Omoge, Michael2021-09-212021-09-212021Michael Omoge (2021) Naturalised modal epistemology and quasi-realism, South African Journal of Philosophy, 40:3, 229-241, DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.194955610.1080/02580136.2021.1949556https://hdl.handle.net/10566/6745Given quasi-realism, the claim is that any attempt to naturalise modal epistemology would leave out absolute necessity. The reason, according to Simon Blackburn, is that we cannot offer an empirical psychological explanation for why we take any truth to be absolutely necessary, lest we lose any right to regard it as absolutely necessary. In this article, I argue that not only can we offer such an explanation, but also that the explanation will not come with a forfeiture of the involved necessity. Using �squaring the circle� as evidence, I show that, contrary to quasi-realism, absolute necessity will not be left out in attempts to naturalise modal epistemology.enquasi-realismnaturalise modalepistemologyempirical psychologicalArticle