Beck, Simon05/08/201405/08/20142013Beck, S. (2013). Understanding ourselves better. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 20(1):51-551086-3303https://hdl.handle.net/10566/1151INTRODUCTION: Marya Schechtman and Grant Gillett acknowledge that my case in �The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View� (2013) has some merits, but neither is moved to change their position and accept that the Psychological View has more going for it (and the Self-Understanding View less) than Schechtman originally contended. Schechtman thinks her case could be better expressed, and then the deficiencies of the Psychological View will be manifest. That view is committed to Locke�s insight about the importance of phenomenological connections to identity, but cannot do justice to this insight and as a result fails to explain things that it should.enCopyright Johns Hopkins University Press. Publisher granted permission to reproduce the article as published.Personal identityNarrative theoryPsychological continuity theoryLockeSchechtmanArticle