Lerm, Jessica05/06/201705/06/20172013Lerm, J. (2013). The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction: my two sense(s). South African Journal of Philosophy, 32(2): 137-1480379-6175https://hdl.handle.net/10566/2925http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2013.810033The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is very well established and widely employed in the metaethical literature. However, I argue that there are actually two different senses of the distinction at large: the hetero-/homogeneous sense and the dependence/independence sense. The traditional, unqualified distinction ought, therefore, to be amended, with each use of the distinction being stipulated as used in either the hetero-/homogeneous sense or the dependence/independence sense. Careful analysis of various metaethics supports that there are these two senses - analysis, in particular, of a neo-Kantian metaethic, according to which reasons are agent-relative in the dependence sense but agent-neutral in the homogeneous sense, and - perhaps surprisingly - of Utilitarianism, according to which reasons are agent-neutral in the independence sense but agent-relative in the heterogeneous sense.enThis is the author-version of the article published online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2013.810033Agent-relativeAgent-neutralMetaethicalNeo-KantianArticle