

The 'Rough edge of deterritorialisation': Contemplation

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Is there anything more contemplating than a cow? It seems to have a blank look, but not at all. It is true that there are animals that are not contemplative in the least but this is the lowest level of animals, for example cats and dogs, they hardly ever contemplate. That is why they experience little joy. They are bitter animals, they do not contemplate anything. They echo the damned exactly [...] Gilles Deleuze¹

To frame this paper, which given its focus on the installation *Red* should ostensibly deal with a question of aesthetics and technology, with an epigraph that situates the contemplative capacity of a cow alongside the echo of the damned, is perhaps a little strange. It is this haunting echo, however, that asks for a re-working of contemplation and that finds a resonance in the effect evoked through 'Red', an effect that draws out the rumbling of the non-Western in the frame of Western philosophy.² Rather than approach this strangeness as something to be resisted in order to assert the apparent clarity of what appears to us, a resistance that would allow an articulation of an instance of clear aesthetic judgment, thereby affirming a sense of subjective certainty, in what follows I seek to abide by its unsettling effect. This unsettling encounter with a work of art, an encounter that provokes a Kierkegaardian trembling and exceeds the scripts in which it becomes legible, opens, in my reading, toward a re-working of contemplation away from judgment and towards what Nietzsche calls 'life'.³ Contemplation, in this instance, is offered both as an action and as a capacity, a capacity that is *not* peculiarly human and that begins to posit the subject as a question for thought. As Derrida suggests in his critique of both Lacan's and Levinas' production, in keeping with a certain Cartesianism, of a distinction between the human and that which it is not, namely the machine or the animal (what he terms the 'animot'), the human, the animal, and the machine are all similarly responsive to the coding of language. It is the claim to subjective certainty that deploys the distinction as part of its conceptual scaffolding.⁴ *Red*, through its desire to inhabit the dislocated space of a gift that, in its own narrative, carried a weight akin to the task of post-apartheid reconciliation, offers itself as a peculiar instantiation of this unsettling effect.

In this essay, I seek to abide by the unsettling effect provoked by an encounter with Gush's installation, *Red*, which I have read and encountered through four platforms: the digital lens of his website; the montage effect of the documentary by the same name; the installation housed in the Ann Bryant Art Gallery in East London, and the conference 'RED ASSEMBLY: Time and Work' that accompanied the opening of the installation on 27 August 2015 and at which this paper was first presented.⁵ Doing so requires us to grapple not only with its twists and turns, but also with the undercurrents that articulate its effect, an effect that is not, and can never be, total. Taking my cue from Deleuze's statement on contemplation, in this paper I first move through Gush's installation and its attendant documentary before working through the concept of 'contemplation', so as to bring us to the 'rough edge of deterritorialization', in short, to what Deleuze names as a point-of-view.⁶ In producing this reading of the concept I begin with Benjamin's essay on art and technology and its relation to life, drawing on Kant and Nietzsche so as to specify the stakes of contemplation. Through the resonance between Nietzsche's critique of history, Benjamin's reading of the work of art, and Césaire's sense of a people to come, I attend to the 'echo of the damned'—not just the way in which the non-contemplative echoes the damned, but also the damned as an echo, a recurring refrain that unsettles contemplation itself—as it seeps through the installation, *Red*. Following this I return to Benjamin and Deleuze so as to specify what I call the rough edge of deterritorialization, before ending on Fanon. There is, then, a poignant question that resides in this paper's own undercurrents: How, or, at least where, can those who have been produced as 'the damned of the earth' find joy?⁷

Reading Red

To encounter the installation, *Red*, is to enter into a series of constellations, crystallizations, and absences, which provoke a re-figuring of the encountering subject. It is not, however, its exploded structure that provokes this re-figuring, but rather its pedagogical nature: the installation attempts to shape the political undercurrents of its effect by attending to the viewer through its documentary film. This pedagogic effect draws out the visceral presence of the worker in the installation, and runs the risk of being closed down in a necessary and yet commonplace rendering in terms of labour and race relations. I suggest, however, that this effect simultaneously elicited for me a very particular reading, one that confronts the problem of subjective certainty.

The first encounter with the installation is marked by a strong sense of violence. The shell of the 'Mandela car' (a gift that was meant to be symbolic of reconciliation and the un-working of alienation) is presented on wheels that are not its own, with all its cavities and openings exposed. The doors and hoods of the bonnet and boot still hang, but now on walls. The wheels and tires are gone, as is the engine and indeed the entire undercarriage of the vehicle. The vehicle's devices of comfort and safety, namely the upholstery and airbags, are displayed transformed, as beds, as 'strike uniforms', and in the Ann Bryant Art Gallery version of the installation, located

inside the house, with the frame of the car outside, in the yard. The slippage here, the sliding between locations in the sprawling out of the vehicle, is reinforced by the use of a different tone of red for every panel of the vehicle: each panel signifies a line of flight, a restless movement that seems to resist its address as a concrete part of the vehicle's whole, consistently evoking a tendency to arrive elsewhere, or indeed, to not arrive where it was intended.⁸

The gift is presented here as ravished. It has been laid bare, or as Aimé Césaire, in the *Notebook of a Return to the Native Land*, and Frantz Fanon, in *Black Skin, White Masks*, phrase it in speaking of the condition of the black man [*noir*] in the moment of its production as black [*nègre*] (i.e. as essence not adjective): it has been 'sprawled flat' or 'spread-eagled', put on display.⁹ It is clear that this installation asks to be read as hosting, and indeed in its Ann Bryant Gallery instantiation, as housing, the articulations of the workers in the Mercedes plant: the vehicle is produced as clothing them, as housing them, even and especially, in their rebellion. What is sprawled out and put on display here is not simply the vehicle, but also the gift, the worker. This is accentuated in the accompanying documentary in the middle of a segment featuring a perspective articulated by Ian Russell, the former HR Manager at the Mercedes plant in East London. As he explains the 'recognition agreement' that enabled a 'relationship by objectives programme', the camera (which often meanders either through East London or the Mercedes plant) stands still, focusing on the statue of one of the founding members of the Black Consciousness movement in South Africa, Steve Biko. In the midst of a discussion of compartmentalization, premised on a separation of work and politics, the camera raises in a moment of apparent distraction a question of consciousness.

The managers, the negotiators, even the workers, in their interviews given as part of the documentary all agree on one thing: the plant is central to the possibility of life in East London. Thousands and thousands of workers, their dependents, and the zones in which they spend their wages, are all dependent on the German manufacturer and, as such, it is necessary to make the plant work. The strike and occupation of the plant, which is often physically and economically violent, works to place that making work into question, as does the installation *Red*. At its core, then, I read in *Red* the posing of a question which is, on its terms, a reading of the strike and the gift: what is this life that is deemed to be worth living? Or, stated more pointedly for what is named as the post-apartheid, what does Biko mean when he declares that the purpose of Black Consciousness is to achieve 'the gift' of 'giving the world a more human face'?¹⁰

Art against Judgment

In his short and posthumously published 'Theory of Distraction', written from 1935 to 1936 during the time in which he rewrote 'The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility', Walter Benjamin seeks to address the question: what is

the effect of art after the destruction of aura?¹¹ As he had demonstrated in the first 'Work of Art' essay, technological reproducibility evolved to such an extent that, in our modernity, the meaning and use of art had thoroughly shifted. There are two key elements in this shift, the first hinging on 'aura', and the second on 'film'. The refinement of the technological aspect of reproducibility, for Benjamin, can be understood as a slow transition away from mimesis toward expression. Aura, in this trajectory, carries the weight of 'authenticity',¹² it is a truth effect intrinsic to the work of art, hence its value in the roles of ritual and the sacred in society.¹³ Quite clearly art, in this instance, is still produced according to peculiar interests that are neither ostensibly democratic, nor necessarily concerned with life as it is lived by 'the masses'. As technological reproducibility improves however, passing through stages such as the lithograph and then the photograph, this aura comes to be progressively eroded and, as such, the work of art increasingly runs the risk of being 'worn out'.¹⁴ It is, finally, in film that the mechanism of the work of art's reproducibility has become identical with the work of art itself. It has become a representation without the weight of aura: expression.¹⁵ For Benjamin the slide that is carried out through this evolution of technological reproducibility carries a very clear shift in what he calls the 'effect' of the work of art: it moves from contemplation to distraction (*Zerstreuung*, a term that is also translated as 'entertainment'¹⁶), and presents a clear opportunity in the interests of life.

The distinction between these two terms is critical, not only because they mark the 'true humanity' of the work of art through indicating its 'unlimited adaptability' as well as its functioning within the political sphere, but also as it enables us to grasp *Red* in relation to its affective effect.¹⁷ It is in contemplation, Benjamin argues, that the effect of the work of art has traditionally been located, an effect that was accentuated through its increasing separation from both ritual and the sacred.¹⁸ At stake in contemplation is, precisely, the capacity for the subject to consider itself within a frame of subjective certainty: the work of art elicits the attention of the subject, drawing the subject into it, fixing the subject in place, so as to render it as that for which the work of art is. In short, contemplation enables what Immanuel Kant names as Judgment. Due to its centrality to what can be grasped as the European project of Man, a project that includes colonialism and its aftermaths which are evoked in the echo of the damned, it is worth briefly digressing into a reading of Kant so as to specify its terms in some detail.

In Kant's system, judgment is produced as a concept to attend to the difference between theoretical and practical philosophy, where the former has to do with 'understanding' and the latter has to do with 'reason'.¹⁹ More specifically, this distinction whereby 'understanding and reason are two distinct jurisdictions over the same territory of experience' that can never interfere or straightforwardly touch each other creates what can be considered as a split in the subject, an absolute separation into territories.²⁰ Territory, in this instance (and this is critical for understanding what Deleuze and

Guattari (territorialization and deterritorialization) refers to the part of an a priori concept's field that the subject can know, it is the relation between the object of such a field and the 'requisite cognitive faculty' (that is, understanding and reason), and the subject's capacity to legislate (to have agency in relation to concepts) in relation to it is named by Kant as 'realm'.²¹

Judgment operates, in Kant's argument, as a 'necessary subjective principle', a principle that is imputed into nature so as to allow the Western subject to recognize purposiveness in it and, through this, to enable a bridging of the two territories of philosophy. It operates, effectively, at the level of an 'as if'.²² As Kant argues in *The Perpetual Peace*, purposiveness is supplied by us to nature in order that we might act in it as if it is ordered.²³ This necessary principle carries a similar function to the imputation of a distinction between man and animal-machine that structures the Levinasian and Lacanian statements on ethics (discussed in Note 4); it allows an authoritative claim to intentional action (an intentional response) and it is to this extent—the claim to intentionality—that it is necessary.²⁴ Critical in this recognition and subsequent extension of purposiveness is aesthetic judgment which, as Kant suggests, functions as a 'critique which is the propaedeutic of all philosophy': it is the first step, the intertwining, that makes philosophy and the European project of Man possible, 'for us', as it enables this 'us' to recognize the purposiveness in Law (understanding) and Ends (reason).²⁵

The contemplation of Art (as well as the contemplation of nature as art) is then, as Spivak has argued, a mechanism through which the trajectory of European philosophical critique after Kant—as well as its colonial projects grasped as a philosophical extension of the gift of Man to the world—takes place (*Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, 30).²⁶ This 'gift', however, is integral to the production of the black man (*noir*) as black (*nègre*), a process that is diagnosed as 'thingification' in interventions such as Césaire's *Discourse on Colonialism* and Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, and which is evoked in the sprawled-out installation of the 'Mandela car'. Benjamin's difficulties with contemplation do not, however, stop at the level of its complicity with this thingification. Rather, he argues further that it is replaced, in our modernity, by the Fascist production of 'the audience' as a seizing hold of the work of art at the level of its distraction.²⁷ This mass that does not recognize itself as a class is affirmed, according to Benjamin, through the film as a spectacle for consumption: it 'maintains property relations', placing the world on a trajectory towards war.²⁸

It is the 'wearing out' of the work of art that occurs in the shifting of its effect away from contemplation and towards distraction that makes this seizing hold by Fascism

possible. However, it also carries a positive potentiality for Benjamin, a potential that he names under the concatenated sign of ‘Reproducibility–distraction–politicization’.²⁹ Distraction, rather than affirming a sense of subjective certainty and its attendant concepts of property and right, in its dissolution of the work of art into a multiplicity of subjects offers the possibility of an education, the crystallization of a sense of class consciousness that exceeds the self and enables a terrain for struggle.³⁰ This possibility amounts to the recognition of what Benjamin names as ‘a new beauty in what is vanishing’ and which, in his letter responding to Adorno’s critique of his Work of Art essay and the Arcades Project, he refers to as a ‘proper reading’ that entails the ‘construction’ of a new habit adequate to what can be newly seen in the fading of aura.³¹ Although in his essay on Leskov, titled ‘The Storyteller’, Benjamin is particularly writing on the ‘craft’ of storytelling, which is a fading practice of distraction, what he locates in the moment of its fading is useful for the reading of distraction in relation to contemplation that I am developing here. He suggests that what is newly visible is the pedagogical aspect of storytelling, a ‘task [focused on fashioning] the raw material of experience’ through the peculiar practice of the ‘hand’ as it connects what he calls the eye and the soul.³² It is the habit of storytelling, developed as an artisanal craft, to extend the openness of duration toward its listeners (as opposed to the immediacy of information that is fully bound to its time).³³ As such the storyteller – who requires proper listening that is contingent on having ‘boredom’, a ‘community of listeners’ and a listener who is practiced in ‘self-forgetting’ – has the effect of orienting his listeners towards a future that is always a ‘continuation to a story that is just unfolding’.³⁴ The substitution of the work of contemplation for the effect of distraction in Benjamin’s argument, a substitution that might address the Kantian inscription of judgment, is tempered in his broader text through an affirmation of a future that is marked by a difference that, in the terms I have been developing here, can neither be reduced to the animal or to the human. To work this out more fully, it is necessary to return to the question of the contemplative capacity of a cow, especially to the focus of its ‘blank stare’

Immanent Evaluation and the Emergence of a New People

Deleuze’s invocation of the cow immediately recalls the opening of Nietzsche’s ‘untimely meditation’ on the ‘Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ which, in turn, offers a sense through which the re-working of contemplation might be oriented. For Nietzsche, it is not ‘what man is’ but rather ‘what he can be’ that produces the shape of his intervention, a perspective that immediately places it in opposition to Kant’s sense of disinterested contemplation that finds judgment as an expression of what Man already is.³⁶ Arguing that life should be understood as ‘a future to come’, Nietzsche sets out to specify the limits of history as an element in the creation of life.³⁷ While his formulation of Monumental, Antiquarian, and Critical modes of history are perhaps the

most widely read aspects of his meditation, the focus of my reading here will be on his expression of life and its relation to the contemplative capacity of a cow.³⁸ The cow, or cattle as he phrases it, is not capable of judgment as it does not have a sense of time that moves linearly from the past to the future, rather, it has mastered the art of 'forgetting'.³⁹ As Benjamin might put it, the cow has mastered the art of properly listening, or reading, such that it might leap towards the new. Man, however, driven forward by the weight of history, a weight derived from a Hegelian teleology inscribed in the concept of 'world process', has lost its capacity to act unhistorically and to make such a leap.⁴⁰

This is not to argue that history has no benefit for life, rather, Nietzsche posits the notion that it is in the service of an unexamined teleology that each mode accumulates history as a weight that stifles its productive capacities – Monumental history 'transforms reality into a technical object'; Antiquarian history stifles man within the 'stench' of indigeneity; and Critical history traps man within the cyclical nature of its operation.⁴¹ In the face of this removal of the possibility of creation due to the weight of history, which he names as an 'Occidental prejudice', Nietzsche asks: 'Are there still human beings [...] or perhaps only thinking-, writing- and speaking-machines?'.⁴² The machine in this formulation refers to an automaton, a programmed and finely balanced mechanism that can only perform prescribed functions. This, it seems, is the sickness inherent in the ironic existence as the heir to a world process that culminates in the present age: the new is already completed; one is destined to suffocate in the dust of history, or in the case of 'the damned', to loiter on the edge of its threshold without entering. In a formulation that Césaire will come to accentuate through the ordering effect of blackness, Nietzsche argues that the only antidote is to 'create for your selves the concept of a people', to construct a future through which one might become 'first-born', become a beginning and not an end.⁴³

The task of constructing a people is both made more urgent and more complicated by Césaire in his 1956 lecture on 'Culture and Colonialism'.⁴⁴ Within a frame in which colonialism is understood as the mechanism that enables the thingification of the non-European (Césaire is deliberately constructing a political solidarity that extends beyond Africa and its Diasporas) through, in part, the weight of history, Césaire similarly calls for the creation of a new people.⁴⁵ This people, however, cannot be created according to a plan. Rather, they are an expression of a Nietzschean 'future-to-come' whose conditions, Césaire argues, it is the work of black artists and writers to produce. Such an arrival of a future-to-come understood as a people that has been marked by colonialism but that is no longer hemmed in by this marking: a people that is no longer within its cut, would truly be 'first-born'. However, it is not simply life, but also the weight of being produced as black through thingification that, for Césaire, orders the production of an aesthetic sensibility adequate to the conditions that would enable such an arrival. This people, who are named in a political

construction as black by Césaire, will not be reducible to a difference between Europe and its others, an insistence that immediately complicates how this 'black', as a naming, is meant to be thought.⁴⁶

Nietzsche's suggestion that the creation of a new concept of a people might be adequate to a future is rooted in an ethical project that is, from our perspective, enabled by Césaire's intervention. Life, he argues, remains to be learned 'as a craft' and 'from the ground up [...] practiced remorselessly'.⁴⁷ This practice, first articulated by Nietzsche in the meditative calm of the cow, is not simply about forgetfulness as such, but rather has to do with a capacity to leap, to act unhistorically, against the markings of one's subjectivity. Nietzsche names this practice a 'hygiene of life' that may be capable of organizing the chaos as an expression of a point of view.⁴⁸ Such a sense of the practice of learning life, a practice that offers immanent evaluation as a mode of distinction and decision, returns us to the Deleuzian inscription of contemplation with which this essay began.

As Luis de Miranda argues, for Deleuze the subject marks a 'constant process of singular becoming'.⁴⁹ Whereas for Kant the subject is a fixed point located on the caesura between the mind and body, between reflection and action, and made certain through taking its 'I' as an ego in the moment of judgment, Deleuze suggests that this understanding mistakes a 'singular determination' (namely, reason) for an 'essence' (Ontology/Ethics).⁵⁰ Rather, following Spinoza and Plotinus and in a formulation that resonates with Césaire, Deleuze suggests that Being needs to be grasped as an 'affirmation of a living difference' that 'complicates all beings'.⁵¹ While Kantian morality takes the presumed essence of reasonableness 'as an end' so as to realize Man as adequate to this, Deleuze argues that such a process actually reflects the 'fatigue of the real' and works to root the subject in place.⁵² In distinction from this condition, which Deleuze names in an echo of Levinas as 'the damned', the subject emerges as a 'folding' along the 'molar line', 'rupture line', and 'molecular line', each of which corresponds with a particular understanding of desire—a concept that similarly threads the installation *Red*.⁵³

Resisting the quasi-psychoanalytic framing of desire as 'the wish for what we believe we do not have', de Miranda suggests that the molar line is the line of 'territorialization', of convention, duty, and the injunction: 'comply with the norm and you will be beautiful', which seizes up desire; the rupture line is where 'desire makes things flow' through a 'deterritorialization' that allows lines of flight; and the molecular line is the fold that straddles the tension between the first two, it is the line of life that abides by the 'rough edge of deterritorialisation'.⁵⁴ To be either fully territorialized and coded into the socius (that is, to have subjective certainty

and to be stifled under the weight of history), or to be fully deterritorialized with no grip on the socius (that is, to be fully schizophrenic), is to be with 'little joy', to find oneself as only patient, without producing an adequate cause. This expression of the subject, which is 'anomal', between the lines, in an affirmation marked as a 'becoming that is always an adventure', is what is held in a moment of contemplation that is turned toward its own body as, perhaps, a work of art.⁵⁵ As Miranda phrases it: 'every single thing is a contemplation of that which it derives from, which is life becoming difference, flesh of endless disparity'.⁵⁶ Contemplation, in this formulation that carries the tone of Nietzsche's and Césaire's interventions is much closer to an affirmation of distraction as Benjamin formulates it. Contemplation is not passive, is not disinterested or the domain of the Bourgeoisie; rather, it works as an 'envisaging of its own requisites', as a body responsive of desire as power, as Deleuze articulates it paraphrasing responsive of desire as power, as Deleuze articulates it paraphrasing Nietzsche, not as 'that which I want [but] by definition [as that which] I have'.⁵⁷ As such, it is attentive to the habit of its singularity, folding, unfolding, and refolding along the lines, a perpetual becoming 'adequate to that which happens', a practice of learning life.⁵⁸ This practice responds in its orientation toward life to the echo of the damned that haunts Deleuze's affirmation of contemplation, and the question that *Red* poses for thought. As such it abides by the possibility, articulated by Benjamin in his essay on the Work of Art read in conjunction with his Theory of Distraction, of a pedagogic moment in which the conditions for a new concept of a people might be produced, the offering, ultimately, of a gift of a more human face.

Why then is there a strangeness in encountering the installation *Red*? Its depiction of the gift, the worker, 'sprawled-flat', refuses to draw the subject into the work in a mode of self-affirming disinterested contemplation, or judgment. Rather, it unsettles the subject in a manner not recuperable through the Kantian sublime; turning its contemplation toward its body not as the locus of Kantian reasonableness, but rather as a 'small packet of power' that experiences joy in its folds, that seeks to be adequate to difference rather than reducing difference to an instance of the same – a contemplation that presses the sovereign ego of Kantian judgment and of the elevation of the human over the animal to vanish in the distance of its duration.⁵⁹ This contemplation, then, is a response to the echo of the damned, as Fanon articulates the cry of this echo: 'oh my body, always make me a man who questions'.⁶⁰ In the encounter with *Red*, the viewing subject contemplates *his* body and, perhaps, begins to question.

Acknowledgement

I acknowledge the Centre for Humanities Research (CHR) at the University of the Western Cape for providing the funding that made this research possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ On background to *Red* and *Red Assembly*, see the editors' introduction to this issue. Deleuze cited in de Miranda, "New Life," 45.

² For a consideration of 'echo' that resonates strongly with my thinking of this opening that is produced, see Spivak, 'Echo'. Apart from registering two objections in her reading of the dominant articulations of the story of Narcissus and Echo, Spivak produces a reading that offers through abiding by the cut of Echo's enunciations, a sense of 'insufficiency' as 'the name not of the limits of self-knowledge [Narcissus] but of the possibility of deconstruction' (Ibid., 25). Echo, here, becomes an enunciation of differance (Ibid., 26).

³ See Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages." See Derrida, "And say the Animal responded?" In his critique of Lacan's Cartesianism, Derrida returns us to the instability of the claim to intentionality that marks Lacan's exclusion of the 'animal-machine'. In brief, the role of language in the structure of the unconscious produces the subject as less than intentional or agential. Rather, it is a body that is responsive to coding, not unlike the animal or the machine (Ibid., 129, 137). See also Deleuze and Guattari, "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal."

⁵ See <http://www.simongush.net/red-2/>

⁶ See Deleuze, *The Fold*.

⁷ See Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. As Fanon makes clear both in his *Black Skin White Masks* and *The Wretched of the Earth*, 'the native' is produced through the thingification of colonialism as the damned of the earth, as less than human, and as sliding into the category of 'the animal' due to an apparent 'insensibility to ethics' (Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 32). The language that Fanon deploys to describe the status of the colonised is eerily similar to that used by Lacan in his marking of a distinction between the human and the animal (discussed in note 4 above). For Fanon, while violence enables a certain 'taking of place' (Ibid., 47) in the moment of decolonization, it is not able to deal with the 'Manichean problem' (Ibid., 31) of Man as the conceptual terrain that produces the native as such—it maintains the binary, even if it shifts positions within it. What is more urgent is that which might come after the moment of decolonization: the project of 'working out new concepts, setting afoot a new man' (Ibid., 255). In the terms under discussion in this essay, this might amount to inventing a new expression of contemplation, one not premised on subjective certainty or the distinction between Europe and its Others.

⁸ See Lacan, 'Seminar on "The Purloined Letter"', for a discussion of the structure of the unconscious that is recalled by the fluidity of the installation. See also Fink, *Between language and Jouissance*, for a discussion of this in relation to desire, a common thread in the conference, 'Red Assembly: Time and Work'.

⁹ See Césaire, *Notebook*, 8-9, and Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 93.

¹⁰ Biko, “We Blacks,” 51. Benjamin, “Theory of Distraction.” The revised version of the “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility” is published in the same volume, pp. 19-55, and includes additional Theses and notes. Hereafter I refer to this version as II followed by thesis (so, II Thesis 2). The better known first version was published in *Illuminations*, 217–262. Unless indicated otherwise, all references are to this edition.

¹² Benjamin, “Work of Art,” Thesis 2.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Thesis 4-6.

¹⁴ Benjamin, “Theory of Distraction,” 56.

¹⁵ Benjamin, ‘Work of Art’, Theses 12-13. Deleuze will say that a further shift has occurred with the emergence of modern cinema: broadly, a shift from the movement-image to the time-image (*Cinema 2*, 41), as the emergence of a new aesthetic that is expressed in conjunction with many new signs, series, and cuts that emerge in this shift. An aesthetic adequate to the unsettling of the subject and the world in which a new sense of time no longer available to simple linear progression emerges for thought.

¹⁶ Benjamin, “Theory of Distraction” 57.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

¹⁸ Benjamin, “Work of Art,” Thesis 4.

¹⁹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 3-4 and 11.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 11. See also Brown, *The Primitive*, 106-110.

²¹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 10.

²² *Ibid.*, 16.

²³ Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 144-146.

²⁴ Derrida, “And say the Animal responded?” 127.

²⁵ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 29; 19. See also Cohen, ‘Three Problems’. As Cohen’s argument suggests, aesthetic judgment ultimately seems to hinge on a capacity for a judgment on the sublime, something that Kant implies in his discussion of the Analytic of the Sublime in *The Critique of Judgment*, is not universal. As Spivak points out in her reading of this passage in the third Critique, Kant excludes the ‘raw man’, the native, from those that have such a capacity, See Spivak. *A Critique*, especially footnote 32 on 26-29.

²⁶ Spivak, *Critique*, 30.

²⁷ Benjamin, “Work of Art,” II Thesis 19.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Benjamin, “Theory of Distraction,” 57.

³⁰ Benjamin, “Work of Art,” II Theses 18-19. Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” 87; Bloch et al, *Aesthetics and Politics*, 137.

³² Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” 108.

33 Ibid., 90-92.

34 Ibid., 91 and 86. For a reading of this openness of duration in relation to the distinction between the human and the animal, see Lingis, 'Animal body, inhuman face', where he argues that the human is an organism among other organisms unfolding in a rhizomatic 'spreading of duration' (168). Lingis' argument draws near to that of Levinas and Lacan in its mechanism of distinction between the human and the animal. However, for Lingis, the task is to allow the duration of the animal to break through, to shatter the bracketing of flows that gives the illusion of agency, so that we might experience 'joy' (Ibid., 182).

35 de Miranda, "New Life," 130.

36 Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages," XVIII.

37 Ibid., 59.

38 For a reading of the three modes of history and their implication for the role of critique today, see Bové, "Introduction: Nietzsche's Use and Abuse of History," 1-16.

39 Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages," 61.

40 Ibid., 97.

41 Ibid., 69-75.

42 Ibid., 66 and 85. See also Deleuze's discussion of the figure of 'the truthful man' who judges life, and the 'sick man' who is sick with life, for a reading of how the time-image in modern cinema begins to address this problematic of judgment that Nietzsche sets out for thought (*Cinema 2*, 137-143).

43 Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages," 100 and 107. Deleuze similarly suggests that the task of producing oneself as adequate to the aesthetic sensibility of the time-image, a sensibility that resists the becoming automata that inheres in the movement-image, entails the invention of a people, a becoming minor that hinges on an ethical position expressed in the formulation: 'I is another' (*Cinema 2*, 184-222).

44 Césaire, "Culture et colonization," my translations.

45 Ibid., 192-193.

46 Ibid., 200.

47 Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages," 118 and 120.

48 Ibid., 123.

49 de Miranda, "New Life," 133.

50 Deleuze, "Ontology/Ethics," 2.

51 de Miranda, "New Life," 118; Deleuze, "Spinoza/Leibniz," 5.

52 de Miranda, "New Life," 133.

53 Ibid., 110-117. See also Levinas, *On Escape*. For us, of course, this also echoes Fanon.

- 54 de Miranda, "New Life," 140 and 108-132.
- 55 Ibid., 151.
- 56 Ibid., 130.
- 57 Ibid., 131; Deleuze, "Ontology/Ethics," 5.
- 58 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 149.
- 59 Deleuze, "Ontology/Ethics," 5.
- 60 Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, 206.

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