Beck, Simon06/04/201606/04/20162014Beck, S. et al. (2014). Transplant thought-experiments: two costly mistakes in discounting them. South African Journal of Philosophy, 33(2): 189-19902580136https://hdl.handle.net/10566/2105http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2014.923685�Transplant� thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory�s opponents.enThis is the author version of an article published in the South African Journal of Philosophy. The published article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2014.923685.Thought experimentsPsychological Continuity TheoryMarya SchechtmanPersonal identityArticle