farmers who indicated that after applying they had to compete with others to orally motivate their applications. There were no interviews and Eric who is one of the beneficiaries shared the following:

*“ if you were known in the area where the farm is located then the chances of getting land were high as people would vote for your application when the issue was put to a vote, no other criteria, other than being landless and having livestock was applied then”.* (Interview with Eric 6/4/2018).

All 27 farmers indicated that the institutional process for selection could change any day at the behest of the deputy director. They contend that the selection was influenced by ethnic considerations and tribal leanings, especially as the selection was done in the regions where the farms were located. Farmers indicated that if you were not originally from that region, the chances of getting land were slim as people voted for applicants whom they knew. The deputy director’s office was very powerful, to the extent of even signing allotment letters instead of the permanent secretary or the minister. This brings to the fore the challenges highlighted by the PTT Report (2005a) on the importance of clarifying the roles of all stakeholders in land reform, within and outside the institutional framework. Although the process was conducted in a group format, eight farmers cited the lack of transparency and fairness in the land-allocation process as reasons why some were allocated land over others (interviews with farmers 11/11/2017-6/7/2018).

Seven farmers indicated elements of tribalism and questioned the determinant factor that the deputy director had used to select applicants. Twelve farmers thought the process was fair as those originally from Omaheke benefitted first (interviews with farmers 11/11/2017-6/7/2018). Werner et al. (2010:37-39) found accusations of “rampant nepotism” and “murky land hand-outs” to relatives in the region. The process of settler selection and land allocation was flawed, hence the introduction in 2005 of the Regional Resettlement committee (RRC) and 14 deputy

directors. Katarina also pointed out that *“If you didn’t know anyone in that region or you were not from that region your chances of getting land that time were poor as no one would vote for you. People voted for those whom they knew and from their regions”* (Interviews with Katarina 11/11/2017).

The MLR, the Constituency councillor and the traditional authorities were the structures to interact with the prospective land owners through the issuance of letters of support, according to key informants. Upon allocation, the farmers were given allotment letters reflecting their name and size of land but were left to fend for themselves. Although the Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform Report (2005) recommended different packages, all 27 respondents indicated that they have had little or no assistance from the MLR since being resettled. Key informants pointed out the absence of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry in the provision of extension services. Furthermore, 18 of the 27 farmers also pointed to the lack of an organised association to represent and articulate their needs.

Farmers expect the MLR to support them at local level but the assistance has not been forthcoming. Kanyinga (2009) attributes the failure of Kenya’s land-reform programme to the absence of national policies to guide the process and general lack of implementation of comprehensive projects. The situation in Okarukambe concurs with Kanyinga (2009) and demonstrates the existence of unclear and absent structures for land reform as envisaged in the Resettlement Policy.

### **3.5.2 Farmers’ perspectives on selection and land allocation – 2007-2017**

Farmers who benefitted during the period 2007-2017 indicated different experiences on settler selection. The 33 farmers applied for land following advertisements of farms by the government in the newspapers. After submission of the application forms none of the farmers was interviewed to clarify contents of the application they submitted (Annexure 9, households 28 to 60). The farmers complained about the long waiting period of over 95 days and the lack of feedback from the ministry prior to publishing of the names of the successful applicants in the newspaper. All the farmers learned that they had benefitted through the media. Fifteen farmers indicated that they had conducted a site visit to inspect the farms prior to applying.

Twenty farmers sought assistance with the application process and paid for these services. The requirement for financial records and stock cards was considered cumbersome and unnecessary as most farmers had few livestock to sustain the required livestock units (interviews with farmers 2/2/2018-17/8/2018). Owing to the nature of the application process, the researcher was not able to locate and interview applicants who were not successful thus she concentrated on people who had benefitted. Many farmers said that “ *my application form was not even acknowledged in the twenty times that I have been applying and thankfully I saw my name in the paper this time round but what about my other applications*” (Interview with Gustav, 22/6/2018)

Interviews with farmers who were allocated land from 2007 to 2017 indicated that although the MLR appear to be compliant with policy and legal framework on paper, in practice there were a lot of contradictions, especially with the policy outcomes, an issue that Haring et al. (2007) also raised. The Regional office in interviews lamented the lack of policy details pertaining to pre- and post-settlement support to mitigate challenges and assist the farmers to produce.

The farmers want the MLR to change the time taken from land acquisition, selection and allocation to enable applicants to plan ahead. Some indicated that due to the lengthy process farm infrastructure was vandalised and beneficiaries had to spend money on repairs. Farmers queried whether the RRC and LRAC are in a position to be fair and transparent as they are also applying for land. They asserted that the process of land allocation appears fair on paper but in practice it is unfair and out-dated. The farmers concurred that land reform should be inclusive and “*the only criteria should be for one to be a Namibian only, the rest encourages corruption*” (Interviews with Milka, 17/8/2018). Key informants confirmed this sentiment and indicated that due to the scarcity and high demand for land, there are reports and allegations that in some cases money is exchanging hands for a piece of land.

Discussions with the farmers and the Ministry of Land Reform staff indicated the presence of systemic challenges within the institutional structures that are negatively impacting the farmers’ livelihoods. Interviews with key informants indicated a land-reform process that is disjointed in terms of planning and implementation. The Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform Report (2005) noted that productivity could be achieved partly through decentralised and community-driven interventions. Hall (2009) concurred and expounded by arguing for the

inclusion of policies to restructure institutions for land reform to bring efficiency through a 'one-stop shop' service for farmers.

### **3.6 Challenges Raised by Farmers**

All the farmers indicated that they would want access to cheap credit as the funding from Agribank is considered to be limiting, inadequate and unaffordable. The farmers also pointed out that the 99-year lease made it difficult to access credit due to the lease conditions and the ownership of land, thus impacting on production. Many farmers indicated that “ *none of the commercial banks want to give us money with the lease from the government except Agribank who gives very little*”, (interview with Josef, 22/6/2018). Commentators question whether the lease encourages infrastructural investment as farmers do not feel a sense of ownership.

Although the Ministry of Land Reform argue that the current policy and legal framework provides the institutional and implementation plan for land reform, Werner et al. (2010) argues otherwise. They point out that although the policy and legal framework outlines the various sectorial mandates, in certain cases the functions have remained centralised at the MLR head office (Werner et al. 2010). In 2017, the Ministry was supposed to decentralise the land acquisition and allocation functions in accordance with the government Decentralisation Action Plan (2017) but it was only partially done (interview with deputy director 22/1/2018).

Farmers indicated that upon land allocation, they were left to fend for themselves as the MLR rarely engages them. They cited the problems of communication with the regional MLR office and the lack of public transport. Farmers have to travel long distances to Gobabis to seek veterinary services. All 60 farmers indicated the absence of an association except in instances where farmers share water infrastructure and need to contribute towards water repairs. At least 10 farmers are members of a farmer organisation whilst others just fend for themselves in terms of extension services. All the 60 farmers indicated that they would want to be part of a farmer organisation that caters for their specific needs as small-scale farmers.

### **3.7 Government Perspective on Land Allocation**

The MLR is left with the responsibility of coordinating other ministries who are part of the implementation plan for land reform. The MLR found the task challenging as there is no mandate to compel other stakeholders to contribute towards sectoral functions and to land reform (key informant interviews 22/1/2018-15/2/2018). Key informants cited the challenges



associated with processing a huge number of applications against a few subdivisions of land, exposing desperate applicants to bribery solicitation which is said to be rife according to Walters (the official Namibian Ombudsman) (2017). They cited the challenges associated with lack of an existing database for verification purposes and a land information system to capture and store all the data on applicants. The lack of a database opens up the selection system to corruption and opportunities for collusion among members of the RRC and LRAC (interviews with key informants 22/1/2018-15/2/2018).

The budgetary allocation for land purchase is cited by a former director as one of the challenges to land allocation as farms offered to the state are waived due to lack of funding. This is a challenge that is compounded by price escalations, confirming Borrás' (2003) conclusion that it is a fallacy that landowners will lower prices when paid market values. To him this affects the demand for land and the ability by the ministry to respond to the land needs. Farms offered to government are from the driest regions where water is a challenge entailing further investment by the government.

At the MLR office in Gobabis the deputy director lamented the partial devolution of the government Decentralisation Plan (of 2017) where only administrative functions were decentralised. Decisions on budgets on land acquisition and allocation are still taken in Windhoek. The top-down implementation fails to capture the diversity between local communities and their needs. The regional office does not participate in budget planning and just get directives from head office to implement the finalised and adopted Annual Plan. The regional office understands decentralisation as full participation and power to make decisions on land-reform issues which affect the region and not the current top-to-bottom approach. The office pointed the exclusion of the Regional Council in participating in the LRAC although it is the highest institution at regional level that is mandated to plan and implement regional policies. The office attributes the current top-to-bottom approach to planning and management as detrimental to the land-reform process. They view the Annual Plans handed down to the region as *“just a tool to supervise the office of the deputy director as I do not have any say on it”*, signifying frustrations with the bureaucracy (key informant interviews 22/1/2018-15/2/2018).

### **3.8 An LRAC and RRC perspective on the land-allocation process**

The Regional Resettlement Committee (RRC), chaired by the regional governor, works closely with the ministry at regional level. The Committee has 19 members as indicated in Chapter 2. The deputy director indicated that although the RRC's functions are specific to the regional land needs, the Committee is not empowered to make decisions except to recommend to the LRAC. This is contrary to the government's policy to decentralise structures for good land governance and efficacy illustrating a gap between practice and policy. The PTT Report (Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform 2005) spoke of the merits of a decentralised land-reform process for efficiency and general good land governance. Borras (2003) disputes the assumption that decentralisation will bring transparency and efficiency in implementation as experiences in South Africa, Brazil and Colombia have demonstrated. The RRC indicated the pitfalls of the top-down land-allocation process to resolve the region's land needs rendering the committee ineffective in responding to regional land needs, validating Borras' (2003) findings. The current land-allocation process has no feedback structure between the RRC and the LRAC prior to final recommendations to the minister. As a result they cannot contest the decisions of the LRAC with regard to specific regional recommendations. In practice the RRC have expressed frustration with the legal provisions that confine their role to making recommendations only. The RRC are also labelled as insensitive to the plight of overcrowded communities, especially where the landless in the region are not among those allocated land (interviews with RRC 14/12/2017-14/6/2018).

Interviews with the LRAC offered a different perspective. They consider the process of land allocation cumbersome as they have to select one applicant out of 42 recommended applications per farming unit from all 14 regions. The LRAC describes the process as onerous due to limited budgets, thus benefiting only a few applicants. Officials complain about the time spent processing the applications at the expense of their other duties. The Commissioners concurred that demand for land is higher than the land acquired, making the prioritisation on who gets to benefit challenging. To them the policy and legal framework makes the selection challenging as the people targeted cover a wide range of black Namibians, meaning all black Namibians should benefit. Commentators point out that the whole selection process, including the competition for scarce land, opens up to corruption.

The Commission highlighted the challenges posed by the absence of a waiting list for use as a point of reference. The LRAC indicated that a waiting list would assist in informing future land

acquisition, transparency in selection, and prioritisation in land allocation. The absence of a database makes the selection process lengthy and cumbersome for the officials, RRC and the LRAC, as each farm requires separate selection processes. Annexure 7 outlines the roles played the Ministry of Land Reform, the LRAC and the RRC in the land allocation process.

Key informants highlighted instances where some applicants have been applying since 1991 and have not been resettled and others apply just once and are selected, bringing into question the credibility of the process. Discussions on the establishment of a database to bring uniformity and transparency in the selection process was discussed but deemed impractical. The Khomas region is the only one with a small database which informs the number of times an applicants has applied for land and which the RRC utilise to inform recommendations to the LRAC (key informants interview). In South Africa a waiting list is presumed to raise expectations, especially among the poor whom are not a priority (Mtero et al. 2019). Some commissioners consider the land-allocation process to be unfair, as those who do not have access to the media are excluded from applying due to inaccessibility.

Ten LRAC members spoke to the challenge where some commissioners motivate and recommend applicants from their own regions. An ombudsman report (Walters 2017) also raised the issue of cases of conflict of interests, lobbying for friends, tribalism, bribery, and colluding. Administratively, two commissioners felt that the legal process was not adhered to in instances where recommendations by commissioners are changed without ratification, as required by law. Key informants corroborated this observation by noting the high court cases where land allocation is challenged and referred for review, stressing the importance of transparency in the land allocation process.

### **3.9 Procedures for Settler Selection**

Key informants noted that stakeholders are keen to understand the efficacy and legitimacy procedures of land allocation. Those who have benefitted must respond to national imperatives of poverty alleviation, employment and food security. In 2008, the minister of land reform spoke of a resettlement process that is unquestionable, to the extent that those who do not get the land must be satisfied with the reasons behind the decisions. Further, the National Resettlement Policy (Republic of Namibia 2001a) is meant to respond to unequal land distribution and improved access to land. Thus, a transparent selection process is inferred in the policy definition.

According to the deputy director, the ministry acquires farms and as soon as the planning and subdivision is finalised, an advertisement is placed in the local newspaper inviting Namibians to apply. The completed application forms are handed in at the head office or regional office. The applicants are not given a reference number for follow-up, nor are copies scanned and stored as documentary proof, making it difficult for applicants to make enquiries on the status of the application. Applicants get to know about the status of the application when the names of the beneficiaries are advertised in the newspaper. Key informants consider the process frustrating to applicants as they have to wait for the next advertisement to rekindle hope of access to land.

The secretariat to the RRC indicated that unsuccessful applicants query and demand to see how the RRC apportioned marks to their application. Applicants also demand the minutes of the meeting to verify but the minutes are privileged and not shared. It is due to the lack of participation by applicants and lack of information that has led Namibians to castigate the selection process as mired in *'favouritism'*, *'corrupt'*, *'secretive'* and *'tribal'* according to the deputy director: *"People want to know and to be given feedback about the fate of their application at every stage and that way they feel the process is transparent"* (interviews with Mr Burse, RRC, 14/6/2018).

Moyo (1999) writes about a beneficiary-selection process in Zimbabwe which is 'elitist, corrupt and not transparent'. Commentators informed that access to information on the status of applications is difficult unless you know someone in the RRC, LRAC or the MLR (interviews with key informant, Mr Botha, 22/1/2018).

The secretariat considers the resettlement criteria as an efficient way of selecting farmers for such a few farms. They however argue that it is challenging to judge commitment and priority of land needs based on an application form without an interview. They also agreed that some important aspects of the application can be misinterpreted through human error and this affects the applicant's chances on land allocation.

### **3.10 RRC Perspective on Procedures for Beneficiary Selection**

The secretariat to the RRC in Omaheke gave a synopsis of the process of beneficiary selection, discussed in Chapter 2. In practice the secretariat and the MLR coordinate the process that Werner et al. (2010) labels as 'contentious' due to lack of clarity of the selection criteria which is open to different interpretations.

After land acquisition, the ACLRA provides for the preparation of allotment plans for the subdivided farming units, placement of advertisements in the government Gazette and local newspapers inviting applications; Annexure 8 shows an example of a farm advertisement.

The RRC is guided by the Resettlement Criteria (Republic of Namibia 2011) and Resettlement Policy (Republic of Namibia 2001a) in selecting applicants. Interviews with key informants dispute this assertion and argued that the selection process is perceived by communities as unfair, not transparent and nepotistic. Mr Ndook a deputy director emphasised the issue by stating that:

*“it is an open secret that members of the RRC and the LRAC take turns during their meetings to motivate and select each other’s relatives and friends at different times of the month and in different regions so as to evade suspicion. This practice makes it difficult to prove these allegations (key informant Interview, 14/2/2018).*

The Resettlement Policy (Republic of Namibia 2001a) targets vulnerable communities but the RRC has argued that it takes agricultural qualifications and ability to finance farming operations into consideration. Key informants dispute these assertions and questioned the lack of farming experience and knowledge among the beneficiaries. They argued that some farms are being subleased, indicating that there could be some beneficiaries who want land for residential purposes and not for farming. Key informants coined the phrase ‘land banking’ to denote the current situation where land beneficiaries sublease the allocated land in exchange for money with the hope to work the land when they get resources. The RRC conceded the shift in policy from the landless poor to well-resourced Namibians due to budgetary challenges. Werner et al. (2010) validates the findings and argued that the policy change is informed by neo-liberal economic thinking adopted by government which targets applicants with resources and agriculture graduates. South Africa also targets the ‘fittest’ beneficiary with the competency to be a commercial farmer (Mtero et al. 2019)

Harring et al. (2007) argue that inferences in the language of the policy will undercut the priority groups and focus on poverty alleviation. Werner et al. (2010) argue for a streamlined criterion which is transparent as the current criteria qualifies even Namibians who afford to buy a farm through Agribank.

### 3.11 Land Allocation Prioritisation – Who Should Benefit First?

Sixty farmers interviewed concurred on the need to revise the Resettlement Policy of 2001. They argued for the assessment and review of categories which have benefitted since 1991 to inform those to be prioritised. Forty-seven of the 60 farmers allocated are originally from Omaheke region and felt that 70% of all land acquired should be allocated to beneficiaries originally from the region where the farm is located and 30% to those outside the region labelled as ‘foreigners’ (Werner 1993). Thirteen farmers felt that Namibians should apply for land in any part of the country.

Although 47 of the 60 farmers originally from Omaheke region benefitted, resettled farmers still maintain that preference in land allocation is being given to people outside the region. During follow-up questions, the farmers argue that the evidence is in the state of the overcrowded and overgrazed communal areas within Omaheke. A report by the ombudsman (Walters 2017) indicated that Namibians generally believe that applicants from the northern parts benefit more and facts prove differently.

Key informants, the RRC and the LRAC rank civil servants, politicians, business people, returnees, refugees and former farm workers constitute the groups that have benefitted. The returnees, refugees, youth, farmers from overcrowded communal and farm workers are part of the target group but very few have benefitted. The ranking concurs with the findings of the ombudsman report (Walters 2017) that the elites have benefitted more than the poor who are meant to be the targeted group. The Report claims that the current clamour for restitution of ancestral land rights is due to unfair resettlement processes. Key informants indicate that former farmworkers, women, youth, those with livestock and no land, agricultural graduates, returnee, farmers from overcrowded communities and any Namibian who wants land should be prioritised in that order.

The RRC in Okarukambe failed to consider the people with no land, no livestock and no money as espoused in the Resettlement Policy of 2001 when allocating land. In this regard, Cousins et al. (2002) pointed to the prevalence of contradictions in land-policy implementation and its negative impact on rural development.

### **3.12 Who has benefitted?**

Out of the 60 farmers interviewed, 25 are government employees, 17 are former farm workers, 13 are business people, 4 are private sector professionals and 1 is a governor's wife. Only 17 beneficiaries out of the 60 farmers are targeted by the National Resettlement Policy (2001). The findings confirm the complaints by civil society that those who are benefiting are individuals who can afford to buy their own farms through the AALS. This also proves Cousins' (2002) assertions on policy mismatch and contradictions, as the intended beneficiaries only benefitted marginally. Key informants argue that the proliferation of court applications challenging the procedures and decisions of the RRC, LRAC and the minister prove lack of transparency in land allocation.

### **3.13 Socio-economic status of those allocated land**

The researcher distinguishes between part-time and full-time farmers in Okarukambe. Out of the 60 farmers interviewed, 52 farmers are part-time farmers and 8 are full-time. Fifty-nine of the 60 farmers are livestock farmers with small seasonal gardens for household consumption. One is a full-time game farmer. The 59 farmers farm with cattle, goats, and sheep, although 40 farmers own donkeys and horses for transportation and farm work and 2 farmers keep pigs.

#### **3.13.1 Part-time small-scale Farmers**

Of the 52 part-time farmers, 25 are civil servants, 13 are self-employed, six are private sector employees and six are former farm workers who still continue to work on neighbouring commercial farmers' farms to supplement income and pension grants (Annexure 6). This category relies on other sources of income for livelihood. Six households employ workers whilst the rest rely on family labour. Although these farmers earn income outside the farm, the majority are unable to employ wage labour, purchase more land to expand or change their current economic status as envisaged by Bernstein (1995) when he spoke of 'rich peasants'. In fact all the sampled farmers indicated that they could not afford resources to employ farm managers.

#### **3.13.2 Full-time farmers**

Eight farmers are full-time and rely on the income from farming for livelihood (Annexure 6, households, 11, 14, 18, 34, 44, 45, 48 and 50). They rely on family labour but due to lack of

support from government they are not able to expand farming operations. They rely on the sale of goats and sheep to pay for food and services. Owing to financial stress the farmers sublease parts of their grazing in exchange for money and this leads to overstocking and overgrazing. This is contrary to what Sender (2016) envisaged for small-scale farmers who are supported to 'accumulate from below'. In Okarukambe, farmers eke out a living without support from the government and rely on off-farm income to supplement meagre livestock-farming earnings and, as a result, most are part-time farmers. The study findings concur with Cousins' (2011) argument for a policy framework that is informed by the diversity of the farmers and not a 'one size fits all' policy framework as is currently the case under Namibia's land-reform programme.

### **3.14 Institutional Challenges to Settler Selection**

The study indicates a land reform that is in 'disarray' (Cousins 2013a:11), where there is poor planning, non-existent support (Hall 2015), and unavailable data on the profile of beneficiaries (Lahiff 2009). The lack of transparency in the selection process and within the key institutions tasked to implement the programme is an issue that warrants address as it impacts the outcome of the resettlement process.

At regional level, key informants spoke of procedures conducted without due regard for the policy and legal framework. The Resettlement Policy (2001) speaks of giving priority to the poor but the outcome is different. What irked the respondents was the exclusion from the selection process as they failed to participate. The exclusion made applicants apprehensive and vulnerable to bribes and kickbacks in order to get information on the status of their applications (interview with farmers). Sohail et al. (2009) attest to the negative effects of secrecy to the detriment of institutions when corruption, fraud and favouritism become rife. In this respect the UN Habitat (2007) advocates transparency as one of the building blocks of good land governance.

Although eight out of the 60 targeted farmers are still to be issued with leaseholds, the majority have leaseholds. The farmers point out the ineffectiveness of the leasehold as it compels them to access credit only from Agribank where the maximum loan amount is inadequate for infrastructure and restocking. Key informants noted the skills shortage in land administration within the MLR which has negatively impacted on the issuance of leaseholds.



Key informants argue that the decision by the MLR to centralise land acquisition and resettlement has excluded other key institutions impacting on the programme outcomes. The RRC complains of being ‘toothless’ and ‘rubber stamping’ the decisions made at MLR head office, (key informant interview 22/1/2018-15/2/2018). Although the high court and the land tribunal are available for arbitration they are not accessible to the poor who require that service. Land policies and institutions are important strategic tools that enable the poor to accumulate assets, sustainable resource use and lead to agricultural productivity. It is a futile exercise to have institutional and policy frameworks that are not informed by good land governance as these will not serve the objectives of land reform but rather acts as detriments. This sums up the populace’s frustrations with the current land-reform institutional framework (Adams 2000a).

### **3.15 Livelihood Assets and a Livelihood Typology**

This section outlines the different livelihood assets by applying the sustainable livelihood framework to understand the different categories of households who benefitted in Okarukambe. This outline will assist to clarify whom of the farmers who benefitted are ‘hanging in’, ‘stepping up’, ‘stepping out’ or ‘dropping out’, as advanced by Dorward et al. (2009). One of the objectives of the land-reform programme is to improve the livelihoods through food security. The livelihoods assets that will be discussed below are in relation to farming and household food security.

#### **3.15.1 Livelihood assets and application of the sustainable livelihoods framework.**

The five categories of assets identified in Okarukambe are discussed below:

##### **Natural capital**

Land and water are prerequisite resources for livestock production. In Okarukambe land and water are scarce resources which depend on the efficiency of institutions to deliver. Although households have access to land, access to water is a challenge in semi-arid Namibia. Underground water is a challenge and farming units are left without a water source after subdivision and rely on shared water infrastructure. The farms were utilised as single entities but they are subdivided into farming units averaging 600-1400 hectares and allocated to 3 or 4 small-scale farmers guided by the land’s carrying capacity. Notable is the issue of the capacity

of the boreholes for production and household use that previously sustained one farmer but is now shared among three families (key informant interview 22/1/2018-15/2/2018).

Key informants also questioned the 600 hectares allocated to farmers during 1995-2002 for livestock farming in a semi-arid country. Key informants contend that overstocking due to subleasing is contributing to land degradation, stress, poverty, and disputes among farmers. This scenario is not tenable for the resettlement prospects and the envisioned objectives. They point to the poor institutional framework and absence of monitoring and evaluation for contributing to the mismanagement of the farms.

In terms of tenure arrangements, 52 out of the 60 farmers have 99-year leases which they can use to access small loans through Agribank as discussed earlier. The farmers indicated that although they can only access funding from Agribank, they feel secure as the leasehold gives them power to bequeath, sublease and inherit. They indicated that none of the farmers have been evicted or had the lease cancelled by the government. Informants indicated that due to institutional inefficiency and unclear policies, divorced women's tenure rights are threatened. Although not in the study area, two women face eviction following divorce as the leasehold is issued in the name of the spouse. These cases demonstrate ineffective land governance as the MLR joint land registration certificates and leaseholds are issued in communal areas but the MLR fails to articulate similar clarity under the Resettlement programme (interviews with key informants, Mr Kanga, Mr Allen and Mr Muza, 13/2/2018)

However inheritance procedures have been clarified except in cases where a widow's lease is under threat from the husband's family. Two families in Okarukambe have inherited the leasehold from their parents, (interview with Paul and Gerson 7/4/2018 and 2/2/2018), but findings by Mtero et al. (2019) indicates apprehensions and lack of clarity on inheritance in the north-west, creating room for corruption.

### **Physical capital**

Access to transport is a challenge for households in Okarukambe. The farms are located in a commercial farming area not serviced by public transport. The households use donkey carts for transportation to the main roads to access public transport. Transport is expensive and households frequent the town for shopping and other services. What irks the farmers most is the cost of transporting livestock to the auction as most of the profit goes towards transport.

They suggest that the government should provide subsidised group transportation for livestock marketing to cut costs (interviews with farmers, Martin, Henry, Paul and Fred, 7/4/2018)

In terms of communication, all the households have private cellular phones and radios with a few owning a television set and having access to newspapers. The constituency office, church, MLR officials and auction floors are common platforms for sharing information (interview with farmers, Obed, Lyody and Silba, 28/4/2018).

### **Financial capital**

Financial capital varies from one household to another. Out of the 52 part-time farmers, 25 are employed and have a salary from government, 13 are business owners, six are salaried and have private-sector, professional jobs, and six are former farm workers who rely on piecework (Annexure 6). Hall et al. (2017), in their analysis of three models of agricultural commercialisation in Kenya, Ghana and Zambia, highlight the importance of piecework to supplement livelihoods and prevent small-scale farmers from immigrating to other areas for income. Only eight households, (Annexure 6, households, 11, 14, 18, 34, 44, 45, 48 and 50) who are full-time farmers rely on a pension, grants, and the sale of livestock. Only two households receive remittances (Annexure 6, households 8 and 14) from their children. Most of the farmers spent income on food, water infrastructure, transport and inputs due to lack of water and support.

All 60 households own livestock, cattle range between 22 and 176 per household, Boer goats between 10 and 158, sheep between 4 and 90, 2 households own 10 pigs and others between 2 and 10, only 55 households own donkeys (between 2 and 10) and only 55 households own horses (ranging from 1 to 15). Chickens and pigs are kept mainly for household consumption.

### **Human capital**

All the sixty farming households have basic education, knowledge of livestock farming and experience having been farming in communal areas or working on commercial farms prior to being resettled (interview with farmers, 11/11/2017 – 17/8/2018). Education and experience in farming are ranked high in the selection process (Annexure 4; Box 2.1). The sixty farmers have basic literacy, numeracy and knowledge in veldt management, livestock management and diseases control using passed down knowledge. They require training in animal husbandry and new technologies in livestock breeding. Six former farm workers are the most affected due to under investment in schools in the farming community and restrictions from former employers

from attending school (Interview with former farm workers households 11, 14, 18, 34, 44 and 45, 11/11/2017-17/8/2018). The Ministries of Education, Agriculture, Water and Forestry (Annexure 7) have failed to provide such services due to budgetary constraints and farmers indicated that *“if the issue is not addressed it might continue to affect us and children unless intervention measures are put in place”* (Interview with former farm workers households 11, 14, 18, 34, 44 and 45, 11/11/2017-17/8/2018)..

All the 60 farmers indicated that although they are able to farm with livestock and provide family labour they experience challenges due to lack of training in modern farming techniques which impinge on their ability to increase production and earning potential. The six former farm workers rely on traditional farming knowledge and skills acquired on commercial farms. They consider modern farming techniques as expensive. Out of the 52 part time farmers 44 indicated that they are challenged by a lack of both traditional and modern farming methods especially the application of veterinary medications. These knowledge gaps constrain their production and outputs (Interview with farmers 11/11/2017-6/7/2018). All the sixty farmers felt that production activities on the neighbouring large scale commercial farmers was high due access to information on better breeds of livestock and training. As a result they fetch better prices at auctions. (interview with farmers, 11/11/2017-6/7/2018).

Sixteen farmers find it difficult to sell livestock due to transport costs and end up overstocking and overgrazing, negatively impacting their productive capacity and earning potential (Interview with farmers 11/11/2017-6/7/2018). Due to successive droughts and farming part-time some are losing livestock. The 60 farmers stressed the importance of off- farm income to augment farming activities. Due to lack of post-settlement support investment on the farming activities is low. Although the government declared 2019 as a drought year and is mobilising funding for fodder most farmers consider the intervention too little and late.

### **Social capital**

All the 60 farmers indicated that they belong to a water committee that is established on each farm for purposes of maintaining water infrastructure. Farmers' benefit from shared labour for water infrastructure repair, livestock farming techniques and shared cost of water. Although other farmers fail to contribute in cash or labour for water, the benefits in terms of basic survival and social maintenance outweigh the strife. Farmers indicated that the committee also provide

a safety net of shared costs in the absence of adequate post settlement support (Interview with farmers 11/11/2017-17/8/2018). Former farm workers indicated that they sometimes provide labour for reciprocity for paid services provided by some of the part time farmers. In other cases labour is exchanged for money for borehole repairs. In some cases farmers sublease portions of their land in exchange for livestock.

44 out of the 60 farmers also belong to the newly-created Emerging Commercial Farmers Union (ECFU) which is earmarked for resettled farmers. Although still in its infancy, the ECFU attracted the membership of the resettled farmers due to its focus on issues affecting them although farmers indicated that the benefits were still not apparent at household level. The rest of the farmers are not members of a union due to lack of interest. None of the farmers indicated that they are restricted from joining any association.

### **3.16 Conclusion**

Chapter 3 presented the findings and analysis of the Okarukambe case study. The findings show a land selection and allocation process which is technically driven in terms of the existence of a policy and legal framework. The selection criteria define in broad terms the beneficiaries of land reform as poor farm workers and returnees but there is no system or strategy to prioritise those groups. Lahiff (2009), Hall (2009), and Cousins (2018), agree that contrary to policy pronouncements, land-reform beneficiaries are actually not ‘small-scale farmers’ or ‘rural poor’ but ‘emergent black bourgeoisie’. The study point to a mismatch between policy and practice and questions the effectiveness of disjointed institutions which have made little contribution to livelihoods of farmers. Farmers are struggling to eke out a living due to lack of support (Cousins et al. 2015). It is evident in Okarukambe that the selection process is under contestation. The current policy gaps in land reform and ineptitude is also questioned by Hall (2009) who argues for a land-reform process that acts as a ‘catalyst’ for change, which is not the case in Okarukambe.

Access to livelihood assets, institutional support and the external environment are crucial in the ability of households to produce food and contribute to the household food security (Scoones 1998). Most households in Okarukambe rely on livestock sales and income from outside the farm for livelihood. A few of the farmers have access to remittances from relatives and pension grants. Fifty-two out of the 60 farmers still farm part-time to augment income and are struggling to earn a livelihood.

The case of Okarukambe is not isolated, as studies in Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe indicate challenges in an environment where the new political and economic elites get more access to land at the expense of the poor (Kanyinga 2009, Moyo 2009, Hall 2009, Cousins 2018). Farmers in Okarukambe suggest the review of the resettlement criteria. Based on the socio-economic dynamics experienced by the farmers in Okarukambe, the researcher concludes that the typology of ‘rich peasants’ by Bernstein (1995) and the ‘accumulation from below’ by Cousins (2011) is not possible unless the land-reform policy and legal framework is reviewed.



## **Chapter 4: Reflections on policies and institutions**

### **4.1 Introduction**

Although the land-reform programme is implemented amidst continual questions, lessons can be drawn to inform future policies. This study has shown the intrinsic capacity for land reform to address poverty if specific policies and strategies to target the poor are introduced. The findings also indicate the urgency with which the programme needs to be reviewed to ensure inclusive sustainable livelihoods. This chapter discusses and analyses the research findings using the literature in order to connect the findings back to debates. The analysis is guided by the key thematic areas emanating from the research question and objectives

### **4.2 Institutional Structures and Land-reform Implementation.**

#### **4.2.1 Government ministries and other stakeholders**

The findings indicate an institutional framework that is flawed due to the fragmentation of the key stakeholders, overlapping responsibilities and lack of coordination (Hall 2015). The Regional Resettlement Committee (RRC) and the Land Reform Advisory Commission (LRAC) are legally constituted but weak and not responding to the land needs of the poor. The institutions exist on paper but operate in a vacuum as attested by the 60 farmers in Okarukambe who have not met or engaged with many of the institutions (Annexure 7). Farmers are left to fend for themselves perpetuating class inequalities due to institutional ineffectiveness.

Although some of the objectives of the programme have been met in terms of redistribution and reintegration, it has failed to bring small-scale farmers into the mainstream economy and create employment in agriculture (key informant interview). Institutions mediate processes for access to land, resources and strategies for creating livelihoods (Scoones 1998). In Okarukambe, all the 60 farmers (Annexures 6, households 1 to 60) complained of lack of post settlement support in the form of training, provision of extension services and finance. They indicated that the institutions that were set up by government to respond to land reform issues are disjointed, uncoordinated and they have not implemented the policies under their mandate which are meant to benefit them (Annexure 7). The disengagement is reflected in low production activities which translate to low income diversification and few opportunities for the resettled farmers.

Farmers complained about lack of support in terms of water and infrastructure. The Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry (Annexure 7) is tasked with the drilling of boreholes but during interviews farmers complained of the non-existence of these services. One farmer stated that *“since being resettled in 2002 I have not seen anyone from Agriculture in our area except some Lands officials once in a while, we are on our own”* (Interview with Joselyn, 5/12/2017). Similarly, this study concurs with findings by Kirk (2015) that access to land is not sufficient without having institutional structures with clear mandates and access to post-settlement support for beneficiaries.

The land-reform programme is made complex due to misaligned mandates of the different ministries and agencies which undermine the implementation process. Although some of the institutions in Annexure 7 have been decentralised, the study demonstrated the futility of the decision as the envisaged impact is not felt by the farmers. The Ministry of Land Reform (MLR) regional office and the RRC are excluded in the planning and budgeting process for land-reform projects being implemented in their region. As a result, they indicated that they are endorsing programmes that are out of sync with the regional poverty alleviation plans. Levine et al. (2008) concurs with the RRC and concluded that the impact of decentralisation at regional level has been marginal. The RRC questioned the top-down policy decisions and the absence of an instrument to enforce regional decisions. In addition, one regional official stated that: *“all the plans that we sit and agree upon as a region to solve issues at hand are not considered in the overall plan, we are just handed down a plan approved at head office to implement”* (interview with Ms Salt, 14/12/2017)

The study found that the manner of the implementation of the land-reform programme at regional level failed to increase its relevance and widen its scope among stakeholders, an observation that Adams (2000a) made in respect of South Africa.

#### **4.2.2 Policy and legal framework**

The study demonstrated the importance of clear and targeted policies and legislation in assisting the poor to accumulate assets, agriculture productivity and access to finance, among other determinants. Farmers and key informants complained that the provisions of the Resettlement Policy (Republic of Namibia 2001a) were not being complied with during implementation. The situation is compounded by the absence of regular monitoring and evaluation which could assist in informing policy interventions on unintended developments.



The study links policies and the legal framework underpinning land reform as the cause for delaying land redistribution and concentrating land in the hands of white and black economic elites. Agricultural reforms in Southern Africa, argue Moyo et al. (2004), have been modelled on neoliberal economic principles which do not offer solutions to the purpose of land reforms in those countries. In Namibia, Kaapama (2007) is critical of the role of land reform which still reinforces the colonial model of economic accumulation from above and has failed to respond to the land needs of the poor. He argues for a comprehensive land reform that is inclusive and transparent (Kaapama 2007). Mtero et al. (2019) concur as South Africa has had similar experiences.

While the need to improve access to land is implied in the National Land Policy, 1998, the role of land reform in poverty alleviation is not clearly articulated. Findings in Okarukambe demonstrate the plight of small-scale farmers making a living without any support besides being allocated land. Werner et al. (2010) argue that land reform is poorly integrated into development policies and remains as a sector issue to address equity. The assertion is supported by study findings where the MLR is the only institution that is in constant engagement with farmers in terms of water and fencing issues as stated above.

Von Wietersheim (2008) found that the resettlement programme was prioritising the elite and investing in their interests. This thinking was bolstered by the minister of land reform who stated that the land-reform programme was supposed to be a place for future farmers to learn how to farm then move out and purchase their own land, (Werner et al 2010). This comment is not in tandem with the welfarist policies which were earmarked to address poverty. Resettlement farms provide the elite with a cheap means to accumulate capital at the expense of the poor (Werner et al. 2010). Perhaps the comment by a key informant is more telling in this respect,

*“You find that now managers, senior civil servants and people who can afford to get a loan to buy their own farm through the Affirmative Action Loan Scheme from Agribank are competing for land with cleaners and landless villagers from overcrowded communal areas. This is also enabled by the current selection criteria that favour the people with qualifications and money”*  
(interview with Ms Kompel, 1/12/17)

### 4.2.3 Viability of small-scale farms

The issue of the viability of the small-scale farms was noted by Werner et al. (2010) who did not support the subdivision of large-scale commercial farms (LSCF). Cousins et al. (2010) differ with Werner et al. (2010) and proffer different perspectives. They point out the diverse policy biases in Southern Africa which favour the LSCF model which defines ‘viability’ in terms of big agriculture and profits negating other important alternative land uses and livelihoods. This study concurs with Cousins et al. (2010) framing of viability. Findings in Okarukambe indicate that resettled farmers consider the size of land allocated viable and productive as they are household-food secure and “have a place to call home” (Interview with farmers, 23/6/2018). Chimhowu (2006) argues for improved access to land for small-scale farmers for poverty alleviation and advocates the subdivision of land to induce economic growth. The recovery of Asian economies is attributed to redistributive land reform (Chimhowu 2006).

The study did not undertake a meaningful assessment of viability of the resettlement farms in Okarukambe but noted that the issue is of concern as the price of land in Namibia has continued to escalate over the profits to be made from agricultural activities. In this regard, Werner et al. (2010); Sherborne (2004); Haring et al. (2002) and Kaumbi (2004) have expressed doubts on whether land reform is the most socially or economically efficient way to uplift livelihoods of the poor.

Critics hint at the challenges of converting economically viable agricultural land into small units for the purpose of resettling poor landless households. Namibia is arid and has a low carrying capacity for livestock production and the small cropping units are not viable to bring meaningful employment to the farmers (Namibia Statistics Agency 2015). It is also feared that subdividing farming units present the threat of over-grazing and land degradation leading to the reduction of the productivity of the land, (Namibia Statistics Agency 2015). Cousins’ (2018) findings in the Eastern Cape challenge this thinking. In Okarukambe, farmers without access to water find it difficult to farm, thus impacting on income and food security. Although Carter et al. (1999) and Jayne et al. (2002) concluded that access to land improves income, in Okarukambe only farmers with off-farm sources of income are able to buy livestock and re-invest on the farm (interviews with Martin, Henry, Paul and Fred, 7/4/2018) .

#### 4.2.4 Post-settlement support

Whilst the ministry remains the primary institution to facilitate access to resources by the poor, the experiences in Okarukambe are different. Kaapama (2007) noted the lack of support as an impediment to production which negatively impacts the ability by the farmers to exploit the land. The study findings on the lack of support are acknowledged in various government blue prints. The Strategic Plan (1997-2001) only indicated budgetary allocations for land acquisition with little provision for post-settlement support as discussed in Chapter 2.

Commenting on the lack of post-settlement support, Haring et al. (2002) made reference to the 2003 Skoonheid Resettlement project in the Omaheke region where beneficiaries are dependent on food hand-outs. To Haring et al. (2002), the lack of targeted policy interventions has created a dependency syndrome which government has to address through the provision of human, technical, infrastructural, and capital support. Cousins (2018) collaborated on this thinking when referring to South Africa and question the adequacy and nature of post-settlement support envisaged for farmers under land reform.

Farmers in Okarukambe complained about being ‘dumped and left to fend for themselves’ by the government, (interviews with Josey, Hilda and Aggy, 2/2/2018). Cousins (2018) concluded that the challenges bedevilling farmers in Namibia cannot be viewed as inability to farm or use of inferior agricultural production methods but ill-conceived government policies. Kaapama (2007: 43) concluded that the lack of support might turn some settlement farms into “rural slums” and “dumping grounds for poor people” leading to frustration and foment “class and ethnic conflicts” in Namibia. The lack of post settlement support is explained by one of the key informants as “a project that is viewed by all ministries as a function for Agribank through the provision of loans to farmers and not as an item that should be part and parcel of the work plan and thus must be budgeted for” (interview with former director 7/2/2018)

Werner et al. (2010) argue for the direct and indirect subsidies and tax concessions for farmers. They lamented the lack of financial support farmers used to get in the form of fodder, bush encroachment, soil conservation, and infrastructural improvements. At independence all the subsidies were removed leaving farmers to depend on off-farm income as observed in Okarukambe (Werner et al. 2010).

In the enduring debate about farm sizes, Rigg (2006) argued against the subdivision of farms and the perceived economic benefits of redistributive land reform for poverty alleviation. He

considers small-scale farming as uneconomic and opines that it will result in perpetual rural poverty. Land reform, to him, is a policy that will satisfy one generation before population growth causes land shortage and livelihood deficiencies to resurface (Rigg 2006). The study findings disagree with some aspects of Riggs' thinking but concur with one of his conclusions that land redistribution alone is not a solution to poverty but comprehensive agrarian policies could well be. Scoones et al. (2010) proved that in Zimbabwe, access to land is not enough but endowing the poor with skills for alternative economic activities outside farming and rural based livelihoods is important. The question is whether Namibia's lack of investment into this area will undo the objectives of the land-reform programme. The contribution to the GDP by small-scale farmers in Kenya, South Africa, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe is well documented. Studies by Ellis (2000) and Cousins et al. (2010) indicate that small-scale farmers are efficient and redistributing land to this category will achieve equity and food security through efficacy.

#### **4.3 Processes of Beneficiary Selection**

This study shows a settler selection process that is under contestation due to lack of transparency. Questions remain on the determinants which are actually considered for selection. Mtero et al. (2019) points out the failure to include the poor at policy design and implementation as a huge oversight. The findings indicate government officials, business people and professionals are ranked as topping the list of beneficiaries in Okarukambe (interviews with key informants Viire and Vetere, 14/12/2017). This finding concurs with the ombudsman's report (Walters 2017) where the elite were pronounced to have benefitted more than the landless poor.

Marongwe (2008) concluded that at policy level the government argued that technical considerations guided the selection of beneficiaries, whilst in practice other socio-political considerations were employed. Although there are some similarities with the findings in Zimbabwe, differences are noted in terms of the involvement of the governing elite and the role played by war veterans in capturing technical processes and procedures in land allocation (Marongwe 2008). The composition of the RRC is not dominated by partisan appointees as is the case in Zimbabwe (Marongwe 2008). Whether the RRC remains so constituted is still to be seen as demand for land gets vocal and whether the elite remain on the side-lines whilst administrative bodies allocate land, remains for further interrogation.

Although study findings did not establish partisan involvement in land allocation, farmers and key informants indicated that the process of land allocation is “unfair”, there is “rampant nepotism” and “murky land hand-outs” to relatives (Werner et al 2010, p. 37-39). These observations confirm the public dissatisfaction with the programme as collaborated by Werner et al. (2010) and Walters (2017) as well as media reports of corruption due to scarcity of land.

The study established that privileged Namibians were prioritised over the landless poor. The RRC is concerned that most of the applicants recommended to the LRAC from their region are not being considered (RRC interviews 14/12/2017-14/6/2018). The study implicates procedural problems within the RRC and LRAC in terms of complying with policy and legislation. The applicants have no access to the information that the RRC and LRAC took into consideration when assessing their application. Sohail et al. (2009) and De Villiers et al. (2010) argue that information pertaining to decisions on land, statistics, policies, laws and regulations should be made available and known to all stakeholders. They assert that lack of access to information and transparency creates opportunities for corruption.

The increase in court applications citing irregularities and deviations from procedure when allocating land, attest to poor land governance. Commentators point to the challenges associated with a selection process which is difficult to subject to public scrutiny due to secrecy, which Moyo (2009) validated. In all the instances the ministry has been requested to review its administrative processes. The inability by the RRC and the LRAC to comply with the law is costly and impacts negatively on the land acquisition budget. Commentators also argue as to the negative impact that the judicial review has on the land-reform policy in general. Are the courts stepping in to bring efficiency and legitimacy into the process due to institutional flaws? How sustainable is this scenario and what would stop the elite from approaching the courts to gain access to land as a way to bypass bureaucracy? Are the RRC and the LRAC still relevant and are they constituted to operate fairly and transparently or is there a need to restructure them? The comments by key informants sum the institutional challenges within the RRC and LRAC:

*“the regional resettlement committee and the commission are supposed to be transparent and usher in good governance processes in land allocation but it seems everything they do is secret, they don’t account or report to applicants and this encourages corruption and suspicion even in cases where there might be nothing happening”* (interview with Kanga and Muza, 13/2/2018)

In practice, Moyo (2009) argued that in Zimbabwe, decentralised beneficiary selection mechanisms were not fully implemented, the transparency of the actual selection was often contested, and the selection was considered unfair. He suggested that the inclusion of women, NGOs and farmers' unions in the process could have contributed to a transparent process but these groups were not engaged with land redistribution; the findings in Okarukambe indicate that Namibia is no exception.

Study findings indicates that farmers and key informants concur that the selection criterion favours beneficiaries who are educated, able to finance farming activities and own livestock over others thus discriminating the economically weak whom are the intended targets in line with the policy and legal framework (interview with John and Hileni, 17/8/2018; interviews with Gotti and Muswe, 8/2/2018). This finding is supported by Marongwe (2008) who concluded that the selection criteria and procedures, including the advertisement of farms, application forms, and the use of the English language , systematically excludes certain categories of people in terms of education, farming experience and resources. The landless poor, former farm workers and the elderly are excluded, although they are the intended beneficiaries (Republic of Namibia 2001a). Key informants labelled the process of selection as meritocratic with a class bias towards well-resourced farmers over unemployed small-scale farmers (interviews with Hanny and Antony, 20/12/2017).

The study found policy gaps in respect of access to land by women, although Article 95(a) of the Constitution of Namibia enshrines gender equity. The MLR has made attempts to mainstream gender in the policy and legal framework but women still face challenges in inheritance unless they are nominated as the beneficiary or the leasehold is registered in their name (Mandimika and Matthaei 2013). In Okarukambe, 17 women benefitted (Annexure 9). Key informants noted the several pending inheritance cases due to lack of a specific policy to address challenges posed by inheritance. Although land grabbing is not prevalent in the study area it remains to be seen how this will last in the absence of a specific inheritance policy.

#### **4.4 Socio-economic Status of Beneficiaries and Livelihood Strategies.**

Two distinct groups of beneficiaries are presented in the study: part-time and full-time farmers. Fifty-two of the 60 farmers are part-time farmers and 8 are full-time farmers (Annexure 6, households 11, 14, 18, 34, 44, 45, 48 and 50). Civil society concur that who and what will set

Namibia on an agricultural growth path depends on the target groups and funding for land reform.

Findings indicate that 47 out of the 60 farmers who benefitted are originally from the Omaheke region and mostly civil servants, contrary to the perceptions among the farmers that applicants from other regions are given priority. Werner (1993) also found the existence of tribal tensions in cases where Namibians from other regions benefit. This perception is attributed to lack of transparency and public participation in the land-reform process as indicated by De Villiers et al. (2010).

Findings in Zimbabwe by Scoones et al. (2010) pointed to a diverse group of beneficiaries not necessarily dominated by the political elite contrary to what was widely perceived. In Okarukambe, the majority of the beneficiaries have access to other resources and are able to acquire farms through the Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS) and not compete with the poor under the resettlement programme. Cousins (2018) and Hall (2009) found contradictions in government policies and the high-jacking of pro-poor programmes by the elites. Key informants indicated the high cost of land as a reason the AALS programme is shunned by Namibians.

The Resettlement Policy (Republic of Namibia 2001a) targets all black Namibians and fails to interrogate the specific land needs and socio-economic status of applicants. The study confirmed this assertion as the farmers are treated the same despite their different circumstances (Annexures 4 and 8). Kaapama (2014) questions the use of the term 'previously disadvantaged' in resources allocation, negating the fact that some Namibians are now 'advantaged' and thus these policy discrepancies need to be discussed for informed policies (Kaapama 2014).

The socio-economic trends generated by the land-reform programme promote social polarisation between those benefitting and those who are marginalised by those policies. Kaapama (2007) observed that the landless feel that the promises of the liberation struggle have been betrayed as reforms are hardening social differentiation in the communities. One farmer in Okarukambe said: *"before I was allocated this land I had no place to call home. My livestock and I were living in the corridors after having been chased by my husband's relatives when my husband died."* (Interview with Natalie, 5/12/17). This statement partly explains why there is need by the Ministry of Land Reform to review the selection criteria to include the different

socio-economic groups. Discussions by civil society also underscore the need by the government to respond and prevent the radicalisation of the rural poor by political elites (Kaapama 2007). Mtero et al. (2019) observed that the marginalisation of the poor is worsened by the capture of resources by the elite who sometimes double dip in state-funded projects.

The government prioritisation of livestock production has also been criticised by key informants for ignoring the different land needs (interview with Gomba, 8/6/18). Wyss (2013) concluded that Namibia has diverse land needs which ranged from residential to farming. Study findings indicate that the use of a single resettlement model has left many Namibians with no alternative but to apply for a farm as it is the only avenue available to get land even for residential purposes concurring with the findings by Werner et al. (2010). The study also established that the land that was allocated in some instances did not match the beneficiaries' asset base. As a result farmers found it challenging to utilise the land and resorted to subleasing to supplement income (Werner et al. 2010).

#### **4.5 Livelihood Strategies of Resettled Farmers**

The study findings in terms of the livelihood strategies for small-scale farmers concur with the conclusion by Hall (2009), Cousins et al. (2015), and Rapsomanikis (2015) regarding the need for a comprehensive agrarian reform cognisant of the needs of each farming sector and not a one-size-fits-all policy as is currently the case. The study shows that although the decentralisation policy by the government is earmarked to bring services closer to the farmers, in reality the policy is failing to respond to the needs of the farmers and the regional institutions. The RRC complained of not being consulted on critical issues affecting their region (interview with deputy director, 13/2/2018).

This study shows the institutional ineptitude towards small-scale farmers in terms of policies to address their role in food security and poverty alleviation (interview with Ibbota, deputy director, 12/2/2018). These policies are also not synchronised within the overall poverty alleviation debates, worsening the farmers' vulnerability (Werner et al. 2010). Although a policy framework for support is available, very little budgetary provisions are appropriated to respond. Farmers in Okarukambe are left to fend for themselves and utilise limited off-farm resources to sustain livelihoods (interview with Lawrence, Jocelyn, Alex and John, 5/12/2017). Commentators question the future of the agricultural sector in Namibia if government does not redress the asset gap of land beneficiaries through policy review.



Owing to limited livelihood outputs in terms of improved income, farmers find it challenging to re-invest on the land (Hall et al. 2004). Ellis (2000) stated that livelihoods comprise of assets, activities and access to a combination of other factors which determine a household's well-being. However, due to limited investment by the government in Okarukambe, the farmers have found it difficult to diversify livelihoods. Spoor (2015) argues that wholesale integration of small-scale farmers into value chains without protection policies are ineffective and usually does not cater for their needs. Small-scale farmers end up being excluded due to costs and risks (Spoor 2015).

Although farmers have access to Agribank credit only 10 farmers have secured the maximum credit of N\$200 000 which is considered inadequate for livestock and infrastructure development. The study found that although the interest rate from Agribank is negotiated, farmers find it difficult to repay due to lack of support concurring with Kirk (2015) study findings on leaseholds in Namibia. Owing to financial stress, farmers in Okarukambe indicate multiple cases of farm subleasing for cash as a manifestation of this challenge (interview with Agnes and Gerson, 2/2/2018). Cousins (2013) and Binswanger Mkhize (2014) also noted the restrictive conditions set by banks that exclude small-scale farmers from accessing credit. Mtero et al. (2019) also concluded that the leasehold acted as a disincentive for beneficiaries to invest in land due to the banks' negative perceptions in terms of security.

Further, Werner et al. (2010) and Aliber et al. (2013) concur on the conclusion that most commercial banks perceive the resettlement farms as economically unviable and financially unsustainable. The resettled farmers in Okarukambe cannot use land as collateral as it is state-owned (Kirk 2015). Key informants indicated that the government is apprehensive that if land is used as collateral it might be repossessed if farmers default (interview with Shitty and Paul, 19/12/17). In South Africa the state preferred to retain ownership of the land under the State Land Lease and Disposal Policy (SLLDP) for fear that the land might be sold under freehold title (Mtero et al. 2019). Access to credit constitutes a challenge to small-scale farmers and as a result, six former farm workers who benefitted opt to work on other people's farms to earn wages to supplement income (Annexure 6, households 11, 14, 18, 34, 44 and 45). The strife by the farmers is ascribed to low capital investment in farm infrastructure by government. Further policy rigidity within the resettlement programme makes it difficult for farmers to accumulate capital and pursue other livelihood strategies (Werner et al. 2010). Hall (2003) spoke of 'institutional failure', which in Okarukambe means lack of effective policies, institutional

clarity and collaboration in government. Thus this policy ineptitude is impending livelihood strategies by the farmers.

While the 99-year lease is perceived by farmers to offer secure tenure, cases of women being dispossessed upon divorce have been indicated by key informants although outside the study area. The issue has been flagged urging the government to address the issue through joint title under the resettlement programme (key informant interview, Ms Elly, 4/10/17)). Chitja and Marojele (2014) noted the benefits of using engendered institutions in capacitating to build assets and agency for better livelihoods. They also advocate the inclusion of men in order to raise awareness and buy-in for sustainable livelihoods.

Having been selected from diverse communities, the farmers consist of people with different skills and experiences (Annexures 6 and 9). Some of the farmers belong to the Emerging Commercial Farmers Union (ECFU) which is critical for networking and survival in the new community. Rapsomanikis (2015) elaborated on the importance of bringing clarity to the various types of small-scales farmers in order to develop targeted comprehensive policies which respond to their livelihood strategies. Studies by Gollin (2018) in Kenya found that small-scale famers who owned land with opportunities by other family members to earn off-farm income achieved more per capita income than those who only relied on farm income. In Okarukambe the majority of the 52 part-time farmers have managed to self-finance using off-farm income (Annexure 6).

Studies by Block et al. (2001) on the importance of income diversification to reduce vulnerability have shown positive results in Ethiopia. Most poor households face constraints in diversifying from one livelihood strategy to another but Block et al. (2001) found that households with more assets such as livestock and crops could withstand the negative effects of famine. In Okarukambe those with secondary income are able to buy stock feed, access credit, and avoid subleasing their farms during drought, thus preserving grazing for livelihoods ( interviews with Meka, Johannes, Alyse, Katarina, Mulba and Ludwig, 11/11/2017) .

Increasing access to water and land by the government is viewed as a positive policy intervention which could raise production and offer alternative livelihoods (Food and Agriculture Organization 2015). Ibekwe et al. (2010) found that although Sub-Saharan Africa stresses the importance of agriculture in poverty alleviation, public sector funding in this area

has declined. They argue for the development of an off-farm economy to cushion and give small-scale farmers options for off-farm income which are perceived to be above farm income.

Another aspect that impacts on the livelihood of farmers is the question raised by Werner et al. (2010) on the economic sustainability of the land parcels which are allocated to farmers in Okarukambe. To Werner et al. (2010) the size of land under allocation is not viable to generate enough revenue for households to sustain themselves. Schuh et al. (2006) have countered this thinking and argued that the current size of small-scale resettlement farms can still generate income to sustain livelihoods.

#### **4.6 Challenges Arising from Selection and Land-allocation Processes**

This study found that gaps exist in the registration of applicants and the non-existent waiting list. The waiting list could be used to select applicants when farms are purchased. Namibians are fatigued by the process as they face the prospects of re-applying each time a farm is advertised. Key informants question whether this process is best suited to redistribute land (interview with former director Mr. Nedlod, 9/2/2018). Lahiff (2009) and Hall (2015) found that current land reforms are characterised by poor planning, non-existent support and data on the applicants and beneficiaries.

The study also establishes a lack of transparency and accountability within the selection process as highlighted by the increase in the number of high court and land tribunal cases. The court applications consider the selection process unfair and request the review of the administrative procedures. The RRC and the LRAC are failing the system by ignoring calls to comply with the law (interview with key informants Mr Kompel and Ms Lotty, 1/12/17) Walters (2017) spoke of corruption and self-interests being maintained by the RRC and LRAC in land allocations. Interviews with the LRAC, RRC, and key informants also brought forward these allegations. Key informants indicated that the courts should not be seen to be doing the administrative duties of the ministry. If it continues then the legitimacy and governance processes will be brought into question, making it impossible for Namibians to buy into the programme (interviews with Mr Kompel and Ms Lotty, 1/12/17).

The use of the courts to review the decisions of the minister implicates a class issue as the courts are not accessible to the poor but the elite (Kaaopama 2007). This fact is pronounced more by Tapscott (1995), who found that the most vocal and clear claims for land have been from the black elite seeking to expand their land portfolio and not from the landless poor. He

concluded that the elite were not concerned with “inequitable distribution of land but rather their share of it”, Tapscott (1995:165-166). Tapscott’s conclusions are reflected in the fencing of commonage in northern Namibia by the elites robbing villagers of grazing land, (Mandimika and Matthaei 2018).

In analysing the selection process commentators concluded that information on the resettlement programme should be accessible to all Namibians (De Villiers et al. 2010). Walters (2017) found information on beneficiaries to have been kept secret. Fifty-five farmers indicated that the selection process has not been transparent due to lack of feedback from the ministry (interview with farmers 11/11/2017 – 17/8/2018). To Van Der Molen (2007), access to information is important for accountability and transparency. Although the MLR is decentralised, information is centralised in Windhoek making it inaccessible for stakeholders within the regions (interviews with key informant, Mr Engel, 9/2/2018).

The Namibia University of Science and Technology (NUST) (2014) found that class and political interests shaped the selection of beneficiaries. They argued that the selection criteria are too wide, such that it includes ‘all previously disadvantaged’ Namibians. They found that ‘assets’, ‘income’, and ‘educational level’ were not really an issue in the selection of beneficiaries for resettlement. In this respect the study also concurs with the findings due to the fact that the RRC, LRAC and other key informants indicated that being a previously-disadvantaged Namibian was the only criteria which could easily be verified and defended. The study indicates that landless poor Namibians were not being specifically targeted but were competing with the elite for land. Farmers in Okarukambe suggested a review of the policy to specifically target the poor (interviews with Andrew and Moses, 4/5/2018) .

The study found that the RRC and the LRAC have little information on which to inform the decisions on selection. This is evident by the assumption that all applicants need land for livestock farming which might not be the case. The study also found that the selection and land-allocation process is bureaucratic such that some people, according to key informants, just give up (interview with deputy director, Mr Simple, 7/2/2018). Further to this Kaapama (2007) indicated that the system of selection as it is laid down does not bring efficacy and legitimacy to the programme. De Villiers et al. (2010) argued that the long processes and procedures provide opportunities for corruption and short cuts, especially in the absence of an oversight body to check and monitor the decisions of the RRC and the LRAC. The land-allocation

process does not provide an explanation for the lengthy process or justification. Commentators indicate that the programme could be out of touch with the land needs of Namibians.

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

Chapter Four has discussed the findings of the study juxtaposing them to other studies and literature. The role of the institutions in mediating the processes and procedures of beneficiary selection and eventually livelihoods is interrogated. It has been shown that while institutions mediate access to resources, ill-conceived and ineffective policies, lacklustre project implementation and a lack of sectorial coordination undermine their role in creating livelihoods. Although a robust policy and legal framework exists, it is not being complied with, resulting in judicial review of administrative processes and procedures.



## **Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **5.1 Introduction**

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the institutional nature and outcome of the beneficiary-selection processes focusing on who benefitted in Okarukambe Constituency and the impacts of the land-reform programme on livelihoods. In doing so, the researcher first located the thinking behind the different perspectives and paradigms on redistributive land reforms and ideologies which are advanced on small-scale farmers, areas of convergence and differences within the debates.

In the preceding chapters, the researcher provided the socio-economic status of beneficiaries, typology of farmers found in Okarukambe, the institutional framework for land-reform implementation based on the field data collected with attention on livelihood assets, and strategies. The researcher discussed and analysed the research findings to establish the extent to which her findings support (or otherwise) the views in literature. Here, the researcher summarises the main arguments of the entire study, revisits the research objectives and questions to establish the extent to which the findings support other studies, and draws conclusions. The researcher has focussed on the issue of beneficiary selection as this study has been centred on the contestations around this issue, paying special attention to its effectiveness to respond to programme objectives and who should actually be prioritised in land allocation. The researcher has then followed up with the outcome of livelihood trajectories and class differentiation which is currently emerging among the land beneficiaries in Okarukambe as a result of the land-reform programme and a conclusion.

### **5.2 Revisiting Institutional Process Issues and Procedures of Beneficiary Selection**

The importance of institutional structures on the outcome of government projects is highlighted by Neves (2017). In his study on rural development policy in the former homeland communities in South Africa, he found widespread challenges associated with unclear terms of reference and uncoordinated mandates in the public sector. Study findings indicate lack of clarity and of efficacy between the Ministry of Land Reform (MLR), the Regional Resettlement Committee (RRC) and the Land Reform Advisory Commission (LRAC) on the agenda of land reform that risk compromising the anticipated outcome (Hall et al. 2017). The ineffectiveness of institutions is also lamented by Erasmus (2019) who opposes assigning the responsibility and

whole mandate of land reform to one department in South Africa. In Namibia, the mandate is divided among sectors but in practice the situation is similar to South Africa (see Chapters 2 and 3). This argument validates studies that argue for a streamlined definition of the priority beneficiaries within the law as the current definition includes all Namibians irrespective of their socio-economic status (Republic of Namibia 1995). The current definition undermines the objective of land reform (Harring et al. 2007). A key informant points to the systemic challenges in beneficiary selection: “The selection process should be done by an independent body which is not linked to the administrative operations of the MLR for transparency and independence” (interview with Ms. T of the LRAC 20.12.17).

Mrs T’s response highlights the lack of transparency within the three institutions charged with land allocation (see Chapter 3). The involvement of the government in all structures is also said to lead to the selection of the least-efficient beneficiaries, promote ‘patronage and corruption’ (Chimhowu et al. 2007). This could explain the media focus on the selection process (see Chapter 2).

The study also brings out the different perspectives that make the RRC and the LRAC question each other in terms of land allocation. Key informants, small-scale farmers, the RRC and the LRAC regard the selection process as not being transparent (see Chapter 3). Cousins (2013) and Hall (2015) advocate reforming institutional processes. Concurrently, De Villiers et al. (2010, p. 14) concurs and suggests that processes and procedures that occur within a certain time frame should be made public otherwise “the impression of secrecy is created and consequently distrust”. The extent of these apprehensions was articulated by the minister of land reform when he argued for a clear and transparent resettlement process (Republic of Namibia 2008). The minister’s statement is argued by Kinsey (2004) in respect to Zimbabwe: “. . . it is striking how the existing evidence points to a selection process of land-reform beneficiaries that appears to have been remarkably equitable and also efficient in targeting those who were government’s and donors’ priorities of the time” (Kinsey 2004, p. 1681).

The RRC is not prioritising the poor in the selection process although the National Resettlement Policy of 2001 provides for that. Under Annexure 4, generational farm workers are awarded the maximum 5 points but, in practice, very few benefit as they are not awarded points within the other attributes (key informant interview 22/1/2018-15/2/2018). The study findings support the questions on unclear land policies and the efficacy of the institutional arrangement with

regard to land-reform programmes (Chapters 1 and 2), whilst Mtero et al. (2019) and Hall (2009) argue for a broad and inclusive land-reform policy that responds to the class agenda.

### **5.3 Who are the Beneficiaries in Okarukambe?**

Fifty-two of the 60 beneficiaries are part-time farmers and eight are full-time farmers (Annexure 6). Out of the 60 farmers interviewed, the dominant categories are civil servants, business people, and former farm workers. Seventeen of the 60 beneficiaries are women who are allocated land in their own right. Seven youths benefitted, supporting the African Union (AU) call for access to land by this category (Chapter 3). Although technical considerations are outlined, questions still remain as to whether the actual criteria are used in the selection or other considerations as discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The motivation for resettlement is varied, with beneficiaries pointing to the desire to move out of overcrowded and overgrazed communal areas.

Although women are awarded an extra 3 points (Chapter 2 and 3), more men benefitted in Okarukambe, confirming the growing gender disparity in land allocation (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 2015). Kinsey (2004) argued that selection criteria, by their nature, disadvantage women when competing with men. Deere (1987: 180) expanded further and argued that:

Reforms based on a points system and criteria for qualification tended to exclude women as the requirements include formal education qualification, histories of residence in the area concerned, farming experience and good reputations. In most cases women did not have equal education opportunities and, even when agricultural knowledge was extensive they were culturally perceived as helpers rather than experienced farmers in their own rights. Single mothers and other female headed households failed to meet the good reputation criteria as they do not confirm to the patriarchal nuclear family norm.

Deere (1987) concurs with the comments by the RRC on the criticism by some men in Namibia about awarding the extra 3 points to women applicants to bring gender equity in land allocation. In South Africa, Mtero et al. (2019) recommended that 50% of beneficiaries from state resources be women, thus making sure this group benefits, however, the challenge remains with implementation and monitoring.

Contrary to the claims by the public and media, the majority of beneficiaries in Okarukambe are not 'two-goat farmers', only six former farm workers benefitted (see Chapter 2). Sachikonye



(2003) suggests that land-reform programmes negatively impact farm workers more due to loss of employment, shelter and livelihood strategies. Contrary to assertions by the public and media, 47 of the 60 beneficiaries in Okarukambe are originally from the Omaheke region.

The Okarukambe case study supports discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 that more middle-class working Namibians who can afford to buy farms are benefitting at the expense of the poor. Farmers argue that without support and off-farm income it is difficult to fully utilise and invest on their farms. This argument is expounded on in Chapter 2 by Cousins' (2013) argument that most government policies are meant to benefit black elites over the landless poor. The majority of the beneficiaries in Okarukambe are urban-based, part-time livestock farmers supporting the narrative by Chambers and Ghildyal (1985) that land reforms have failed to develop criteria for identifying the poor. This could be ascribed to the concept of urban bias, suggested by Lipton (1982) and Griffin et al. (2002) (see Chapter 2) where, due to top-down policies as argued by the RRC, the elite control the distribution of resources and advocate policies aligned to their interests. In Chapters 1 and 2, through various scholars, the researcher has explained that governments rationalise undertaking land reforms as a tool to address poverty and inequality but it remains a challenge.

Others argue that the challenge to land reform is in putting up strategies for targeting the poor as evidenced in Okarukambe. Jayne et al. (2002) and Cousins (2006) conclude that the poor are excluded at policy development due to fragmentation and the fact that civil society is not active at grassroots level. Contrary to findings in Okarukambe, China and Colombia managed to target the poor in land reform through reforming the institutional framework to include the poor in the structural channels which are involved in selection (Marongwe 2008). Studies in Kenya (see Chapter 2), indicate the impact of policy failure in excluding the poor in land reform (Kanyinga 2009).

#### **5.4 Livelihoods, Strategies and Trajectories of Beneficiaries in Okarukambe**

In this section, the researcher discusses the livelihood trajectories and strategies of the beneficiaries. The researcher applies Dorward et al.'s (2009) theory on the strategies which beneficiaries are pursuing and the impact land reform has had on their livelihoods.

The analysis of livelihoods, assets, and strategies in Chapter 3 highlights that farmers in Okarukambe are experiencing various challenges due to lack of support. Although all farmers are experiencing financial stress, former farm workers, pensioners, and female-headed

households are the most affected. Former farm workers are opting to work on other farmers' land as a pathway to sustaining their livelihoods. Part-time farmers rely on salaries and the sale of small stock for services and food and little is reinvested on the farm.

With regard to assets such as knowledge and skills, farmers in Okarukambe have basic knowledge and training in livestock farming prior to resettlement. Although specific intervention support for land reform is recommended, farmers have not received it due to prioritisation and budgetary constraints (Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform Report 2005a).

## **5.5 Livelihood Trajectories**

In this section the researcher applies the different accumulation trajectories identified in rural land-reform communities namely, the 'hanging in', 'stepping up', 'stepping out' and 'dropping out' framework of Dorward et al. (2009, p.4) on the conceptualisation of poverty and pathways for the poor. This framework is important to assess the impact of the land-reform programme on the different farming households in Okarukambe. The researcher discusses conditions that enable households to step up and the policies that government should initiate to enable farmers to do so. As this is a micro-study and in light of observations by Scoones (2015), the livelihood trajectories for Okarukambe that are outlined are based on the reports of the small-scale farmers and offer only an overview of the households' current status and are not in any way representative of the changes over time that life history studies and longitudinal panel surveys are able to do. Studies on rural poverty and the use of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) have been challenged for not delving deeper to capture assets' resources and strategies and forgetting that these aspects are dynamic and not static (Scoones 2015)

### **5.5.1 Who is hanging in and why?**

Fifty-four of the 60 part-time farmers are hanging in due to income from off-farm employment, small businesses, sale of livestock, pensions, and remittances, (Annexure 6). Dorward et al. (2009) points out that the ability to hang in is enhanced by access and ownership of assets and an ability to undertake livelihood activities which enable farmers to maintain existing livelihood positions. Some of the farmers are subleasing subdivisions of their farms for grazing in exchange for cash or livestock as a strategy to hang in. Others are inviting relatives to graze on their units in exchange for sharing the farming costs. For farmers in Okarukambe, the most feasible option to avoid destitution is to subsist off the farm.

Eight of the 60 full-time farmers depend on income from the farm and off-farm income from pensions, remittances, sub-leasing, and piece jobs. Although these would have been at risk of dropping out, they use family and own labour and have access to off-farm income streams (Mushonga and Scoones 2012).

### **5.5.2 Who is dropping out and why?**

In Okarukambe no households were observed to be having dropped out. Mushonga and Scoones (2012) argue that households that depend solely on farming income are at risk of dropping out than those with multiple livelihood strategies. Although farmers do not receive support, none of them has dropped out, as outlined in Annexure 6.

### **5.5.3 Who is stepping up and why?**

Six out of 60 households are stepping up. The six farmers have access to off-farm income which has enabled them to be financially resilient and secure. The farmers are investing on their farms to expand current livelihood activities (Dorward et al. 2009). The six part-time farmers have accumulated assets, built houses and farming infrastructure, regularly selling livestock at auctions and investing the proceeds on the farm. These farmers could benefit more if the government were to implement support policies to increase production and sales. This finding means that without off-farm income these farmers would not be able to pursue this livelihood (Annexure 6).

### **5.5.4 Who is stepping out and why?**

Mushonga and Scoones (2012); Cliffe et al. (2013) concur that households in Zimbabwe which could step out, who they called 'cell phone farmers' were able to do so because they could cultivate more land, buy livestock and relied on remittances. In Okarukambe, stepping out is an option which is being pursued by the six households who are engaged in off-farm economic activities which enable them to accumulate savings and assets such as livestock and farming infrastructure which are likely to bring in more income in the future (Dorward et al. 2009). Although these farmers do not have access to support, they can access it on their own using savings from off-farm income. In order to escalate this strategy for other farmers the government should provide skills training to resettled farmers in other areas to enable diversification farming, whereby the farmers will then be able to access alternative income to ensure household food security (Cliffe et al. 2013).

### **5.5.5 Who is stepping in and why?**

Fifty-four out of the 60 households are stepping in to agriculture. The farming activities in these households are driven by off-farm income from government and the private sector salaries, investments from business, retirement funds, and remittances. The findings in Kenya, Ghana and Zambia reveal the positive impact of on-farm production activities which are driven by off-farm investments (Hall et al. 2017). The sources of income in these three models are similar to those identified in Okarukambe where off-farm income is paving way for the households' next phase of life. The selection criteria informed by neo-liberal thinking awards maximum points to applicants with access to off-farm capital. This is due to lack of financial support by the government. Hall et al. (2017) also found that these households are stepping in to commercial farming and not emerging from small-scale farming into larger-scale farming. These findings are similar to what is currently being found in Okarukambe where acquired capital is brought to support farming activities in the absence of government support.

### **5.6 Class Differentiation of Small-scale Farmers in Okarukambe**

Using Cousins' (2011) class-analytical approach to small-scale farming the following categories of farmers are identified in Okarukambe:

#### **5.6.1 Petty commodity producers producing to partially meet their social reproduction needs**

Cousins (2011) argued that due to the nature of capitalism, small-scale farmers find it difficult to reproduce themselves outside of the existing commodity paths, such as access to markets for inputs and outputs, even in cases where they depend on their own labour and family labour and utilise most of their production for household consumption. Full-time farmers in Okarukambe can be regarded as being petty commodity producers since they are engaged in livestock production and rely on that for subsistence consumption through meat, milk and manure for small gardens. As pensioners who rely on grants and remittances, livestock farming enables them to sell for food and payment of services. All the pensioners and former farm workers rely on their own labour, family labour and on livestock auction floors to sell livestock in order to procure inputs that are all based within a capitalist system (Cousins 2011).

Some of the farmers in this group sometimes sell livestock directly to informal markets. Cousins (2011) also argued that in cases where income from the market is insufficient for

production and consumption then families have to engage in alternative forms of livelihoods for income. In Okarukambe, Cousins' (2011) assertion is supported as some households look for casual work on neighbouring farms.

### **5.6.2 Petty commodity producers producing enough to meet most of their social reproduction needs**

According to Cousins (2011), commodity producers in this category fail to reproduce due to factors such as drought which affects livestock. In such instances the farmers rely on selling their labour or on state grants for livelihood. Findings in Okarukambe support Cousins' (2011) analysis as some of the households are selling their labour due to persistent drought, relying on pensions and subleasing portions of their land for income. Although they have pensions, these are not enough for fodder and contribution to the cost of water. Owing to lack of post-settlement support, farmers find it difficult to farm during drought but none in this study has opted to drop out.

### **5.6.3 Petty commodity producers producing enough to make profit and accumulate capital**

In Okarukambe only six of the 60 farmers closely resemble what Cousins (2011) refers to as 'the missing middle', characterised by its ability to produce for the household and market and able to accumulate capital to be invested into the farm. This category can be described as engaging in 'expanded reproduction'. The six farmers rely on off-farm income which they use to pay for water, buy livestock and expand farming. This enables the farmers to expand through acquisition of more livestock and leasing more grazing land (Cousins 2011). The six farmers have managed to build cattle-handling facilities, install solar pumps, and hire occasional labour. It is envisaged that through support farmers will expand production and income for better livelihoods, Aliber et al. (2010) has argued. In such instances it would support Cousins' (2011) theory of accumulation from below. Without post-settlement support most of the farmers in Okarukambe will not be able to accumulate savings to reinvest.

## **5.7 Summary of Study Findings**

### **5.7.1 Institutional structure for land reform implementation**

Findings in Okarukambe reveal institutions that are fragmented, dysfunctional and operate in a vacuum, resulting in land-allocation inequalities. Institutions have failed to implement their mandates and this is reflected in low production activities and outputs which, in turn, translate to fewer opportunities for farmers. Access to land is not enough but remains important for creating livelihoods and the provision of institutional structures with clear mandates and post-settlement support which is crucial for livelihoods (Scoones 1998).

The implementation of the land-reform programme is complex due to the rules and mandates of the different ministries which undermine institutional arrangements. The study has demonstrated the futility of the decentralisation policy as it has failed to register the desired impact in the absence of instruments to enforce sector ministries to cooperate. Planning and budgeting for land reform is centralised in one ministry resulting in regional institutions implementing programmes which are outside the overall regional poverty alleviation plans (Chapter 3) (Levine et al. 2008). Mtero et al. (2019) found the use of local level participatory planning to be a working strategy that will get the poor to participate and benefit in land reform.

### **5.7.2 Policy and legal framework**

The policy and legal framework on land reform (see Chapter 3 and 4) is not being complied with during implementation due to the absence of regular institutional monitoring and evaluation which could inform policy intervention on unintended developments.

The land-reform policy which is influenced by neo-liberal thinking is not responding to the land needs of the poor. This is compounded by the fact that the role of land reform in poverty alleviation (Chapters 2, 3, 4) is not well articulated in overall government programmes and remains a sector issue. The findings support the need for a policy and legal review to re-align land reform and create effectiveness and nodes of functionality (Kaaopama 2007).

### **5.7.3 Processes of beneficiary selection**

Study findings reveal that questions on the selection process still remain. The determinants for selection in Okarukambe are contrary to findings by Marongwe (2008) in Zimbabwe where war veterans, political and partisan influence played a pivotal role in beneficiary selection.

Hulme (1987) also noted that the state, through the MLR, has overall programme oversight and this has been known to promote a system of patronage. Walters (2017) also noted this issue.

While there is no evidence of partisan involvement in land allocation the process is considered “unfair” “rampant nepotism” “murky land hand-outs” to relatives of members of the RRC and LRAC, (key informants interviews 22/1/2018-15/2/2018); (Chapter 3). Allegations of corruption within the selection and land allocation process have been made in the study area but due to the nature of the allegations which normally takes place in the private domain, it is difficult to prove. The lack of transparency in the selection of beneficiaries and non-compliance with policy and legal framework by the RRC, LRAC and the MLR, have led to contestation in the high court for review of administrative processes. To Hulme (1987) and Deininger (2003), the allegations are credible due to the fact that most state-led land-reform programmes are known to promote corruption and patronage. Chimhowu et al. (2007) also questions the direct involvement of the state in land allocation as it often benefits the least efficient users thus defeating the programme objectives.

The processes for selection are designed to exclude the poor with a bias towards those with resources (Kaapama 2007). The study attributes the policy shift to lack of political will to appropriate adequate funding to land reform. Farmers in Okarukambe suggested a policy review that includes the landless poor. It is in light of these observations that the study argued that the current processes of beneficiary selection are not targeting the landless poor but the elite contrary to the policy and legal framework.

#### **5.7.4 Socio-economic status of those who benefitted**

Findings in Okarukambe indicate that government officials, small business owners, professionals, and former farm workers benefitted. The findings concur with the Walters (2017) (Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4), that very few poor landless Namibians benefitted. The findings indicate a class issue and not a tribal/ethnic issue in terms of those who benefitted, contrary to the conclusions reached by Walters (2017). This is what Cousins (2013) referred to as the new black elites who are capturing land reform for own benefit. In Okarukambe, only six former farm workers benefitted and similarly less than 5% of farm workers benefitted in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye 2003).

Prior to being resettled most of the beneficiaries were farming in overcrowded, overgrazed communal areas, corridors and were landless. Although most of the beneficiaries have access

to off-farm income they are not able to employ wage labour and invest on the farm and off-farm, contrary to Bernstein's (1995) and Cousins' (2015) findings. This is due to inadequate support as advocated by the Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform (PTT) Report (2005b).

Contrary to the findings in Walters (2017) and perceptions by Namibians and the media, the majority of the beneficiaries in Okarukambe are originally from the Omaheke region. These perceptions are due to lack of transparency and public participation in the process.

The study finds that the policy and legal framework categorise Namibians who apply for land as being the same, irrespective of their socio-economic status. This is perpetuated by the use of the term 'previously disadvantaged' in policy and legal documentation on land reform, disregarding that some black Namibians are no longer poor (Werner et al. 2010). Hall (2012) suggests the review of policy to clarify the class agenda of land reform and how the agrarian structure will be re-planned.

The use of a single resettlement model has ignored the diverse land needs. Namibians have no option for access to land for other land uses but to apply for resettlement; some thus end up subleasing portions of the farm (Von Carlowitz and Mandimika 2015).

#### **5.7.5 Livelihood strategies pursued by beneficiaries**

Livestock production remains the most important land-based livelihood strategy among farmers. Owing to semi-arid conditions and lack of access to support, livelihood strategies remain a concern but the study established that farmers with access to off-farm income, piece work, remittances, and subleasing are managing to hang in.

Limited livelihood outputs in terms of income and livestock remains a challenge to farmer's ability to invest on the land and off the farm partly due to limited government investment in the programme. The tenure arrangements also affect the ability of the farmers to access credit based on negative perceptions over the conditions of the 99-year lease. Although negotiated loans are available at Agribank, farmers find it difficult to repay due to drought and lack of post-settlement support (Chapters 2, 3 and 4).

The study showed institutional ineptitude towards farmers in terms of policy implementation. The policy subscribes to land redistribution for poverty alleviation, however, it is not



synchronised within the overall poverty-alleviation strategies, thereby making it difficult for farmers to access services. This is also compounded by inadequate budgetary provision of support (Werner et al. 2010). The study concurs with Hall (2009) on the need of a comprehensive agrarian reform which is cognisant of the needs of each farming sector and not a one size fits all policy.

#### **5.7.6 Challenges arising from procedures of settler selection**

Findings in Chapters 2 and 3 provided evidence of the challenges with the current resettlement process in terms of systemic chaos in the registration of land applicants and a non-existent waiting list at all levels. The lack of a system to administer and capture data on the applicants is frustrating landless Namibians who have to re-apply every time land is available. This confirmed institutional ineptitude.

Findings indicate a lack of transparency and accountability in the selection of beneficiaries. The significant number of court cases seeking review of the administrative processes attest to this. Key informants indicate that information on those who benefitted is not accessible, nor does the system make provisions for feedback to the applicants.

Interviews indicate a selection criteria and process that is benefitting the elite. The study concurs with conclusions by the Namibia University of Science and Technology (NUST) (2014) that class and political interest contribute to selection as the criteria are too wide and include all Namibians. The attributes of the selection criteria that include 'assets' 'income' 'educational level' were found not to be an issue that is taken into consideration (Namibia University of Science and Technology 2014). Even though the score sheet (see Annexure 4) awards generational farm workers the maximum 5 points, the reality is different as access to the whole land application process is not accessible in terms of language used and the several attachments required. The study concludes that landless Namibians are competing for land with civil servants, politicians, professionals, and business people, contrary to the objectives of the land-reform programme.

The study established that the RRC and LRAC have very little information to inform decision making and selection. The information available through the submitted applications cannot be verified, thus opening the processes of selection and land allocation to corruption (De Villiers et al. 2010).

## 5.8 Conclusions

The foregoing study argues that the institutions set up to implement land reform are fragmented and dysfunctional and have failed in their mandate to bring land-reform benefits to the landless and resettled farmers through development policies. This is reflected in the slow pace of land redistribution, low agricultural output and limited land-based livelihood opportunities for resettled farmers. As a solution, the study concurs with Mtero et al.'s (2019) recommendation for the restructuring of land reform and agriculture mandates to create one portfolio for a comprehensive policy coherence and coordination. Within this scenario the question on the purpose and basis for implementing a land-reform programme with the objective of poverty alleviation remains especially in the wake of what is currently the case in Okarukambe. The study argues that access to land alone is not sufficient for sustainable livelihoods but institutional structures with clear mandates and support to farmers.

In the context of this study it is established that neoliberal-informed policies have entrenched land for the elite at the expense of the landless poor. Furthermore, the policies and procedures for settler selection are not transparent and are contradictory to the stated role of land reform in poverty alleviation. Policies point to the disparity between policy pronouncements and actual implementation, although there is no evidence of partisan involvement in beneficiary selection contrary to findings by Kinsey, (2004), Marongwe (2008) and Matondi (2012) in Zimbabwe. The significant number of court cases seeking arbitration attest to the flawed procedures and institutional systemic challenges. This finding is also validated by Hopwood (2005) who advocates an appropriate legal framework for transparency and clarity on administrative procedures. UN Habitat (2004) spoke of transparency as a prerequisite for good land governance and how it is thus important for an effective land-reform process. Tools for institutional reform that includes the Ombudsman office and anti-corruption agencies are accessible to the poor and they should be empowered to review the appeal process for selection of beneficiaries (De Villiers et al. 2010).

On the issue of prioritisation in land allocation, the study argues that there is elite capture and the marginalisation of the landless poor and the abandonment of the poverty alleviation agenda which is synonymous with land reform. The study argues that there is no system or strategy to prioritise the poor and ensure that they actually benefit, an issue that Lahiff (2009) also found in the South African experience. The use of the term 'formerly disadvantaged' in land-reform programmes includes all black Namibians irrespective of their socio-economic status, thus

disadvantaging the poor who remain excluded as inequalities are reproduced. Furthermore, the youth and women are under-represented, pointing to the need to escalate available gender-parity policies on land reform as advocated by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (2015). Mtero et al. (2019) recommend clear guidelines on implementation to ensure gender equity at all levels. Farmers in Okarukambe pointed to the need to revise the Resettlement Policy of 2001. Perhaps Namibia could benefit from the conclusion by Mtero et al. (2019) of the necessity to apportion 50% of the budget to each socio-economic group to ensure representation and access by the poor and under-represented.

Regarding livelihood assets and strategies pursued by the beneficiaries, the study argues that livestock production remains an important livelihood strategy. Owing to lack of support, most of the farmers are part-time who stepped in to agriculture, bringing in capital and now rely on off-farm income to hang in (Hall et al. 2017). In Okarukambe, part-time farming is correlated with successful farming due to the reliance on other livelihood activities outside the farm which assist farmers in investing in the farm. This supports Cousins' (2011) argument for a differentiated definition of small-scale farmers to bring out the diverse farming households. Findings contradict Mushongah et al. (2012) on the ability by farmers to step out due to re-investment in agriculture as limited livelihood outputs and government support is challenging farmers in terms of re-investment. Thus, as Cousins (2018) concluded, the challenges bedevilling smallholder farmers in Namibia cannot be seen as reflecting any inherent inferiority in their agricultural production but ill-conceived government policies.

With regard to Cousins' (2011) class differentiation theory, the researcher's findings concur with his findings on the need to define and separate the various categories of small-scale farmers to ensure a guided intervention policy which speaks to the different categories of farmers. Evidence in Zimbabwe after the Fast Track Land Reform programme (FTLRP) found that the difference among A1, A2 and former farm workers was a class issue as each group experienced different challenges and livelihood options based on opportunities available to them (Matondi 2012). Based on the current socio economic dynamics being experienced by the farmers in Okarukambe, the researcher concludes that the typology of 'rich peasants' as articulated by Bernstein (1995) and the accumulation from below as envisaged by Cousins (2011), is not possible in Okarukambe unless the current land-reform policy and legal framework is reviewed. What are prevalent in Okarukambe are part-time, small-scale, subsistence farmers who are differentiated by the type of farming and output.

While Cousins (2011) demonstrated that access to land by small-scale farmers can address poverty and food security, this study argues that there is need to reframe ‘pro-poor’ land-reform policies within a sustainable livelihood approach which requires policy-oriented research speaking to the context, needs, aspirations and prevailing local realities which transcend the elitist interests being reflected by the current land-reform programme.



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## **Annexure 1: Policy and legal framework for land reform.**


The mandate of the Ministry of Land Reform is derived from the following legislation:

- Namibian Constitution, Article 95
- National Land Policy of 1998
- Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995 (Act No.6 of 1995)
- National Resettlement Policy of 2001
- Communal Land Reform Act, 2002 (Act No. 5 of 2002)
- Deeds Registries Act, 1937 (Act No. 47 of 1937)
- The Registration of Deeds in Rehoboth Act, 1976 (Act No. 93 of 1976)
- Land Survey Act, 1993 (Act No. 33 of 1993)
- Sectional Title Act, 1971 (Act No. 66 of 1971)
- Flexible Land Tenure Act No. 4 of 2012
- The Property Valuer's Profession Act 2012




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## Annexure 2: Land acquired by region 1991-2018



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### Annexure 3: Overview of the resettlement process in Namibia



## Annexure 4: Point scoring system

### Section 1: Evaluation of agricultural background

<b>Statement: Formal and practical training<sup>1</sup></b>		<b>Rating 1 - 5</b>
1	Recognised National Certificate or National Higher Certificate or practical training in appropriate Agricultural Sector (Typically one or two years of post-high-school training)	2
2	Recognised National Diploma or practical training in appropriate Agricultural Sector (Typically three or more years of post-high-school training)	3
Sub-total for section 1.1:		

<b>Statement: Experience in relevant agricultural activities<sup>2</sup></b>		<b>Rating 1 - 5</b>
1	0 – 1 years	1
2	2 – 5 years	2
3	6 – 10 years	3
4	11 – 14 years	4
5	15+ years	5
Sub-total for section 1.2:		
Total for section 1 (section 1.1 + section 1.2)		

### Section 2: Age

<b>Statement</b>		<b>Score</b>
1	Between 21 and 25 years	2
2	Between 26 and 60 years	5
3	Between 61 and 75 years	3
3	Above 75 years	0
<b>Total for Section 2:</b>		

<sup>2</sup> Farm workers who apply for resettlement would score points under this section.



### Section 3: Gender (GDR)

Statement		Score
1	Applicant is Female <sup>3</sup>	3
2	Applicant is Male	0
<b>Total for Section 3:</b>		

### Section 4: Generational farm workers

Statement applies only to generational farm workers of the farm in question.		Score
1	Generational Farm Worker	5
<b>Total for Section 4.1:</b>		

### Section 5: Literacy

Statement		Score
1	Basic Reading, Writing and Numeracy Skills (Grade 6 Level)	3
<b>Total for Section 5:</b>		

### Section 6: Gross non-agricultural annual income<sup>4</sup>

Statement		Score
1	N\$ 0 – N\$ 45 000	5
2	N\$ 45 001 – N\$ 90 000	3
3	N\$ 90 001 – N\$ 200 000	1
<b>Total For Section 6:</b>		

### Section 7: Current agricultural annual income (number of livestock)<sup>5</sup>

Statement		Score
1	100 to 149 LS or equivalent small stock	5
2	50 to 100 LS or equivalent small stock	4
3	0 to 50 LS or equivalent small stock	3
<b>Total for Section 7:</b>		

<sup>3</sup> This applies to all females regardless of marital status.

<sup>4</sup> If the applicant is married the joint income is considered for these purposes.

<sup>5</sup> The NS incentive scheme can be applied where large stock farmers from north of the red line are resettled south of the red line. Small stock can be transferred across the red line with the appropriate quarantine procedures.

**Section 8: Applicants from communal areas<sup>6</sup>**

Statement		Score
1	Full-time Communal Farmer	5
<b>Total for Section 9:</b>		

**Section 9: Evaluation of applicant with respect to all resettlement criteria**

Add up the scores for Sections 1 – 9 to determine the applicant’s suitability for resettlement.


Points Scored Per Section	SCORE
Section 1 – Agricultural Background (Score)	
Section 2 – Age (Score)	
Section 3 – Gender (Score)	
Section 4 – Generational Farm Worker (Score)	
Section 5 – Literacy (Score)	
Section 6 – Gross Non-agricultural Monthly Income (Score)	
Section 7 – Current Agricultural Monthly Income (Number of Livestock) (Score)	
Section 8 – Applicant from Communal Areas (Score)	
<b>Grand Total</b>	



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<sup>6</sup> This includes persons who hold communal grazing rights or who have agricultural leasehold rights in a communal area.

**Annexure 5: Map displaying study area and regions where land is acquired for redistribution.**



Source: MLR 2018/2019 Land Reform Statistics Booklet

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## Annexure 6: Total sample of small-scale farmers interviewed in the study

	Type of farming Household	Household number	Sex of interviewed	Age bracket	Hectares allocated	Source of labour	Source of income	Livelihood trajectories
1	Part-time livestock farming for sale and consumption.	8	M	46-55	1530	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
2	Part-time livestock farming for sale and consumption	6	M	46-55	1635	Own, family	Small dairy business, pension	Stepping up
3	Part-time livestock farmer for sale and Consumption	3	M	46-55	1192	Own, family	Pension, farm	Hanging in
4	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and consumption	7	M	46-55	1226	Own, family	Farm, pension	Hanging in
5	Part-time livestock farmer sale, consumption	5	F	26-45	1325	Own, family	Pension, farming	Hanging in
6	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and consumption	4	F	46-55	1528	Own, family	Employment, farming	Stepping up
7	Part-time livestock farmer-business owner	3	M	46-55	1538	Own, family	Salary, farming	Hanging in

8	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and consumption	6	F	46-55	1192	Own, family, 1 worker	Pension, Remittance from abroad	Hanging in
9	Part-time livestock farmer for sale and consumption	6	F	46-55	1656	Family, own, 2 workers	Employment, farm	Hanging in
10	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and consumption	8	F	46- 55	1999	Own, family	Pension, farm	Hanging in
11	Full-time livestock farmer for sale and consumption	4	M	Over 55	800	Family, own	Pension, farming	Hanging in
12	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and consumption	4	M	Over 55	815	Family, own, 1 worker	Pension, farming, small business	Hanging in
13	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and consumption	7	M	Over 55	830	Family, own	Pension, farming, small business	Hanging in
14	Full-time livestock famer	5	F	Over 55	600	Family, own 1 worker	Pension, farming, remittances	Hanging in
15	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and consumption	6	M	46-55	1345	Family, own	Employment, farming	Stepping up
16	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	4	M	26-45	1345	Family, own, 1 worker	Pension, farming, business	Hanging in

17	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	5	M	Over 55	650	Family, own	Pension, farming	Hanging in
18	Full-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	4	M	Over 55	700	Family, own	Pension, farming	Hanging in
19	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	6	M	46-55	1590	Family, own	Employment, farming	Hanging in
20	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	9	M	Over 55	615	Family, own	Business, pension farming	Hanging in
21	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	7	M	Over 55	661	Family own,	Farming, pension	Hanging in
22	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	4	M	Over 55	750	Family, own, 1 worker	Farming, pension, wife salary	Hanging in
23	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	8	M	Over 55	700	Own-family	Pension, business, farming	Hanging in
24	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	6	F	46-55	1373	Own-family	Employment, farm	Hanging in
25	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	5	M	26-45	1677	Own, family	Pension, farming	Hanging in

26	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	8	M	Over 55	617	Own, family	Pension, family	Hanging in
27	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	6	M	Over 55	909	Own, family	Pension, farming	Hanging in
28	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	10	M	46-55	1549	Family, own	Employment, farming	Stepping up
29	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	5	F	Over 55	700	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
30	Full-time farmer, sale and own consumption	2	F	Over 55	701	Own, family	Salary, farming	Hanging in
31	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	10	F	Over 55	1569	Own, family	Salary, farming	Hanging in
32	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	5	M	46-55	2138	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
33	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	2	F	46-55	1812	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
34	Full-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	6	F	Over 55	715	Family, own	Pension, farming	Hanging in

35	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	3	F	46-55	1691	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
36	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	5	M	26-45	1660	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
37	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	7	M	46-55	1466	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
38	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	3	F	46-55	2275	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
39	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	3	F	46-55	2913	Own family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
40	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	5	F	Over 55	695	Own family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
41	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	6	F	46-55	2003	Own family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
42	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	8	F	46-55	2003	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
43	Part-time livestock farmer, sale and own consumption	5	M	Over 55	603	Own, family	Business, pension, farming	Hanging in



44	Full-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	4	F	Over 55	625	Own, family	Pension, farming	Hanging in
45	Full-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	6	F	Over 55	635	Own, family	Pension, farming	Hanging in
46	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	2	F	46-55	1846	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
47	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	3	M	Over 55	710	Own, family	Farming, employment	Hanging in
48	Full-time livestock farmer, own, consumption, sale	4	F	Over 55	800	Own, family	employment, farming	Hanging in
49	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	3	M	Over 55	810	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
50	Full-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	7	M	Over 55	812	Own, family	Pension, farming	Hanging in
51	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	6	M	Over 55	813	Own, family	Small business, farming	Stepping up
52	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption	6	M	46-55	1280	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in

53	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption	10	M	Over 55	625	Own, family	Wage labour, farming, disability pension	Hanging in
54	Part-time livestock farmer own consumption, sale	5	M	26-45	1275	Own, farming	Pension, farming	Hanging in
55	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	6	M	46-55	1050	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
56	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	3	M	46-55	2091	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
57	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	2	M	46-55	2875	Own, family	Employment, farming	Hanging in
58	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	3	M	40-45	1275	Own, family	Employment, farming	Stepping up
59	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	4	M	Over 55	715	Own, family	Pension, farming	Hanging in
60	Part-time livestock farmer, own consumption, sale	3	M	26-45	1285	Own, family	Wage labour, farming	Hanging in

## Annexure 7: Institutions of land reform and area of responsibility

INSTITUTION	ROLE IN RESETTLEMENT
MINISTRY OF LAND REFORM i) Directorate Resettlement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planning, coordination of resettlement programme</li> <li>• Project implementation</li> <li>• Supervision of resettlement projects</li> <li>• Monitoring and evaluation of projects</li> </ul>
ii) Directorate of Land Reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Registration of leases</li> <li>• Resource surveys and planning of resettlement areas</li> <li>• Development of planning grid lives</li> </ul>
iii) Survey General's Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides mapping, land surveys and aerial photo graph service.</li> </ul>
iv) Registrar of Deeds	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Registration of leases and real rights</li> </ul>
v) Directorate of General Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial control and budgeting</li> <li>• Human resource development</li> </ul>
Directorate of Regional programme Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of Land-reform Programme in all 14 Regions.</li> </ul>
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE WATER AND FORESTRY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of veterinary services</li> <li>• Farm evaluation</li> <li>• Provision of extension training</li> <li>• Provision of water</li> <li>• Identifying markets for resettled farmers</li> <li>• Maintenance of water and infrastructure on resettlement farms.</li> </ul>
MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM - Dept. Of Environmental Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assisting in planning of wildlife-based resettlement schemes</li> <li>• Ensure that all plans are done with environmental consideration</li> </ul>

MINISTRY OF RURAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proclamation of resettlement areas when necessary</li> </ul>
MINISTRY OF WORKS AND TRANSPORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of infrastructure on resettlement areas</li> </ul>
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of schools, teachers in resettlement areas</li> </ul>
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of health facilities</li> </ul>
NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advising on project planning and funding</li> </ul>
AGRICULTURAL BANK OF NAMIBIA (Agribank)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of loans</li> <li>• Farm valuation</li> </ul>
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planning, post settlement support, training</li> </ul>
REGIONAL RESETTLEMENT COMMITTEE (RRC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assist the LRAC in performing its functions.</li> <li>• Receive scrutinise and evaluate applications</li> <li>• Shortlist 3 beneficiaries and recommend to LRAC</li> <li>• Monitoring resettlement farms and promote development</li> </ul>
LAND REFORM ADVISORY COMMISSION (LRAC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Receive, scrutinise and evaluate applications for resettlement.</li> <li>• To recommend prospective beneficiaries to the minister</li> <li>• To recommend applications for resettlement compensation for expropriated farms.</li> </ul>
LAND TRIBUNAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Makes recommendations to the minister of land reform in terms of the Act.</li> </ul>

Sources: *Harring and Odendaal in Werner et al. (2010), PTT Report, (2005)*

# Annexure 8: Copy of farm advertisement



**GOVERNMENT NOTICE  
MINISTRY OF LAND REFORM**

NO. 2019

**NOTIFICATION OF FARMING UNITS OFFERED FOR ALLOTMENT: AGRICULTURAL (COMMERCIAL) LAND REFORM ACT, 1995 (ACT NO. 6 OF 1995).**

In terms of Section 39 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995 (Act No. 6 of 1995), I-  
(a) make known, in terms of subsection (3) of that section, that copies of the approved allotment plans in respect of the farming units referred to in the Schedule are available for public inspection at the places and during the periods mentioned in the Schedule; and  
(b) invite, in terms of subsection (4) of that section, applications for the allotment of the farming units offered for allotment, which applications must be made in the manner stated in the Schedule.

*[Signature]*  
Minister of Land Reform

**SCHEDULE**

**1. Number, location and description of farming units offered for allotment**

REGION	DISTRICT	REG. DIV.	FARM NAME & NUMBER	NUMBER OF FARMING UNIT OFFERED FOR ALLOTMENT	SIZE OF FARMING UNIT (HA)	LAND USE OF FARMING UNIT
Omahaka	Gobabis	"L"	Portion N of the Farm Kaururus No. 79	3	Unit A Measuring 2139.3340 ha (2 x Boreholes) functional Unit B Measuring 1985.0000ha (1x Borehole) functional Unit C Measuring 1915.0000ha (2x Boreholes) functional	Large and Small stock farming
Hardap	Mariental	"R"	Remaining Extent of Farm Hapoyland No. 282	1	Unit A Measuring 2702.6878 ha (5 x boreholes) Functional Unit B Measuring 2596.7609 ha (3 x boreholes) functional	Small and Large stock farming
Erongo	Usakos	"H"	Remaining Extent of Portion 1 of Farm Goabeb No.83	2	Unit A Measuring 2280.1200 ha (3 x Boreholes) Functional (1 x Borehole) Non- Functional Unit B Measuring 3953.2276 ha (1 x Borehole) Functional (1 x Borehole) Non-Functional	Large and Small stock farming
Hardap	Kalkrand	"R"	Portion 1 of the Farm Auro-West No.15	1	Single Unit Measuring 5140.0018 ha (4 x boreholes) Functional	Small and Large stock farming
Hardap	Kalkrand	"R"	Portion 1 of the Farm Gurus No. 137	1	Single Unit Measuring 4665.0644 ha (3 x boreholes) Functional	Small and Large stock farming

**2. Public inspection of allotment plan**

The approved allotment plans, in respect of the farming unit offered for allotment, are available for public inspection during the office hours at the offices mentioned in paragraph 3 (c) for a period of 30 days from the date of publication of this notice in the Gazette.

**3. Application for allotment of farming unit**

An application for allotment of a farming unit must -

(a) be made on the forms determined by the Minister, which form may be obtained from the offices mentioned in subparagraph (c);

(b) where the unit to be allotted is to be used for project development, be accompanied by -

i. detailed project proposal

ii. proof of registration or provisional registration, where the applicant is a company, a close corporation, a co-operative or any other entity required by law to be registered; and

(c) within 30 days from the date of publication of this notice in gazette, be delivered or sent to any of the following offices:

**4. Minimum qualifications required to qualify of applicants**

An applicant, other than a company or close corporation contemplated in section 41 (7) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995 (Act No. 6 of 1995) must be a Namibian citizen who -

(a) 18 years of age or older;

(b) has a background or interest in agriculture or related activities;

(c) has been socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices; and

(d) has relinquished any right in respect of agricultural land.

**Physical Addresses:**

The Regional Governor  
Erongo Regional Council  
Government Building  
Tobias Haiyeko Street, Swakopmund

The Regional Governor  
Hardap Regional Council  
Government Building  
Ernst Stumle Street, Mariental

The Regional Governor  
//Karas Regional Council  
Education Building  
Wheeler Street, Keetmanshoop

The Regional Governor  
//Karas Regional Council  
Pull Mann Street  
Windhoek

The Regional Governor  
Kavango East Regional Council  
Government Building  
Ushu Road, Rundu

Postal address:  
The Regional Governor  
Erongo Region  
Private Bag 1230  
Swakopmund

The Regional Governor  
Hardap Region  
Private Bag 2017  
Mariental

The Regional Governor  
//Karas Region  
P.O. Box 38  
Keetmanshoop

The Regional Governor  
//Karas Region  
P.O. Box 3379  
Windhoek

The Regional Governor  
Kavango East Region  
Private Bag 2082  
Rundu

The Regional Governor  
Kavango West Regional Council  
Ntunenkur  
Kavango West

The Regional Governor  
Karas Regional Council  
Government Building  
Opuwo Main Road, Opuwo

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Regional Council  
Government Building  
Eenhana Main Road, Ondangwa

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Regional Council  
Government Building  
Church Street, Gobabis

The Regional Governor  
Omusati Regional Council  
Government Building  
Hamaungu Street, Outapi

The Regional Governor  
Kavango West Region  
P.O. Box 6274  
Ntunenkur

The Regional Governor  
Karas Region  
Private Bag 502  
Opuwo

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Region  
Private Bag 2032  
Eenhana

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Region  
Private Bag 2277  
Gobabis

The Regional Governor  
Omusati Region  
Private Bag 523  
Outapi

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Regional Council  
Government Building  
Leo Shoopaka Street, Oshana

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Regional Council  
Omuhiya Main Road  
Omuhiya

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Regional Council  
Edi No. 219  
Hage Geingob Street, Main Road  
(Next to Avis Car Rental)  
Ojiverongo

The Regional Governor  
Zambezi Regional Council  
Government Building  
Boma, Ngoma Road, Katima Mulilo

The Regional Governor  
Zambezi Regional Council  
Private Bag 5002  
Katima Mulilo

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Region  
Private Bag 5543  
Oshana

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Region  
P.O. Box 19247  
Omuhiya

The Regional Governor  
Oshana Region  
P.O. Box 2081  
Ojiverongo

The Regional Governor  
Zambezi Region  
Private Bag 5002  
Katima Mulilo

**5. Rent payable in respect of farming units**

A farming unit is to be leased for a period of 99 years and the approximate rent payable in respect of a farming unit leased for livestock farming, is as determined by the Minister of Land Reform, on the recommendation of the Land Reform Advisory Commission, based on the value of the farming unit.

**6. Lease Agreement**

A successful applicant must enter into a lease agreement with the Minister of Land Reform.

**Annexure 9: List of households allocated land in Okarukambe from 1995 to 2018 (interviews held)**

No.	Name <sup>7</sup>	Gender	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
1	Dora Katata	F	19.12.2017	Windhoek
2	Meka Upiro	M	11.11.2017	Farm - Omaheke
3	Johannes Wyse	M	11.11.2017	Farm - Omaheke
4	Alyse Kahoro	M	11.11.2017	Farm - Omaheke
5	Katarina Engelbrecht	F	11.11.2017	Farm - Omaheke
6	Mulba Inovanasha	M	11.11.2017	Farm - Omaheke
7	Ludwig Anders	M	11.11.2017	Farm - Omaheke
8	Lawrence Tom	M	5.12.2017	Windhoek
9	Jocelyn Kapere	F	5.12.2017	Windhoek
10	AlexThebe	M	5.12.2017	Windhoek
11	John Kamapo	M	5.12.2017	Windhoek
12	Martin John	M	7.4.2018	Farm - Omaheke
13	Henry Isaacs	M	7.4.2018	Farm - Omaheke
14	Paul Mundiuro	M – son took over	7.4.2018	Farm - Omaheke
15	Fred Aram	M	7.4.2018	Farm - Omaheke
16	Timothy Horace	M	6.4.2018	Farm - Omaheke
17	Zex Katiti	M	6.4.2018	Farm -Omaheke

<sup>7</sup> All names are fictitious so as to preserve anonymity

18	Eric Tjingati	M	6.4.2018	Farm - Omaheke
19	PetrusKadjii	M	5.12.2017	Windhoek
20	Albert PHEME	M	5.12.2017	Windhoek
21	Natalie Alfeus	F	5.12.2017	Windhoek
22	Moses Nduma	M	4.5.2018	Farm - Omaheke
23	Andrew Witbooi	M	4.5.2018	Farm - Omaheke
24	Zebald Uazenga	M	6.7.2018	Windhoek
25	Willem Van Dyk	M	4.5.2018	Farm - Omaheke
26	Raginald Mweshixwa	M	6.7.2018	Windhoek
27	Mathilda Oneases	F	5.5.2018	Farm - Omaheke
<b>List of 33 households allocated land in Okarukambe from 2007 to 2017 (interviews held)</b>				
28	Obed Uanivi	M	28.4.2018	Farm - Omaheke
29	Lyody Mumba	M	28.4.2018	Farm - Omaheke
30	Silba Maata	F	28.4.2018	Farm - Omaheke
31	Angela Tjira	F	2.2.2018	Windhoek
32	Gerson Ngatjiko (deceased)	M (Son inherited farm)	2.2.2018	Windhoek
33	Esther Mbama	F	16.8.2018	Farm - Omaheke
34	Victor Makgona	M	16.8.2018	Farm - Omaheke
35	Modester Batise	F	16.8.2018	Windhoek
36	Helen Kejjo	F	16.8.2018	Farm - Omaheke
37	Mary Owos	F	16.8.2018	Farm - Omaheke

38	JohnAjumbelo	M	17.8.2018	Farm - Omaheke
39	Hileni Johannes	F	17.8.2018	Farm - Omaheke
40	Josey Naruses	F	2.2.2018	Windhoek
41	Hilda Tjaverua	F	2.2.2018	Windhoek
42	AggyXoagubes	F	2.2.2018	Windhoek
43	Milka Tjitemima	M	17.8.2018	Farm - Omaheke
44	Stanley Mukuru	M	3.8.2018	Windhoek
45	Silvia Hengari	F	22.6.2018	Farm - Omaheke
46	Sebastian Khaiseb	M	3.8.2018	Windhoek
47	TeofilusNghitima	M	3.8.2018	Windhoek
48	Josef Moketo	M	22.6.2018	Farm - Omaheke
49	GustavTjijombo	M	22.6.2018	Farm - Omaheke
50	Pieter Karaseb	M	22.6.2018	Farm - Omaheke
51	Nelago Onesmus	F	23.6.2018	Farm - Omaheke
52	Simon Katjivita	M	23.6.2018	Farm - Omaheke
53	Erastus Kamati	M	5.7.2018	Windhoek
54	Andeline Kidjo	F	23.6.2018	Farm – Omaheke
55	Manuel Katopoloka	M	23.6.2018	Farm - Omaheke
56	Motlhoki Silver	M	22.6.2018	Farm - Omaheke
57	Jacob Muniaro	M	5.7.2018	Windhoek
58	Edward Schwartz	M	5.7.2018	Windhoek
59	James Tjarua	M	5.7.2018	Windhoek



60	Noah Tjikambe	M	5.7.2018	Windhoek
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## Annexure 10: List of key informants

Name <sup>8</sup>	Date of interview	
Mr. Botha	22.1.18	<b>Members of the Land Reform Advisory Commission interviewed</b>
Mr. Simple	7.2.2018	
Mr. Kraaly	12.2.2018	
Mr. Mutti	15.2.2018	
Mr. Gotty	8.2.2018	
Mr. Nedlod	9.2.2018	
Ms. Kamuti	7.2.2018	
Mr. Allen	13.2.2018	
Mr. Ndook	14.2.2018	
Mr. Muza	13.2.2018	
Mr. Kanga	13.2.2018	
Ms. Ibboa	12.2.2018	
Mr. Engel	9.2.2018	
Ms Muswe	8.2.2018	
Name <sup>9</sup>	Position	
Ms. Bothwe	LRAC	20.12.17 Windhoek

<sup>8</sup> All names are fictitious so as to preserve anonymity

<sup>9</sup> All names are fictitious so as to preserve anonymity

Mr. Natter	LRAC	4.10.17 Windhoek
Mr. Emvula	LRAC	19.12.17 Windhoek
Ms. Gomba	LRAC	8.6.18 Windhoek
Ms. Shobby	LRAC	20.12.17 Windhoek
Mr. Neddy	LRAC	12.1.18 Windhoek
Ms. Elly	LRAC	4.10.17 Windhoek
Mr. Hanny	LRAC	20.12.17 Windhoek
Ms. Antony	LRAC	20.12.17 Windhoek
Ms. Renate	LRAC	14.12.17 Windhoek
Mr. Shitty	LRAC	19.12.17 Windhoek
Mr. Paul	LRAC	19.12.17 Windhoek
Ms. Kempel	LRAC	1.12.17 Windhoek
Ms. Lotty	LRAC	1.12.17 Windhoek

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## Omaheke Regional Resettlement Committee

Name <sup>10</sup>	Institution	Date and place of interview
Mr. Caseb	Government	14.12.2017 Gobabis
Ms. Peter	Government	1.12.17 Windhoek
Mr. Meki	Traditional Authority	15.2.2018 Gobabis
Mr. Vatty	NGO	15.12.2017 Gobabis
Mr. Tom	Traditional Authority	16.2.2018 Gobabis
Mr. Henny	NGO	15.12.2017 Gobabis
Mr. Goba	Traditional Authority	13.4.2018 Gobabis
Mr. Anny	Farmers Union	15.12.2017 Gobabis
Mr. Gere	Farmers Union	15.12.2017 Gobabis
Ms. Loary	Traditional Authority	13.4.2018 Gobabis
Mr. Merto	Traditional Authority	14.6.2018 Gobabis
Ms. Salt	Government	14.12.2017 Gobabis
Mr. John	Government	14.12.2017 Gobabis
Ms. Burse	Traditional Authority	14.6.2018 Gobabis
Mr. Viiere	Government	14.12.2017 Gobabis
Mr. Vetere	Government	14.12.2017 Gobabis

<sup>10</sup> All names are fictitious so as to preserve anonymity

Ms. Nokuturra	Regional Council	15.12.2017 Gobabis
Mr. Casper	Government	14.12.2017 Gobabis
Mr. Gabby	Government	14.12.2017 Gobabis



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## Annexure 11: Study Questionnaires

### Questionnaire A for resettled farmers<sup>11</sup>

#### INTRODUCTION

“My name is Prisca Mandimika. I am a post-graduate student at the Institute of Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies [PLAAS] at the University of the Western Cape. I also work at the Ministry of Land Reform. I am conducting field work as part of my studies. It is the objective of this study to establish the socio-economic characteristics of those that have benefitted under the Land Redistribution Programme. The information that you share with me is confidential. Thank you for your participation”.

Date of interview \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

Name of respondent \_\_\_\_\_

Farm name \_\_\_\_\_

Farm number

Farm unit

Farm size [hectares]

Farm owner \_\_\_\_\_

Sex: Male

Female

#### Marital Status

(Please tick the appropriate response)

- a) Married
- b) Unmarried
- c) Cohabiting
- d) Single

<sup>11</sup> Notes on general farm observations

e) Other [specify]   
Identification Number

1. When were you resettled/allocated this farming unit? \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_
2. Type of resettlement: Individual  Group  Cooperative
3. Are you a full-time or part-time farmer? Yes  No
4. Do you have a Letter of Allotment or Lease Agreement? Yes  No
5. If part-time farmer what is the frequency of visit to the farm? (Please tick the appropriate box)
  - a) Once a week
  - b) Once a fortnight
  - c) Once a month
  - d) Once every three months
  - e) Once a year
  - f) Never
6. How many years have you been farming? (Please tick the appropriate box)
  - a) Less than a year
  - b) 2-5 years
  - c) 6-10 years
  - d) Over 10 years
7. In whose name is the farm unit registered? (Please tick the appropriate box)
  - a) Husband
  - b) Wife
  - c) Both spouses
  - d) Son
  - e) Daughter
  - f) Other male relative
  - g) Other female relative
  - h) Not yet registered
8. When were you allocated the farming unit?, [please provide month and year]  
\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_



9. How did you know about the availability of this resettlement farm? *(Please tick)*

- a) Media advertisement – newspapers and radio
- b) Government officials
- c) Family and friends
- d) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

10. Who allocated you this farm? (Observe and tick the appropriate box)

- a) Government official
- b) Regional Resettlement Committee
- c) Land-reform Advisory Commission
- d) Regional governor
- e) Traditional authority
- f) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

11. How did you join the resettlement programme? *(Please tick the appropriate box)*

- a) Application
- b) Came with someone who was resettled in this area
- c) First occupied the farm without permission then applied to formalise occupation.
- d) Farming in the corridor then occupied without permission.
- e) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

12. Why did you apply to be resettled?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

13. Where were you farming prior to being resettled? *(Please tick the appropriate box)*

- a) Corridors
- b) Communal area
- c) Leasing
- d) Sub-leasing on a resettlement farm
- e) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

14. When did you start farming? \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_



15. How have you been resettled?

- a) Individually with own family
- b) As part of a larger group of families
- c) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

16. What is the size of land allocated to you?

Arable \_\_\_\_\_  
Grazing \_\_\_\_\_  
Other \_\_\_\_\_

17. If you share the land with a group, what was the size of land that was given to your group?

Arable \_\_\_\_\_  
Grazing \_\_\_\_\_  
Other \_\_\_\_\_

18. Prior to the allocation were you ever interviewed about your social status?

Yes  No

19. If yes, what kind of questions were you asked and by whom?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

20. What is your level of education? *(Please tick the appropriate box)*

- a) No formal education
- b) Matric
- c) Grade 10
- d) Primary school
- e) College, university/polytechnic

21. What is your spouse's level of education? *(Please tick the appropriate box)*

- a) No formal education
- b) Matric
- c) Grade 10
- d) Primary school
- e) College, university/polytechnic

22. What is your current main occupation? *(Please tick the appropriate box)*

- a) Farming
- b) Non-farming – business
- c) Government/public sector
- d) Wage labour
- e) NGO
- f) Student

23. Prior to being resettled what was your main occupation? *(Please tick the appropriate box)*

- a) Unemployed urban dweller
- b) Retrenched worker
- c) Retired/pensioner
- d) Farm worker
- e) Government/private sector
- f) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

24. What was your marital status at the time of resettlement? *(Please tick the appropriate box)*

- a) Married
- b) Widowed
- c) Single
- d) Divorced
- e) Polygamist

25. What previous work experience related to farming did you have before being resettled?

- a) Farmer in a communal area
- b) Farmer in a commercial area
- c) Farm worker
- d) No experience
- e) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

26. If farming part-time what other occupation do you have? *(Please tick the appropriate box)*

- a) Government
- b) Private sector
- c) Self-employed
- d) Part-time/ casual worker/contract employment
- e) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

27. What assets did you own at the time of resettlement? *(List the assets)*

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28. What agricultural qualification did you or your spouse have at the time of land allocation? *(Please tick the appropriate boxes)*

- a) Agricultural training certificate
- b) Experience as ex-farm manager/communal farmer
- c) Agricultural college graduate
- d) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

29. How old were you at the time of land allocation? *(Please tick the appropriate box)*

- a) 18-25
- b) 26-45
- c) 46-55
- d) Over 55

30. Did you participate in the Liberation Struggle or are you a returnee/refugee?

- a) Yes (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- b) No

31. What is your region of origin?

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32. Number of livestock owned at the time of resettlement and current?

Type of livestock	Number of livestock owned	
	At resettlement	At current
Cattle		
Sheep		
Goats		
Horses		
Pigs		
Donkeys		
Other (Specify)		

33. What type of assets did you own at the time of land allocation and now?

TYPE OF ASSETS	AT RESETTLEMENT	AT CURRENT

34. Do you employ any workers, if yes, how many and what are their qualifications?

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## Questionnaire B for officials<sup>12</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

“My name is Prisca Mandimika. I am a post-graduate student at the Institute of Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies [PLAAS] at the University of the Western Cape. I also work at the Ministry of Land Reform. I am conducting field work as part of my studies. It is the objective of this study to establish the socio-economic characteristics of those that have benefitted under the Land Redistribution Programme. The information that you share with me is confidential. Thank you for your participation”.

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Name of Respondent .....

Position held.....

Date of interview.....

1. What is your role in the Resettlement Programme?

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2. Do you have any role in the selection of beneficiaries under the Resettlement Programme?

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<sup>12</sup> General comments invited from the respondent on the land-reform process.

3. If yes, what is your role?

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
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4. What is the government policy on the selection of beneficiaries for the Land-reform Programme?



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5. Are there criteria that are used in the selection of beneficiaries?

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6. If yes, what are the resettlement criteria?

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
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7. If No, what should government use to select potential resettlement beneficiaries? What do you suggest?



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8. Where do potential beneficiaries of the Resettlement Programme register for land?

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9. Where do potential beneficiaries get to know about land that has been acquired and is to be allocated?

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10. Is there a Waiting List for potential land beneficiaries?

Yes  No

11. If yes, who maintains the Waiting List and where is it kept?

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
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12. What mechanisms have been put in place to disseminate information about the availability of land/farms to Namibians?

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17. In your opinion is the current system of land allocation fair and transparent. If not how can fairness in selecting beneficiaries be improved. If yes how fair is it?

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18. Please suggest what could be part of a selection criteria?



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19. In your opinion who should benefit from land redistribution and currently whom do you think has been benefitting from the programme?

<b>Who should benefit from land redistribution?</b>	<b>RANK</b>	<b>Who Has Been Benefitting from Land Redistribution?</b>	<b>RANK</b>
The poor		The poor	
Returnees		Returnees	
War veterans		Refugees	
Struggle kids		Rich business people	
Agricultural graduates		Government officials	
Namibians with resources to produce		All Namibians	
All Namibians who want land for farming		Politicians	
Other (specify): _____		Other (specify) _____	

20. Are you aware of farmers who are subleasing land? If so, why are they subleasing?

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
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## Annexure 12: Letter of Authorisation



REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA

### MINISTRY OF LAND REFORM

Tel No: (+264 61) 296 5000  
Fax No: (+264 61) 228 240  
Enquiries:

55 Robert Mugabe Avenue  
Private Bag 13343  
WINDHOEK  
NAMIBIA

7 September, 2017

Ms Prisca Mandimika  
P.O. Box 35184  
Windhoek  
Namibia

Dear Ms. Mandimika

**RE: REQUEST FOR CONSENT TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON LAND ISSUES IN NAMIBIA.**

The above refers,


The Ministry of Land Reform hereby grants you permission to conduct research for your studies as requested in your letter of the 7<sup>th</sup> of September, 2017. We trust that you will conduct the research with an ethical conscience and to the best of your abilities.

The Ministry gives you official authorisation to conduct interviews with staff members of the Ministry of Land Reform based at Head office and in all our Regional offices, Regional Resettlement Committee of Omaheke, identified members of the Land Reform Advisory Commission and any other institutions related to the Ministry. You are also given permission to obtain and use information within the Ministry that is in the public domain, unless the respective departments feel that certain information is confidential. The information gathered should not be misused and should serve for the sole purpose of your research.

The Ministry would appreciate regular updates on the findings of the research, and looks forward to a final presentation of the results.

We wish you all the best with your research.

Sincerely,



Utoni Nujoma, (MP)  
MINISTER OF LAND REFORM



*All official correspondence must be addressed to the Permanent Secretary*